Voulters v. Voulters
| Decision Date | 08 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–CA–00745–COA.,2014–CA–00745–COA. |
| Citation | 196 So.3d 1019 |
| Parties | Lee VOULTERS, Appellant v. Leslie Dayle VOULTERS, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
David M. Sessums, Penny B. Lawson, J. Mack Varner, Vicksburg, attorneys for appellant.
William R. Wright, Ridgeland, Amanda Jane Proctor, attorneys for appellee.
Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.
BARNES, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. In this domestic-relations case, Dr. Lee Voulters appeals the judgment of the Warren County Chancery Court related to maintenance of a $1.08 million life insurance policy for his former wife, Leslie Voulters. Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. In April 2004, Leslie and Lee Voulters were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences after twenty-six years of marriage. Leslie did not work outside of the home but raised the children; Lee is a physician. The parties executed an agreement for the custody and maintenance of their remaining minor child and for property settlement (the Agreement), which was incorporated into the judgment of divorce. Lee was ordered to pay $10,000 per month in alimony until reaching the lump sum of $1.08 million. Lee was also to maintain a life insurance policy for $1.08 million, naming Leslie as the primary beneficiary. The Agreement did not provide for termination of the insurance upon payment of the alimony, and specified that the “respective rights and obligations of the parties hereunder are deemed independent and may be enforced independently irrespective of any of the other rights and obligations set forth herein.”
¶ 3. In March 2013, Leslie filed a petition for contempt with the chancery court alleging Lee had failed to pay the last two months of lump-sum alimony payments of $10,000 for February and March 2013. He had also failed to provide proof of life-insurance coverage for Leslie. In response, Lee filed an answer and cross-complaint requesting, among other matters, that the chancery court interpret Lee's obligation to maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of $1.08 million for Leslie, and that Leslie reimburse him $30,000 that he had advanced to her on the sale of the marital home. Lee argued that the life insurance was to protect Leslie's lump-sum alimony payments in the event of his premature death, and that she would no longer have an insurable interest once the alimony was paid in full.
¶ 4. In January 2014, trial was held on Leslie's contempt petition and Lee's cross-complaint. Lee testified that he originally purchased the policy in 1996 when still married to Leslie, with her as the initial beneficiary. The policy had a face value of $1.5 million. When Lee remarried in July 2004, approximately three and one-half months after his divorce from Leslie, he made his new wife the beneficiary of the policy. On August 6, 2004, Lee executed an “Assignment of Life Insurance Policy as Collateral” (Assignment) listing Leslie as Assignee, which gave her “[t]he sole right to collect from the Insurer the net proceeds of the Policy when it becomes a claim by death or maturity.” The Assignment also provided the following:
This [A]ssignment is made and the Policy is to be held as collateral security for any and all liability of the undersigned, or any of them, to the Assignee, either now existing or that may hereafter arise in the ordinary course of business between any of the undersigned and the Assignee (all of which liabilities secured or to become secured are herein called “Liabilities”).
¶ 5. Over the objection of Leslie's counsel, both parties testified at trial about the intent of the life-insurance provision in the Agreement. Lee claimed the intent of the policy was to insure payment of the lump-sum alimony in the event of his death before all payments had been made. Leslie testified that the policy was to remain in effect permanently, with her as the beneficiary. She claimed the policy was to provide security for her since she had been a stay-at-home mother for twenty-six years and did not have a college degree. She thought it was to protect the alimony, as well as an entitlement independent from the lump-sum alimony.
¶ 6. The parties' attorneys negotiated the Agreement. Leslie's attorney testified:
¶ 7. On May 12, 2014, the chancellor entered a final judgment finding Lee in contempt for his failure to pay Leslie the $20,000 in alimony payments. Lee was also ordered to maintain the life insurance policy in the amount of $1.08 million naming Leslie as beneficiary, and pay $5,000 in attorney's fees. Leslie was ordered to pay Lee $30,000 for the advance on the marital home. Lee appealed solely on the issue of maintaining a permanent $1.08 million life insurance policy naming Leslie as beneficiary.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. A chancellor's interpretation and application of the law is reviewed de novo. Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So.2d 190, 192 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001). Here, the resolution of the case is tied to the interpretation of the Agreement. Since a property-settlement agreement is a contract, and the interpretation of a contract is a matter of law, the standard of review is de novo. Warwick v. Gautier Util. Dist., 738 So.2d 212, 215 (¶ 8) (Miss.1999) ; McLeod v. McLeod, 84 So.3d 804, 807 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Meek v. Warren, 726 So.2d 1292, 1293–94 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) ).
ANALYSIS
¶ 9. Lee makes three arguments regarding his life-insurance obligation to Leslie. First, he claims that the trial court erred in relying on Sheppard v. Pace, 757 So.2d 173 (Miss.2000), to find that the absence of language in the Agreement on the termination of Lee's obligation to maintain the life insurance policy means a continuing obligation to maintain it. Second, he argues the trial court should have found that the Agreement was ambiguous about the life insurance policy because there was no express term of duration. Finally, Lee maintains that once he satisfied the payment of the lump-sum alimony, Leslie no longer held an insurable interest in Lee's life, so he should not be required to maintain the policy. We shall discuss each of Lee's arguments in turn.
¶ 10. The pertinent provisions of the Agreement are as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 11. The chancellor found the language of the parties' Agreement unambiguous, and that it did not “expressly state that the life-insurance provision would terminate upon the final payment of lump sum alimony.” Also, she stated the life-insurance obligation was not tied to the alimony, but was a separate obligation set forth in a separate section of the Agreement. Moreover, the alimony did not...
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