Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors, S034268

• Decision Date: 23 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. S034268,S034268
• Citation: 884 P.2d 645,35 Cal.Rptr.2d 814,8 Cal.4th 765
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 884 P.2d 645 VOTERS FOR RESPONSIBLE RETIREMENT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TRINITY COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 814

35 Cal.Rptr.2d 814

8 Cal.4th 765, 884 P.2d 645

VOTERS FOR RESPONSIBLE RETIREMENT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TRINITY COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S034268.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 23, 1994.

Alfred S. Wilkins, Weaverville, for plaintiff and appellant.

John W. Anderson, County Counsel, David L. Cross, District Attorney, and W. James Wood, Deputy Dist. Atty., for defendants and respondents.

Lita O'Neill Blatner, County Counsel, Tulare, Kathleen Bales-Lange, Deputy County Counsel, Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel, Santa Clara, James Rumble, Deputy County Counsel, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel, San Diego, John Sansone, Deputy County Counsel, Dwight L. Herr, County Counsel, Santa Cruz, Margie Valdez, William Corman, San Jose, and David L. Edwards, Redding, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

In this case we are called upon to decide whether a county's decision to enter an agreement with the California Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), to enable their employees to join PERS's retirement plan, is subject to approval or rejection by the local electorate via referendum. Respondent Trinity County (the County) advances several constitutional and statutory arguments designed to establish that decisions of a county board of supervisors regarding employee compensation generally, and decisions regarding the adoption or implementation of memoranda of understanding (sometimes referred to hereafter as MOU's) between public employers and employees in particular, are not subject to referendum. Appellant Voters for Responsible Retirement (VFRR) contends, on the contrary, that a referendum is in this instance constitutionally compelled.

We conclude that article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution, contrary to contentions of both parties, neither restricts nor secures the local right of referendum on employee compensation decisions. We also conclude that Government Code section 25123, subdivision (e), when read in conjunction with the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, does restrict the people's right of referendum in this case, in which the ordinance that would be the subject of referendum specifically relates to the implementation of a memorandum of understanding between the County and its employee associations.

I. Facts

On November 5, 1991, the Trinity County Board of Supervisors (the Board) approved a three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Trinity County Employees' Association, representing most of the County's clerical, professional and service employees, and an MOU with the Trinity County Road Employees' Association, skilled trades unit, representing various county employees in maintenance, engineering and related fields (hereafter referred to collectively as the Employee Associations). Section 8.00.00 of both MOU's provided that, effective July 1, 1992, the County would implement the PERS "2 percent at 60" retirement program (wherein an employee could retire at age 60 with an annuity of 2 percent of his or her salary for every year of employment) for all members of the Employee Associations. Provisions were made to return employee contributions from the previous retirement plan. Section 8.02.00 further provided that the County would pay the employee's contribution to PERS. Section 8.03.00 imposes certain conditions on the final approval of the amended PERS contract implementing the new retirement plan, which will be discussed at greater length in part III.C. of this opinion.

The approval of these MOU's was done in conjunction with the negotiation of an amendment to the County's contract with PERS. The previous contract had included only members and employees of the deputy sheriffs' association. The amendment would place the employees from the Employee Associations in PERS, under the terms of the 2 percent at 60 plan in a manner consistent with the provisions of the MOU's stated above. On November 19, 1991, pursuant to Government Code section 20457, the Board adopted Resolution No. 153-91, declaring its intent to approve an amendment to the PERS contract. On December 17, 1991, pursuant to Government Code sections 20460 and 20461, ¹ the Board approved the contract amendment through the passage of Ordinance No. 1161.

Concern over the new financial commitment the County was assuming in funding the pension plan sparked opposition. In a December 27, 1991, letter to a citizen of the County, the County Administrative Officer noted that there was substantial community concern that the new retirement plan created a burden the County would be unable to bear without cutting back on essential services, including the "closure of the County Hospital." The County Administrative Officer gave assurance that no such service cutbacks would occur, and that implementation of the PERS plan was necessary for maintaining a stable and high quality county workforce.

Despite these assurances, citizens of the County collected and timely filed with the County Clerk petitions with signatures calling for a referendum on Ordinance No. 1161. On January 29, 1992, the clerk presented the petitions to the Board and certified that sufficient signatures had been obtained to require the Board to either repeal the ordinance or put it up for a referendum vote pursuant to Elections Code sections 3753 and 3754. On the advice of county counsel, the Board refused to do either. A group of Trinity County citizens calling itself the Voters for Responsible Retirement (VFRR) thereupon filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court to compel the Board to put the ordinance to referendum. The County argued that, for various reasons, Ordinance No. 1161 was not the type of ordinance subject to referendum, and the trial court agreed, denying the writ.

The Court of Appeal reversed. It found that article XI, section 1, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution dictated that issues of employee compensation be subject to referendum. Moreover, it rejected contentions that there were valid statutory exemptions from the referendum requirement applicable to Ordinance No. 1161. We granted the County's petition for review to consider the important question of the applicability of referenda to county employer-employee agreements.

II. Article XI, Section 1, subdivision (b)

Both the County and VFRR contend that the answer to the question whether a referendum should be permitted in this case lies in the proper understanding of article XI, section 1(b) of the California Constitution (article XI, section 1, subdivision (b)). As shall be seen, that constitutional provision supports neither side's contention.

Article XI, section 1(b) states in full: "The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected assessor, and an elected governing body in each county. Except as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 4 of this article, each governing body shall prescribe by ordinance the compensation of its members, but the ordinance prescribing such compensation shall be subject to referendum. The Legislature or the governing body may provide for other officers whose compensation shall be prescribed by the governing body. The governing body shall provide for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees." (Italics added.)

The County and its amici curiae argue that the specific mention of the referendum power in connection with the compensation of members of the governing body implies that other employee compensation decisions are not subject to referendum. In support of this position, amici curiae for the County produce the ballot argument by the proponents of the November 1970 amendment to article XI, section 1(b), in which reference to referendum for the governing body's compensation first appeared. As will appear, we find these arguments unpersuasive.

In interpreting the meaning of a constitutional amendment, we seek to give effect to the intention of the electorate enacting it by looking at the language of the amendment and by examining the ballot argument and other indicia of voter intent. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 16, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) In this case, the language of article XI, section 1(b) is admittedly ambiguous--neither explicitly affirming nor negating the right to referendum regarding the compensation of employees other than the members of the boards of supervisors. We concede that section 1(b) is susceptible to the County's interpretation. However, once the amendment is understood in its proper context, such an interpretation is implausible.

Article XI, section 1(b) was originally enacted in June of 1970, as part of a comprehensive revision of article XI, governing the constitutional prerogatives of and limitations on California cities and counties. The predecessor to article XI, section 1(b) was the former article XI, section 5, which, as explained further below, was amended in 1933, and subsequently, to give greater local autonomy to the setting of salaries for county officers and employees, removing that function from the centralized control of the Legislature. Nonetheless, the June 1970 enactment still mandated the Legislature to set the salary of the boards of supervisors, which were in turn to set the salaries of all other officers and employees. In November of 1970, in an action of the Legislature, the amendment to article XI, section 1(b) was placed on the ballot to provide that the supervisors should set their own salaries, subject to referendum, and it was approved.

Amici curiae for the County maintain that, if the June 1970 version of article XI, section 1(b) already had subjected decisions on employee compensation to referendum, the Legislature would not have needed to include the explicit language on referendum for the boards of supervisors'...