Vrooman v. Vrooman

• Decision Date: 16 July 1998
• Citation: 244 A.D.2d 122,676 N.Y.S.2d 290
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 7054 In the Matter of Christine VROOMAN, Respondent, v. Dean VROOMAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 290

676 N.Y.S.2d 290

244 A.D.2d 122, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 7054

In the Matter of Christine VROOMAN, Respondent, v. Dean VROOMAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

July 16, 1998

Sanford N. Finkel, Troy, for appellant.

Christine Vrooman, Albany, in person.

MIKOLL, J.P., MERCURE, WHITE, PETERS and CARPINELLO, JJ.

CARPINELLO, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Duggan, J.), entered December 31, 1996, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, for modification of a prior child support order.

Petitioner, the custodial parent of the parties' minor son, sought a modification of a prior child support order entered upon consent of the parties in April 1995. Respondent, who receives $37,284 per year in Social Security disability benefits and is sent another $550 per month in dependant benefits on behalf of his son, agreed in the stipulation to, inter alia, pay the son's benefits to petitioner for child support. Thereafter, on December 8, 1995 petitioner, who currently earns $20,441 per year, filed a modification petition alleging a change in circumstances because she had lost income from a second job and the parties' son had increased medical and recreational expenses.

Following a hearing, the Hearing Examiner dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed objections and Family Court reversed, making new findings of fact (see, Family Ct.Act § 439[e][ii] ), and held that the original stipulation was invalid and, in any event, petitioner had established a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant upward modification of child support. Relying upon the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of Graby v. Graby, 87 N.Y.2d 605, 641 N.Y.S.2d 577, 664 N.E.2d 488, Family Court found that respondent could not utilize his dependent's Social Security income to avoid his child support obligation and that a deviation from the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter CSSA) was not required; accordingly, the court directed respondent to pay the sum of $244 biweekly plus an additional $56 biweekly for arrears. Respondent now appeals.

Respondent argues that petitioner knowingly waived application of the CSSA as part of the April 1995 stipulation and, since she has not established a sufficient change of circumstances, she is bound by the stipulation. "It is well established that a party seeking to modify the child support provisions of a *** stipulation *** has the burden of proving that the agreement was unfair or inequitable when entered into or that an unanticipated and unreasonable change of circumstances has occurred resulting in a concomitant increased need or that the needs of the children are not being adequately met" (Matter of Cook v. Bornhorst, 230 A.D.2d 934, 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d 945; see, Matter of Lunman v. Lomanto, 239 A.D.2d 770, 657 N.Y.S.2d 479; see also, Family Ct.Act § 461[b][ii] ). Where a valid stipulation is entered into, a rebuttable presumption exists that the amount of child support therein is the correct amount to be awarded (see, Family Ct.Act § 413[1][h] ).

Here, however, we agree with Family Court's ruling that the parties' April 1995 stipulation was unfair and inequitable at its inception. Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time and she testified that her only substantive discussions as to the correct amount of child support were with respondent's attorney. Given the conclusion that the stipulation is invalid, there is no need to consider whether petitioner also demonstrated a change in circumstances.

In the absence of a valid stipulation, we now consider the appropriateness of the child support order directed by Family Court pursuant to the CSSA ¹ and conclude that Family Court did not abuse its discretion. In Matter of Graby v. Graby, 87 N.Y.2d 605, 641 N.Y.S.2d 577, 664 N.E.2d 488, supra, the Court of Appeals, in construing the statutory framework of Family Court Act § 413, noted that a child's dependent benefits were not intended to displace a parent's statutory obligation to support his or her child and cannot be included as part of the noncustodial parent's income when considering the "[c]ombined parental income" (...