De Votie v. Iowa State Fair Bd., 41651.
| Citation | 216 Iowa 281,249 N.W. 429 |
| Decision Date | 20 June 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 41651.,41651. |
| Parties | DE VOTIE v. IOWA STATE FAIR BOARD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Polk County; A. A. Herrick, Judge.
Action for damages brought by an administrator for the wrongful death of the intestate-decedent. It is charged that the death resulted from the negligent conduct of the “Iowa State Fair Board,” which is named as the sole defendant. Counsel made a special appearance for the purported defendant, and prayed that the proceeding be dismissed as against the purported defendant on the ground that the “Iowa State Fair Board” is a mere name for one of the agencies of the state of Iowa, and that it was not suable for damages for that reason. The district court sustained the special appearance and dismissed the petition. The plaintiff has appealed.
Affirmed.
Gillespie & Moody, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Edw. L. O'Connor, Atty. Gen., Le Roy A. Rader, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Carl J. Stephens, of Des Moines, for appellee.
The decedent lost his life as the result of an accident on the fair grounds on the occasion of the Iowa state fair in August, 1930. Among the attractions provided for the fair in that year was a certain stunt advertised as the It was foolish enough to have furnished the basis for a claim of damages by any victim thereof as against any suable entity responsible therefor. Two airplanes collided in the air. One of them fell to the earth, and thereby injured several spectators, including the decedent of the plaintiff. Upon the record, there is no lack in the elements of the cause of action, except that there can be no cause of action in a practical sense, without a suable defendant. The contention of the plaintiff is that the Iowa state fair board is such. The allegation of fact and of argument is that the purported defendant is a voluntary corporation; that it owns property; that it takes the gate receipts into its exclusive dominion, and that it uses the same and pays it forth to whom it will; and that it does so independently of any control by the superior authority of the state. The validity of this contention is the one question presented on this appeal.
Concededly, if the fair board be an arm or agency of the state, it is not suable. We have then only to consider the question: Is it, or is it not, an arm of the state?
We have heretofore answered the question both directly and indirectly. In Hern v. Iowa State Agricultural Society, 91 Iowa, 97, 58 N. W. 1092, 24 L. R. A. 655, we answered it directly in the affirmative. We did likewise in State v. Cameron, 177 Iowa, 262, 158 N. W. 470, L. R. A. 1916F, 578. We answered the same question indirectly in Hollingshead v. Board of Control, 196 Iowa, 841, 195 N. W. 577, which was an action brought against the board of control. We answered it likewise in Cross v. Donohoe, 202 Iowa, 484, 210 N. W. 532, which was an action against the superintendent of the insane hospital. We answered it likewise again in Long v. Highway Commission, 204 Iowa, 376, 213 N. W. 532, which was an action against the highway commission, as such. In view of these settled precedents, we are not disposed to discuss at length the pros and cons of the question. The contention of appellant that the purported defendant is a voluntary corporation interested as such in the actual ownership of property is thoroughly negatived in the cited cases. This board is purely a legislative creation. The method and purpose of its creation are set forth in chapter 135, Code 1931 (section 2873 et seq.). It will be noted that the Governor of the state is made a member of the board ex officio. The same is true of the secretary of agriculture. The method of the selection of its officers and employees is provided. No one is allowed to have any stock therein nor to have any pecuniary interest therein other than the statutory salaries, which are awarded to certain of the officials. No power is conferred upon any member thereof to do aught than to perform the specified duties assumed by the state and imposed upon this agency. We are not alone in our holding on this question. It has arisen at various times in other states, and has been passed upon by their respective courts. These courts have spoken with one voice and have held without exception to the same effect as we ourselves have done. One apparent exception to this rule should be noted....
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