W.U. Tel. Co. v. Wilson
Decision Date | 08 November 1893 |
Parties | WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. WILSON. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Escambia county; James F. McClellan Judge.
Action by Charles M. Wilson against the Western Union Telegraph Company for a failure to transmit and deliver a message. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
The following rule, formulated in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341: 'Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be either such as may fairly and substantially be considered as arising naturally, i. e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it,'--held to be applicable to the contracts of telegraph companies for the transmission and delivery of telegraphic messages, and, consequently, that, for its breach of a contract to transmit or deliver an unexplained cipher or otherwise unintelligible message, such company is liable only for nominal damages, or at most for the sum paid it for the transmission and delivery thereof. Telegraph Co. v Hyer, 22 Fla. 637, 1 So. 129, overruled. Mabry, J dissenting.
COUNSEL Mallory & Maxwell, for appellant.
John C. Avery, for appellee.
The appellee sued the appellant in the circuit court of Escambia county, in case, for damages for its failure to transmit and deliver a telegraphic message in cipher. The suit resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $688.88, and therefrom the defendant telegraph company appeals.
The declaration alleges as follows: 'That the Western Union Telegraph Company, a corporation, the defendant, on the 12th day of December, 1887, was engaged in the business of transmitting telegraphic messages between Pensacola, Fla., and New York, in the state of New York, and in the delivery thereof to other cable and telegraph companies for transmission to Liverpool, England, where the said plaintiff had a regular merchant broker or agent, to wit, one A. Dobell, through whom the plaintiff negotiated, by means of such messages, the sale in Europe of cargoes of lumber and timber, the plaintiff being then and there a timber and lumber merchant at the city of Pensacola. That on said day the plaintiff delivered to the defendant, and the defendant received from him at its office in the city of Pensacola, and undertook to transmit and cause to be transmitted, and it was its duty to transmit and cause to be transmitted, to the said A. Dobell, the following cipher message: 'Dobell, Liverpool: Gladfulness--shipment--rosa--bonheur--luciform--banewort--margin,'--which the said Dobell would have understood, and the plaintiff intended to be an offer of a cargo of lumber and timber from said port of Pensacola for sale through the said Dobell in Europe, and the said Dobell would have sold the same for the plaintiff on the terms of said offer at a profit to the plaintiff of twelve hundred dollars, but the defendant failed and neglected to send the said message, in violation of its duty to the plaintiff, and to the plaintiff's loss of $1,200,' and therefore he sues, etc.
At the trial the plaintiff, over the defendant's objection, was permitted to testify, in establishment of the damages claimed, that he had to sell his cargo of lumber in Europe upon the market for the best price he could get, which was 52 shillings a load, and which amounted to $630.84 less than the price at which he offered same for sale in the message failed to be sent. The overruled objection of the defendant to this testimony was that the damage sought to be shown thereby was too remote, and was not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the alleged making of the contract for the transmission of said message. To this ruling the defendant excepted, and it is assigned as error. The question presented is, what is the proper measure of damages to be recovered of a telegraph company holding itself out to the service of the public, for hire, as the transmitter of messages by electricity, upon its failure to transmit or deliver a message written in cipher, or in language unintelligible except to those having a key to its hidden meaning. As this question has heretofore been passed upon by this court contrary to the views we find it impossible to become divested of, and, as we think, contrary to the great weight of the well-reasoned adjudications both in this country and in England, we take it up with diffidence that finds no palliative in the fact that the decision heretofore was by a divided court. Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 637, 1 So. 129. In that case the majority of the court, while approving the following well-established rule first formulated in reference to carriers of goods in the cause celebre of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341: 'Where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the damage which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be either such as may fairly and substantially be considered as arising naturally, i. e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it,'--hold that it has no applicability to the contracts of telegraph companies for the transmission of messages, and that such companies may be justly considered and treated as standing alone,--a system unto itself. The reasoning leading to this conclusion is as follows: The answer to all this is that the same argument is equally applicable as a reason why the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale should not apply to carriers of goods for hire. The carrier of goods, in contracting to carry and deliver, deals with the tangible. When he contracts, he has in his mind's eye, from the visible, tangible subject of his contract, what will be the probable damage resulting directly from a breach of it on his part, and so has the other party to the contract with the carrier. Therefore, the damage likely to flow from a breach by the carrier can properly be said to enter mutually into the contemplation of both parties to the contract, and it is this mutuality in the contemplation of both parties to the contract of the results that will be likely to flow directly from its breach that really furnishes that equitable feature of the rule that the damages thus mutually contemplated are in fact the damages that the law will impose for the breach. Why? Because, in the eye of the law, the parties having mutually contemplated such damages in going into such contract, those damages can alone be inferred as having entered into their contract as a silent element thereof. The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale is applicable alone to breaches of contract, and formulates concisely the measure of damages for the breach of those contracts that do not within themselves, in express terms, fix the penalty to follow their breach. In other words, this rule does nothing more than to give expression to that part of the contract which, in the eye of the law, has been mutually agreed upon between the parties, but concerning which their contract itself is silent. This essential leading feature of the rule, we think, was wholly lost sight of in the discussion of the question in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, supra, i. e. that the damages provided for under the rule arise ex contractu, and that, unless there is mutuality in all the essential elements that enter into or grow out of the contract, the whole fabric becomes unilateral, and abhorrent in the eyes of the law. The assertion, as a rule of law, that one party to a contract shall alone have knowledge that a breach of that contract will directly result in the loss of thousands of dollars, and that upon such breach he can recover of the other party to the contract all of such, to him, unforeseen, unexpected, uncontemplated, nonconsented-to damages, seems to us to be a complete upheaval of all the old...
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