Vos v. Washington, 2004 Ohio 1388 (Ohio App. 3/17/2004)
| Decision Date | 17 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 03-CO-20. |
| Parties | Donald L. Vos, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Village of Washingtonville, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Donald L. Vos, Pro Se, 190 Washington Street, Washingtonville, Ohio 44490, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Attorney Craig G. Pelini, PELINI & FISCHER, 8040 Cleveland Ave., NW, Suite 400, North Canton, Ohio 44720, Attorney Ian Robinson, 600 E. State St., P.O. Box 590, Salem, Ohio 44460, for Defendants-Appellees.
Hon. Gene Donofrio, Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich, Hon. Cheryl L. Waite.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Donald L. Vos, appeals a decision of the Columbiana County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Village of Washingtonville, et al. on appellant's claims of denial of due process of law, defamation and slander, a "civil conspiracy", libel, and for a declaratory judgment that the Village of Washingtonville acted and is still acting outside the scope of the law.
{¶2} Appellant's claims stemmed from events at a Village of Washingtonville council meeting. Appellant alleged that the Village of Washingtonville, through its council members, acted in a civil conspiracy to defame appellant and to keep appellant from being placed on the council. Appellant also alleged that appellees denied him of his constitutionally protected rights of due process of law and equal protection under the law guaranteed him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
{¶3} Apparently, appellant alleged that he was wrongfully denied a seat on the Village of Washingtonville council, because someone held a meeting in violation of the Sunshine Law, R.C. 121.22, and presented a newspaper article that said that he was a felon and that felons could not serve on village council. Appellant claimed that he was denied due process and equal protection because he was not invited to council to explain the charge of "corruption of a minor in Pennsylvania". Appellant further complained that his reputation was damaged by this libel or slander.
{¶4} Appellant also brought forth some complaints about the appropriateness of the appellees' counsel and pleadings. Appellant contended that because there were two lawyers filing two answers without the withdrawal of one that the second answer was not an appropriate answer and is in default. He also argued that because some of these council members were not bonded that they were not actually in office and therefore their counsel, Attorney Ian Robinson, could not represent all of them at the same time.
{¶5} Each party filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On March 12, 2003, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, dismissing all of appellant's claims. This appeal followed.
{¶6} Initially, it should be noted that appellant's pro se brief does not even approach minimal compliance with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has previously noted:
{¶7} Jancuk v. McHenry (Aug. 24, 1999), 7th Dist. No. 95 C.A. 131.
{¶8} Appellant sets forth seventeen "ITEMS" in his brief which this Court will construe as assignments of error. Where some of these "ITEMS" raise similar issues of fact and legal analysis, they will be addressed together.
{¶9} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, at ¶24. Summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1976), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46, 8 O.O.3d 73; Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶10} * * *" (Emphasis sic.) Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264.
{¶11} The "portions of the record" or evidentiary materials listed in Civ.R. 56(C) include the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact that have been filed in the case. The court is obligated to view all the evidentiary material in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267.
{¶12} Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264.
{¶13} Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. A "material fact" depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc. (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202.
{¶14} In appellant's first assignment of error, appellant appears to argue that since appellees were represented by two different attorneys, and both filed separate answers, neither answer was properly filed and appellees were, therefore, in default.
{¶15} Appellant filed his initial complaint on September 24, 2002, and an amended complaint on October 28, 2002. Attorney Craig G. Pelini filed an answer on November 24. 2002, on behalf of the Village of Washingtonville. On November 26, 2002, Attorney Ian Robinson, listing himself as co-counsel, also filed an answer, in addition to counterclaims, on behalf of the Village of Washingtonville and all of the other individually named defendants.
{¶16} Appellant cites no case law or statutory authority that would support his assertion that this was improper. Appellant cites irrelevant and inapplicable local rules of court and Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶17} In appellant's second assignment of error, appellant appears to argue that Attorney Ian Robinson should not have been permitted to file an answer on behalf of appellees because there was a conflict of interest. Appellant fails to identify the source of the alleged conflict. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶18} In appellant's third assignment of error, appellant argues that Attorney Ian Robinson should not have been permitted to answer for appellees because he failed to "deny" many of the claims and factual assertions made by appellant. The primary purpose of an answer is to deny plaintiff's claims. In his answer, Attorney Robinson denied all but one of the twenty paragraphs set forth in appellant's complaint. Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶19} In appellant's fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court held him to a stricter standard of compliance with the rules of procedure than he did with counsel for appellees. Trial courts have broad discretion in settling procedural matters. Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 209, 214, 16 O.O.3d 244, 404 N.E.2d 752. He alleges that the trial court made him bring his filings into compliance with the local rules, while granting leave to Attorney Robinson to file certain responsive motions. Given the numerous and poorly constructed filings made by appellant, including his appellate brief before this court, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, appellant's fourth assignment of error is without merit.
{¶20} In appellant's fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not addressing some of his pending motions before granting summary judgment. On November 25, 2002, appellant filed a "MOTION TO SUPPRESS ANY AND ALL OF THE PAST CRIMINAL RECORD OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT...
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