Voter v. Voter

• Decision Date: 29 January 2015
• Docket Number: Docket No. Pis–14–72.
• Parties: Patricia Mae VOTER, v. Dexter R. VOTER.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

109 A.3d 626

2015 ME 11

Patricia Mae VOTER

v.Dexter R. VOTER.

Docket No. Pis–14–72.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 27, 2014.

Decided: Jan. 29, 2015.

Kirk D. Bloomer, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Dexter R. Voter.

Benjamin K. Cabot, Esq., C.W. & H.M. Hayes, Dover–Foxcroft, for appellee Patricia Mae Voter.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.^*

Opinion

HJELM, J.

[¶ 1] When Patricia Mae Voter and Dexter R. Voter divorced in 2006 after twenty-seven years of marriage, the divorce judgment required Dexter to pay Patricia general spousal support of $1,300 per month until he retired, when the amount of support would become “1/2 of his retirement earnings.” After Dexter retired in 2013, he filed a post-judgment motion to modify the amount of his spousal support obligation. The District Court (Dover–Foxcroft, Stitham, J. ) issued an order clarifying the meaning of “retirement earnings,” and then, after a testimonial hearing, denied the motion to modify. Dexter appeals those orders, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Patricia and Dexter's divorce in October 2006 was uncontested. The divorce judgment made reference to the parties' written settlement agreement, which provided for spousal support and the disposition of real and personal property. The judgment required Dexter to pay spousal support as follows:

The Defendant [Dexter] shall pay the Plaintiff [Patricia] as general spousal support $1,300.00 a month starting 10/15/06 and the 15th of each month thereafter until the first of the following to occur:

1. the Plaintiff re-marries, or;

2. the Defendant retires.

In the event that on the date that the Defendant retires the Plaintiff has not re-married, then the Defendant shall on a monthly basis, pay the Plaintiff as general spousal support 1/2 of his retirement earnings until the Plaintiff re-marries.

Patricia has not remarried and therefore remains entitled to receive support pursuant to the judgment.

[¶ 3] Dexter was employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) until he became disabled and stopped working in April 2013. He then began to receive Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits and retirement benefits from the USPS. Additionally, he receives retirement benefits from the United States Air Force (USAF) and rental income from a house he owns, which is occupied by the son of his present wife. He also expects to receive Social Security benefits when he reaches the age of sixty-five.

[¶ 4] In May 2013, Dexter filed a motion to modify the amount of his spousal support obligation pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 951(4) (2014), alleging a change of circumstances because he is no longer employed. At a case management conference on the motion, both parties agreed that the court would issue an order clarifying the term “retirement earnings” as it appears in the judgment. In October 2013, a non-testimonial hearing was held, where Dexter contended that only money earned during retirement, such as the rental income, should be considered “retirement earnings,” while Patricia argued that spousal support should be based on all categories of income that Dexter received during retirement, including his SSD benefits and his USPS and USAF retirement benefits. The court issued a written order clarifying the judgment by defining “retired” and “retirement earnings,” as used in the judgment, as follows:

The Defendant shall be considered to be retired when he ceases to be regularly employed for whatever reason.

Retirement earnings consist of all monies paid to or received by the Defendant. This would include but not be limited to: his Social Security, Social Security disability, postal retirement, military retirement, rental income, and monies received for any of his labor.

[¶ 5] In January 2014, a testimonial hearing was held on Dexter's motion to modify. There, Dexter argued that his support obligation should either be terminated altogether or reduced to a monthly payment of $700.¹ Following the hearing, the court issued a written decision denying Dexter's motion. The court found that Patricia's annual income, including the spousal support that Dexter was required to pay, was approximately $29,000 and that without spousal support, her only source of income was Social Security, which amounted to less than $9,000 annually. At the time of the hearing, she was seventy-five years old and lived in subsidized housing for the elderly. Dexter, who was sixty-two years old at the time of the hearing, received more than $51,000 annually from retirement and disability benefits and rental income. He had remarried, and his new wife received annual retirement benefits of $20,000. The court concluded that the amount of spousal support required by the judgment was both necessary to maintain a “reasonable standard of living” for Patricia and within Dexter's financial capability.

[¶ 6] Dexter filed a timely appeal from the court's order.² He contends that the court erred by construing “retirement earnings” too broadly and by denying his motion to modify his support obligation.³

II. DISCUSSION

A. Clarification of the Judgment

[¶ 7] Dexter first argues that the court erred by clarifying the spousal support provisions of the judgment and, as part of that clarification, by construing “retirement earnings” to include income in addition to his USPS and USAF retirement benefits.⁴

[¶ 8] In order to determine whether the court's clarification of the divorce judgment was erroneous, we use a two-part test. First, we determine “whether the prior judgment was ambiguous as a matter of law.” Thompson v. Rothman, 2002 ME 39, ¶ 6, 791 A.2d 921 (quotation marks omitted). This is a de novo determination that centers on whether the language at issue is “reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Burnell v. Burnell, 2012 ME 24, ¶ 6, 40 A.3d 390 (quotation marks omitted). If the judgment is ambiguous, then “the court has the inherent and continuing authority” to clarify the judgment, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 582 A.2d 976, 977 (Me.1990), and we consider, using an abuse of discretion standard, whether the clarification “is consistent with its language read as a whole and is objectively supported by the record.” Thompson, 2002 ME 39, ¶¶ 6–7, 791 A.2d 921. Where, as here, the judge who clarified the judgment is also the judge who initially issued the judgment, we give particular deference to the clarification because “it is the intention of the court that issued the judgment originally that is controlling.” Id. ¶ 8.

[¶ 9] Here, for two reasons, the court did not err in issuing the order clarifying the judgment. First, because Dexter agreed that the court should issue an order clarifying the meaning of “retirement earnings,” he has waived his contrary argument that it was improper for the court to issue an order of clarification. See Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102.

[¶ 10] Second, a de novo examination of the phrase “retirement earnings” reveals that it is ambiguous. That language can reasonably be construed to mean all income that Dexter receives during retirement, regardless of its source or the reason why he is entitled to receive it. Alternatively, it could mean a smaller universe of benefits, such as benefits that Dexter receives because of his past employment.

Even that more narrow view of “retirement earnings” is ambiguous because, in addition to retirement benefits paid through Dexter's former employers, it may or may not include governmental benefits such as Social Security, which are also based on Dexter's employment history. We therefore conclude that the language in the judgment is ambiguous as a matter of law and that the court did not err by clarifying that language.

[¶ 11] The court's construction of the term “retirement earnings” to mean “all money paid to or received by” Dexter following his retirement, including SSD and rental income, was also not erroneous.

[¶ 12] The court's order did not set out its analysis or findings of fact, but because neither party moved for the issuance of findings or conclusions, we assume that the court made the findings and conclusions necessary to support its decision. See Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 23, 955 A.2d 202. The spousal support ordered in the judgment was clearly intended to be general support, because its evident purpose was “to provide financial assistance to a spouse with substantially less income potential than the other spouse so that both spouses can maintain a reasonable standard of living after the divorce.” 19–A M.R.S. § 951–A(2)(A) (2014) ; see also Miele v. Miele, 2003 ME 113, ¶ 10, 832 A.2d 760 (holding that the purpose of general spousal support is “to provide maintenance and support for the future needs of the payee spouse” (quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, in its order denying the motion to modify, the court confirmed that the purpose of spousal support in this case was to allow Patricia “to maintain a reasonable standard of living which would be comparable to the reasonable standard of living [Dexter] should be able to arrange to maintain.” Particularly given the long duration of their marriage, the court's broad construction of the term “retirement earnings” is consistent with its original objective, reflected in the judgment, of providing Patricia with a meaningful amount of ongoing support for the rest of her life unless and until she were to remarry.

[¶ 13] If the definition of “retirement earnings” were as limited as Dexter contends, it would exclude significant sources of income that he would become eligible to receive, and the amount of support that Patricia would receive as a percentage of Dexter's total income would be materially reduced following his retirement. Any such exclusion would artificially deprive Patricia of the material support necessary to maintain a reasonable standard of living, and it would disproportionately and unfairly work to Dexter's financial benefit by protecting certain sources of income...