W. Plaza, LLC v. Tison
| Citation | 364 P.3d 76,184 Wash.2d 702 |
| Decision Date | 25 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 90179–1.,90179–1. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | WESTERN PLAZA, LLC, Petitioner, v. Norma TISON, Respondent. |
Walter Hartvig Olsen Jr., Olsen Law Firm PLLC, Puyallup, WA, Philip Albert Talmadge, Sidney Charlotte Tribe, Talmadge/ Fitzpatrick/Tribe, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Dan Robert Young, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
Jack W. Hanemann Jr., Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, for Other Parties.
¶ 1 This is an unlawful detainer action subject to the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord–Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW. At issue is whether a provision in a mobile home lot lease that purports to limit the landlord's ability to increase the rent when the lease renews conflicts with the MHLTA and whether the lease violates the statute of frauds. We hold that the provision is permissible under the MHLTA and that the writing and signatures on the lease satisfy the statute of frauds applicable to rental agreements for mobile home lots.1 We affirm the Court of Appeals.
¶ 2 Norma Tison entered into a lease for a mobile home lot in October 2001. The lease was executed on a preprinted form prepared by Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington. It was a one-year lease with several handwritten provisions that Tison specifically negotiated. Relevant to this case, the lease called for a monthly rent of $345 and contained a negotiated provision (hereafter rent cap provision) that stated, "Every other year, rent will be raised no more than $10.00 for remaining tenancy."
¶ 3 Petitioner Western Plaza LLC purchased the mobile home park in February 2008. At that time, Tison's monthly rent was $375.3 In March 2009, Western Plaza sent Tison a notice that her rent would be increased to $405 starting in July 2009. Tison began paying $385 per month, consistent with the rent cap provision; the parties dispute how these payments were considered by Western Plaza, and there is nothing in the record that indicates whether Western Plaza contemporaneously rejected any of Tison's $385 payments or indicated to her that it considered those payments partial. Regardless, this dispute does not affect the outcome of this appeal.4
¶ 4 In June 2011, Western Plaza informed Tison that her rent would increase to $495 starting in October 2011. Relying on the rent cap provision, Tison attempted to pay the $395 she believed was due.5 Western Plaza rejected her payments and initiated this unlawful detainer action.
¶ 5 Tison moved for summary judgment, arguing that Western Plaza was bound by the rent cap provision. Western Plaza argued that the rent cap provision was not enforceable because it conflicted with the MHLTA and violated the statute of frauds. The trial court denied Tison's motion for summary judgment and resolved the unlawful detainer action in Western Plaza's favor. The Court of Appeals reversed. W. Plaza, LLC v. Tison, 180 Wash.App. 17, 322 P.3d 1, review granted, 181 Wash.2d 1022, 336 P.3d 1165 (2014). We granted Western Plaza's petition for review and now affirm.
¶ 6 The issue before us is whether the rent cap provision in Tison's lease is prohibited by the MHLTA, chapter 59.20 RCW. We are also asked to determine whether the rent cap provision violates the statute of frauds. To answer these questions, we apply well-established principles of statutory interpretation to chapter 59.20 RCW. These principles lead us to conclude that the MHLTA does not prohibit the rent cap provision and that Tison's lease does not violate the statute of frauds applicable to her mobile home lot lease. Further, we award Tison reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to RCW 59.20.110.
¶ 7 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wash.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015). The court discerns legislative intent from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ).
¶ 8 The MHLTA controls the legal rights, remedies, and obligations arising from a rental agreement between a landlord and tenant regarding a mobile home lot. Western Plaza argues that the MHLTA does not allow the rent cap provision in Tison's lease to be enforced. We disagree because the MHLTA does not prohibit a properly executed agreement that limits the frequency of such rent increases.
¶ 9 RCW 59.20.090(2) provides, "A landlord seeking to increase the rent upon expiration of the term of a rental agreement of any duration shall notify the tenant in writing three months prior to the effective date of any increase in rent." By its plain language, RCW 59.20.090(2) does not give a landlord an immutable right to increase rent; it is a "limitation" on rent increases. McGahuey v. Hwang, 104 Wash.App. 176, 182, 15 P.3d 672 (2001). The parties to an individual lease are free to set further limits. Cf. Little Mountain Estates Tenants Ass'n v. Little Mountain Estates MHC, LLC, 169 Wash.2d 265, 269 n. 2, 236 P.3d 193 (2010). Furthermore, RCW 59.20.060, which sets out the required and prohibited provisions in MHLTA leases, specifically discusses rent increases and does not prohibit rent cap limitations like the one in Tison's lease. See RCW 59.20.060(2)(c). The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the MHLTA does not prohibit the rent cap provision.
¶ 10 Washington's statute of frauds is purely statutory. Labor Hall Ass'n v. Danielsen, 24 Wash.2d 75, 87, 163 P.2d 167 (1945). This issue, therefore, is one of statutory interpretation. "Our fundamental purpose in construing statutes is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature." In re Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wash.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011). We determine legislative intent from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d at 9–12, 43 P.3d 4.
¶ 11 There are two statutes of frauds that are potentially applicable to the Tison lease: RCW 59.04.010, titled "Tenancies [6 ] from year to year abolished except under written contract"; and RCW 59.20.060, titled "Rental agreements—Required contents—Prohibited provisions."7 (Boldface omitted.) Though neither is called a statute of frauds, these statutes govern the formal requirements for creating a valid lease. In deciding which of these statutes of frauds to apply to the MHLTA, we conclude that a lease under the MHLTA should be governed by the statute of frauds in the MHLTA.
¶ 12 RCW 59.20.060 requires that a lease be in writing and be signed by the parties. It provides in relevant part:
RCW 59.20.060 is clearly a statute of frauds because it includes the same formal elements required by the common law statute of frauds.Compare RCW 59.20.060, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 2.2 (1977). Neither this statute nor chapter 59.20 RCW mentions the necessity of an acknowledgement, and we have never interpreted the MHLTA to require acknowledgement.
¶ 13 RCW 59.04.010 is the general tenancies statute of frauds (chapter 59.04 RCW is titled "Tenancies" (formatting omitted)). RCW 59.04.010 refers expressly to tenancies and leases; it is a special statute of frauds that creates an exception to, and takes the place of, the general real estate statute of frauds, RCW 64.04.010,8 for tenancies. Danielsen, 24 Wash.2d at 87, 163 P.2d 167 (). It provides:
Tenancies from year to year [9 ] are hereby abolished except when the same are created by express written contract. Leases may be in writing or print, or partly in writing and partly in print, and shall be legal and valid for any term or period not exceeding one year, without acknowledgment, witnesses or seals.
¶ 14 RCW 59.04.010 requires a lease to be in writing; leases over one year are legal if they are in writing and acknowledged. As discussed below, the MHLTA presumes that a lease is for one year and that any lease automatically renews. See RCW 59.20.090(1). Under Washington law, any automatic lease renewal must be added to the term of the lease for determining compliance with the statute of frauds. Danielsen, 24 Wash.2d at 85, 163 P.2d 167. Thus, if RCW 59.04.010 applied to MHLTA leases, the presumption would be that every manufactured home lot lease would need to be acknowledged. Tison's lease satisfies the requirements of only the MHLTA statute of frauds.
¶ 15 The plain language of chapter 59.20 RCW, supported by the structure of Title 59 RCW, the context in which the statute appears, and the purpose of the MHLTA all support our conclusion that the MHLTA statute of frauds is the only statute of frauds that applies to...
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