W.C. v. J.C. (In re J.C.)

• Decision Date: 20 September 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-CA-00237-COA
• Citation: 347 So.3d 1188
• Parties: In the MATTER OF J.C.: W.C., Appellant v. J.C., Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

347 So.3d 1188

In the MATTER OF J.C.:W.C., Appellant

v.J.C., Appellee

NO. 2021-CA-00237-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

September 20, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PHILIP MANSOUR JR., Greenville

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CHARLES E. WINFIELD, ASHLYN BROWN MATTHEWS, Starkville

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. W.C. filed a commitment affidavit to have his wife, J.C., involuntarily committed. After entering into an agreed order for commitment, J.C. completed treatment and was discharged eighteen days later. J.C. moved to set aside the agreed order and dismiss the action, to which W.C. objected.

The chancery court granted J.C.’s request and found that W.C. had no standing to object. W.C. appeals from the order of dismissal, asserting that the chancery court erred when it (1) found J.C.’s motion was timely; (2) failed to protect the interests of J.C. and W.C.’s minor children; (3) determined that W.C. had no standing to object to J.C.’s motion to set aside the order; and (4) granted J.C.’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. W.C. and J.C. are married and share three minor children. In December 2019, W.C. filed an affidavit for involuntary commitment against J.C., which stated that while not diagnosed with a mental illness, she was exhibiting bizarre behavior and posed a threat of physical harm to herself or others. Pursuant to Mississippi law, a writ was issued, and J.C. was taken into custody for pre-evaluation screening by physicians.¹ The screening was performed, and a "certificate of physician/psychologist" was filed with the chancery court. According to the certificate, J.C. "did not meet statutory commitment criterion." The doctors handwrote on the certificate that it was their opinion that "[t]here is no evidence of mania or psychosis. She is no danger to herself or others. She is not in need of mental treatment."

¶3. In spite of this assessment, at the commitment hearing J.C.’s attorney signed an agreed order for commitment on her behalf. By statute, J.C. should have been present at the hearing,² and the hearing should have been dismissed when the examiners determined there was no need for treatment.³ The agreed order required J.C. to immediately enter Pine Grove Behavioral Health and "follow any and all treatment and discharge recommendations the center required." Pine Grove was required to release J.C.’s records to the court "to the extent necessary to allow said [c]ourt to determine whether" J.C. was compliant with the order, and to inform the court if J.C. did not comply. The order also required J.C. to provide proof to the chancery court that she was enrolled in the program. It also stated that "upon successful completion of the requirements of this order this petition will be dismissed and this file permanently sealed."

¶4. J.C. completed eighteen days of treatment at Pine Grove and was discharged. In November 2020, approximately eleven months later, J.C. filed a motion to set aside the agreed order and dismiss the cause of action because the order called for ongoing treatment that she did not need. J.C. attached two exhibits to her motion: (1) the certificate of the examining physician from the original commitment hearing; and (2) a form from the Professionals Health Network Inc., an organization that was required to monitor J.C. after the commitment proceedings in order for her to keep her professional orthodontist license. The Professionals Health Network form stated that J.C. had "no diagnosis," was on no medication (explicitly expressing that there was "no need for meds"), had high compliance with all recommendations, had no high risk issues, and had "no need for intervention." The doctor handwrote on the form, "[Patient] is a psychologically stable, high functioning professional, with no liabilities or need for meds." This form was completed in June 2020. At the hearing on the motion to set aside the agreed order in December 2020, W.C. objected, but he was informed by the chancery court on its own motion that he had no standing to object. The chancery court dismissed the original action in a one-page order that did not list the reason for dismissal. W.C. filed his response in opposition to J.C.’s motion to set aside the agreed order, and later filed a motion to reconsider or alter or amend the judgment and for other relief. In February 2021, the chancery court issued an order denying the motion to reconsider or alter or amend the judgment. Aggrieved, W.C. appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. "When reviewing a decision of a chancellor, this Court applies a limited abuse of discretion standard of review." Britt v. Orrison , 323 So. 3d 1135, 1144 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson , 266 So. 3d 1058, 1060 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ). "We will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact unless they are not supported by substantial evidence." Koestler v. Koestler , 976 So. 2d 372, 378 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Pacheco v. Pacheco , 770 So. 2d 1007, 1009 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) ). "Additionally, we will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless they were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous." Id. (citing Vaughn v. Vaughn , 798 So. 2d 431, 433 (¶9) (Miss. 2001) ). "We review questions of law de novo." Id. (citing Ladner v. Necaise , 771 So. 2d 353, 355 (¶3) (Miss. 2000) ). "We review a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence for abuses of discretion." Id. at 380 (¶26) (citing Burton v. State , 875 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) ). "Motions that seek relief from judgment pursuant to [ Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60 ] are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the only question asked on appeal is whether the trial court's ruling on such a motion amounts to an abuse of discretion." Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Bolles , 535 So. 2d 56, 58 (Miss. 1988) (citing Stringfellow v. Stringfellow , 451 So. 2d 219, 221 (Miss. 1984) ).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the agreed order was properly dismissed.

¶6. W.C. raises a number of issues that attack the validity of the court's decision to dismiss the agreed order of commitment. They are consolidated under this heading. J.C. counters that the chancery court properly dismissed the agreed order for three reasons: (1) per section 41-21-71, the commitment proceedings should have been dismissed when J.C. was examined and found not to need commitment, making the agreed order void under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) ; (2) because J.C. completed the terms of the agreed order, by the order's own language it should have been dismissed under Rule 60(b)(5) ; or (3) because J.C.’s circumstances fall within the broad category of "any other reason justifying relief from the judgment" under Rule 60(b)(6). Although these arguments are all persuasive, we need to address only one to determine if the order dismissing the agreed order was appropriate. In this case, we find that J.C. successfully completed the terms of the agreed order and that it was properly dismissed.

¶7. Rule 60(b)(5) states:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application ....

M.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). "The grant or denial of a 60(b) motion is generally within the discretion of the trial court, unless the judgment in question is found to be void. In that case the trial court has no discretion; it must set the void judgment aside." Sartain v. White , 588 So. 2d 204, 211 (Miss. 1991) (citing Overbey v. Murray, 569 So. 2d 303, 306 (Miss. 1990) ).

A. Whether the motion to set aside was untimely filed.

¶8. Here W.C. first argues that the chancery court had no jurisdiction to hear J.C.’s motion to set aside the agreed order because the motion was untimely filed. "A motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), (5), or (6) must be made ‘within a reasonable time’ after the entry of the judgment." Ravenstein v. Ravenstein , 167 So. 3d 210, 216 (¶10) (Miss. 2014) (quoting M.R.C.P. 60(b) ). "What constitutes a reasonable time period is determined on a case-by-case basis." Indymac Bank F.S.B. v. Young , 966 So. 2d 1286, 1290 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Jenkins v. Jenkins , 757 So. 2d 339, 344 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) ). "The court must take into account whether the opposing party has been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief and whether there is good reason for the defaulting party's failure to take appropriate actions sooner." Id.

¶9. W.C. argues that eleven months after the entry of the agreed order was an unreasonable amount of time for J.C. to delay before filing her motion to set aside said order. But W.C. has pointed to no prejudice he has incurred as a result of the eleven-month delay. Additionally, it seems reasonable for a chancery court to reconsider an order after eleven months when the terms require completion of treatment, like the agreed order in this case. Furthermore, the statutes that govern persons in need of mental treatment expressly grant the chancery court "continuing jurisdiction over a person committed to an inpatient or outpatient treatment program under this chapter for one (1) year after completion of the treatment program." Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-104 (Rev. 2018). Given this record and law, we find that the chancery court had jurisdiction over the matter.

B. Whether the chancery court failed to enforce the terms of the agreed order .

¶10. W.C. next argues that the chancery court did not enforce the terms of the agreed order because the court required Pine Grove to supply the chancery court with documentation "to the extent necessary to allow said [c]ourt to determine whether Respo...