Voyles v. Knight
| Decision Date | 08 October 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 22623,22623 |
| Citation | 220 Ga. 305,138 S.E.2d 565 |
| Parties | Tempie P. VOYLES et al. v. Agnes KNIGHT et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Bloch, Hall, Groover & Hawkins, Ellsworth Hall, III, Macon, for plaintiffs in error.
Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Macon, for defendants in error. Syllabus Opinion by the Court
1. As a general rule, the owner of land in fee has the right to use the property for any lawful purpose, and any claim that there are restrictions upon such use must be clearly established, and such limitations of use will be strictly construed, as limitations thereon by implication are not favored. Thompson v. Glennwood Community Club, Inc., 191 Ga. 196, 12 S.E.2d 623; David v. Bowen, 191 Ga. 467, 12 S.E.2d 873; Shoaf v. Bland, 508 Ga. 709, 69 S.E.2d 258; Lawson v. Lewis, 205 Ga. 227, 52 S.E.2d 859; Richardson v. Passmore, 207 Ga. 572, 63 S.E.2d 392. Indeed, any doubt as to the restrictions on use will be construed in favor of the grantee. Randall v. Atlanta Advertising Service, 159 Ga. 217, 125 S.E. 462; England v. Atkinson, 196 Ga. 181, 26 S.E.2d 431.
2. The restrictive instrument was signed by all the owners, witnessed and recorded. It provided that these covenants shall run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all persons claiming under them until January 1, 1979. The first paragraph listed the owners of the land, and the second clause is, 'The said subdivision is intended for residential purposes only.' Then it recites that in consideration of 'the foregoing and the benefits flowing to the present and future owners' the following protective and/or restrictive covenants which shall be applicable to all subdivided lots shown on the plat referred to shall be imposed. Thereafter, it provides that: Other restrictions in the instrument are irrelevant here.
Thus is presented a duly executed and recorded restrictive instrument made by the owners of the land. The words residence and residential relate solely to use. No structure could become a residence or residential in the absence of its use by people residing therein. At precisely the time when people fail to live therein it ceases to be a residence. Put another way to fit the facts of this case, irrespective of its former use, or the nature of the structure, when the building here involved ceased to be a residence and became exclusively 'a day nursery,' it was no...
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Roth v. Connor
...manifest no ambiguity exists, and it is only in cases of ambiguity that the rule of strict construction applies." Voyles v. Knight, 220 Ga. 305, 306(2), 138 S.E.2d 565 (1964). "Where a restrictive covenant in a deed is involved, the legal presumption is in favor of the free use of the prope......
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Metzner v. Wojdyla
...352 (Ky.1970) (operation of residential child care facility for 15 to 25 children violated restrictive covenant); Voyles v. Knight, 220 Ga. 305, 138 S.E.2d 565 (1964) (operation of residential child care facility in vacant house adjacent to defendant's residence violated restrictive covenan......
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Douglas v. Wages
...activities of a commercial nature would not be permitted. See Taylor v. Smith, 221 Ga. 55(3), 142 S.E.2d 918 (1965); Voyles v. Knight, 220 Ga. 305(2), 138 S.E.2d 565 (1964). Non-commercial recreational activities, however, are within the purpose of a residence and are permitted under the re......
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Davies v. Curry, 27600
...215 Ga. 827, 828, 114 S.E.2d 38; Goodwin v. First Baptist Church, 225 Ga. 448, 451, 169 S.E.2d 334. The plaintiffs cite Voyles v. Knight, 220 Ga. 305, 306, 138 S.E.2d 565, to support their contention that the breach of a restrictive covenant against the 'use' of property for a business purp......