Vought v. Williams

• Decision Date: 15 April 1890
• Citation: 24 N.E. 195,120 N.Y. 253
• Parties: VOUGHT et al. v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

120 N.Y. 253

24 N.E. 195

VOUGHT et al.

v.WILLIAMS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 15, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fifth department.

Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the fifth department affirming a judgment entered upon a decree of the special term. The action was for the specific performance of a contract to purchase real estate. In March, 1853, Giles B. Richardson died intestate, seised of the property in question, leaving, surviving him, his widow, Mary P. Richardson, and two sons, William H. and Giles B., Jr. Giles B., Jr., was born on May 16, 1840, and lived with his mother at Pittsford, Monroe county, until 1863. At that time he was unmarried, was in poor health, was very dissipated, and had no business. In May, 1863, he left home and about a week thereafter was seen by an acquaintance in the city of Albany. He was then in a destitute condition, and in want of clothing, and stated that he was going to Troy to procure work. From that time until the trial of the action he had not been seen, and none of his friends or members of his family ever heard anything of him. In April, 1875, his mother and brother, by deed, conveyed the property in question to the plaintiff's grantors. The deed recited that the grantors were the sole heirs at law of Giles B. Richardson, deceased, and that it was intended to vest the absolute title to said lands in the party of the second part; that the deed was executed upon the assumption that Giles B. Richardson, Jr., was actually dead. The contract between the parties to this action for the sale of the land provided that the title was to be ‘first-class,’ and was to be passed upon by a lawyer or conveyancer to be designated by the defendant. The defendant refused to take the property on the ground that the title was not a marketable one. Further facts appear in the opinion.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-MARKETABLE TITLE-PRESUMPTION OF DEATH.

Specific performance of a contract to purchase real estate, in which it is stipulated that the title shall be ‘first-class,’ will not be enforced where it appears that there is an outstanding right in one who had left his home 24 years before, being at the time 23 years old, unmarried, in feeble health, and very dissipated, and who was seen shortly after in destitute circumstances, and never heard from again, and where it further appears that no opposing title has ripened by adverse possession. Affirming 46 Hun, 638.

James B. Perkins, for appellants.

Geo. F. Yeoman, for respondent.

BROWN, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

The provision that the title was to be passed upon by the defendant's lawyer or conveyancer did not make the decision of the conveyancer that the title was good a condition precedent to the right of the plaintiff to enforce the performance of the contract. If a decision to that effect was refused unreasonably, the failure to obtain it would not defeat a recovery; and it would have been unreasonably refused if in fact, and beyond all dispute, the title was good. Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. 395;Thomas v. Fleury, 26 N. Y. 26;City of Brooklyn v. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 475;Bowery Nat. Bank v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 336;Boiler Co. v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 388, 4 N. E. Rep. 749; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 22 N. E. Rep. 406. The stipulation that the title should be ‘first-class' could mean nothing more than that it should be marketable. The trial court refused to find that Giles B. Richardson, Jr., was dead, and it did find that there was no evidence ‘as to whether or not he was dead except the presumption, if any, which is raised from the facts hereinbefore stated with regard to him.’ It found as conclusion of law ‘that the title of the plaintiff to said premises, depending, as it does, upon the disputed question of fact, is not a marketable title, and that the defendant was entitled because of said defect to refuse to carry out the said contract.’

It is an established princlple of law that every purchaser of real estate is entitled to a marketable title, free from incumbrances and defects, unless he expressly stipulates to accept a defective title. Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535;Delavan v. Duncan, 49 N. Y. 485. A marketable title is one that is free from reasonable doubt. There is reasonable doubt when there is uncertainty as to some fact appearing in the course of its deduction, and the doubt must be such as affects the value of the land, or will interfere with its sale. A purchaser is not to be compelled to take property the possession of which he may be compelled to defend by litigation. He should have a title that will enable him to hold his land in peace, and, if he wishes to sell it, be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will arise to disturb its market value. Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234;Shriver v. Shriver, 86 N. Y. 575, and cases cited; Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56;Fleming v. Burnham, 100 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. Rep. 905; Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N. Y. 415, 20 N. E. Rep. 387; Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 22 N. E. Rep. 233; Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. St. 436; Dobbs v. Norcross, 24 N. J. Eq. 327. ‘If a title depends upon a fact which is not capable of satisfactory proof, a purchaser cannot be compelled to take it.’ Shriver v. Shriver, supra. It was said, however, in Ferry v. Sampson, supra, that ‘the rule is not absolute that a disputable fact not determined by the judgment is in every case a bar to the enforcement of the sale. It depends in some degree upon discretion. If the existence of the alleged fact which is supposed to cloud the title is a possibility, merely, or the alleged outstanding right is a very...