W.C. ex rel. Sue C. v. Cobb County School Dist.

Decision Date21 December 2005
Docket NumberNo. 1:04-CV-547-TWT.,1:04-CV-547-TWT.
Citation407 F.Supp.2d 1351
PartiesW.C., By and Through his parent, his next friend and his parent personally SUE C., Plaintiffs, v. COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Dawn R. Smith, Zimring & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Sylvia Germaine Eaves, Neeru Gupta, Brock Clay Calhoun Wilson & Rogers, Marietta, GA, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

THRASH, District Judge.

This is an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, claiming that the Cobb County School District has not provided W.C. a free and appropriate public education. It is before the Court on the Defendant Cobb County School District's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 41]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 30, 2003, the Plaintiff, W.C.,1 filed a due process request seeking public reimbursement from the Cobb County School District for his tuition at a private school. He alleges a denial of his right to a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") under the IDEA in the Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") that was proposed for him by the School District for the 2003-04 school year and for the services that were provided him in previous years. The limitations period for an IDEA claim is the two year statute of limitations that applies to personal injury actions. Mandy S. ex rel. Sandy F. v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 205 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1366 (N.D.Ga.2000), aff'd, 273 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, only events occurring after July 30, 2001, are at issue in this proceeding. The relevant period begins with the 2001-02 academic year, when the Plaintiff was in the fourth grade.

In response to the due process request, a State of Georgia Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") heard testimony and arguments from both parties and made findings of fact and conclusions of law based on this record. The ALJ ultimately determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with a FAPE and that reimbursement for private school placement was not warranted. The Plaintiff appealed that decision to this Court and further alleged a violation under section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For actions brought pursuant to the appeals procedure in the IDEA, the district court: "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The Plaintiff submitted an untimely Motion to Submit Additional Evidence, which was denied by the Court. The Defendant has filed this Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A district court may decide an IDEA case at summary judgment even where facts are in dispute, based on the preponderance of the evidence. Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the usual summary judgment rules under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 do not apply. Id. In reviewing an ALJ's decision, "due weight" should be given to the determinations made during the administrative hearing. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The court must consider the administrative findings of fact, but has the discretion to accept or reject them. Doe v. Alabama State Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 657 n. 3 (11th Cir.1990); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir.1988). When exercising this discretion, the Eleventh Circuit has further noted that a district court is required to respect an ALJ's findings when they are "thoroughly and carefully made." Cory D. ex rel. Diane D. v. Burke County School Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir.2002). To prove by a preponderance of the evidence "simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence." U.S. v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993)).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

Having reviewed the administrative record under the foregoing standard, this Court credits the ALJ's findings of fact and holds that they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The Plaintiff, W.C., is a resident of the Cobb County School District. He has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), episodic dyscontrol syndrome and Asperger's Syndrome — an autism spectrum disorder that results in an inability to process information relevant to social interactions. While in pre-kindergarten, the School District determined that the Plaintiff was eligible to receive special education services under the eligibility category of Emotional/Behavior Disorder. From then up until second grade, the Plaintiff was placed in self-contained classrooms with other non-handicapped students. The School District conducted annual IEP meetings to assess his progress. Then, during the first semester of second grade, the Plaintiff displayed increasingly disruptive and violent behaviors, including throwing furniture, throwing pencils at classmates, attempting to overturn file cabinets on top of other students, and headbutting and punching his teacher. He was again evaluated and his eligibility status was changed to Severe Emotional/Behavior Disorder. He was then transferred to a psychoeducational program within the School District known as H.A.V.E.N Academy.

H.A.V.E.N. is a program designed to help disabled students acquire improved social and behavioral skills. It begins as an in-center program where students receive intensive services and instruction in these areas. Once they achieve a level of fluency in those skills, the students have the opportunity to apply and practice their skills in transition or merit classrooms that are located in regular schools. As appropriate, the students also have the opportunity to access regular education classes in these schools. Once they have achieved a higher level of mastery of the appropriate social and behavioral skills in the merit classrooms, the students may return to their home schools.

As part of its educational program, H.A.V.E.N. utilizes a token economy system, where the students earn points or lose points based on their behavior. The system is individualized to the particular behavioral objectives of each student. A student can use his points to buy items from the school store or buy special privileges. This kind of system is effective for students with autism because it can be generalized so that the student can use his points to access privileges meaningful to him. The School District's H.A.V.E.N. program has proven extremely successful in transitioning students to less restrictive environments. Over the past three years, 150 students have exited the program and of these, very few have returned. All members of H.A.V.E.N.'s staff undergo a five-day workshop to become familiar with the program and all of its teachers are certified.

The Plaintiff was first diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome by his psychiatrist, Dr. Carpenter, in March of 2001 during fourth grade. As a result of this new information, the School District conducted a new evaluation and drafted an addendum to the Plaintiff's previous psychological evaluation. The school's psychologist made recommendations to modify the Plaintiff's home and educational setting to address his needs. The School District was already providing for many of these recommendations through the token system at H.A.V.E.N. Academy. The school subsequently convened a meeting of the Plaintiff's IEP committee and drafted an addendum to his IEP based on this new diagnosis. The committee, which included the Plaintiff's mother, agreed that this IEP was appropriate.

A. Fourth Grade

During fourth grade, the Plaintiff continued to attend the H.A.V.E.N. program, as specified in his most recent IEP. He began the year in a merit classroom at Sedalia Park Elementary, taught by a former H.A.V.E.N. instructor, Ms. Hudacko. She had a masters degree in special education and professional teaching experience in other psychoeducational programs. The Plaintiff's behavior in the fall semester required two returns to the Fitzhugh Lee School, the in-center location for H.A.V.E.N. students.

In December, he went back to Sedalia Park and remained there for the rest of the year. The classroom never contained more than ten students and always included a paraprofessional to assist the teacher. The Plaintiff and his classmates used daily point sheets to identify daily goals, and at the end of the day, the teacher would conference individually with each of them and determine the amount of points they had received. The students took home a note each day reflecting this. The Plaintiff received academic instruction in the merit classroom and attended regular education classes such as art and P.E. The Plaintiff had trouble with the noise in P.E., but did "extremely well" in the class according to Ms. Hudacko. The Plaintiff also had trouble with the noise in the cafeteria, but the School District made accommodations for him by allowing him to watch television in the lunchroom or to eat in his classroom.

Academically, the Plaintiff was expected to do the same level of work as regular education students. His work was guided by the Georgia Quality Core Curriculum, which applies to all regular education students. The merit classroom teacher modified his assignments to meet his individual needs, but the outcome of the assignments was the same. To improve his...

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