W. World Ins. Co. v. Hoey
| Decision Date | 25 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-10220,Case No. 12-10630 |
| Parties | WESTERN WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. BURT HOEY d/b/a JENNY'S MARKET, JENNIFER LAMBERS, and MARY ARMBRUSTER, Defendants. MARY ARMBRUSTER, JENNIFER HOEY LAMBERS and BURT HOEY, individually and d/b/a JENNY'S MARKET, Plaintiffs, v. WESTERN WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.
These two declaratory actions arise out of a civil lawsuit by Mary Armbruster who had become permanently paralyzed as the result of an accident in September 2011. Armbruster's fingers of claimed liabilities were thereafter pointed to Jennifer Hoey Lambers and Burt Hoey, both of whom were identified by her as (1) putative tortfeasors in the September 2011 accident, and (2) insured persons under the Western World Insurance Company ("Western World") umbrella policies. When this insurance carrier's policies facially appeared to cover the claimed liabilities of Lambers and Hoey, Western World filed a lawsuit in this Court, seeking to obtain a judicialdeclaration that it did not have any legal obligation to assert a defense on behalf of Lambers and/or Hoey against Armbruster's allegations in the underlying lawsuit. On the same day, Armbruster, Lambers, and Hoey filed a similar lawsuit in the Washtenaw County Circuit Court of Michigan, with each of them seeking to obtain a judicial declaration that would impose a legal obligation upon Western World to undertake a legal defense in this case.
On February 13, 2012, Western World caused the state court action to be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Thereafter, these two actions were consolidated. Currently before the Court are the motions for summary judgment that have now been filed by Armbruster and Western World.
In the fall of 2011, Mary Armbruster responded to an advertisement for a job that had been placed in a local newspaper by Hoey, who had sought to hire a person with experience with horses. This position, as advertised, required the successful applicant to handle the hay ride responsibilities on weekends. Armbruster was ultimately hired by Hoey, and trained to drive a hay wagon by another employee, who spent a day of instructing and watching her practice. In addition to conducting the hay rides, Armbruster was hired to run the pony rides and to help other employees in other areas of the enterprise, including picking pumpkins, cutting corn stalks, bagging apples, and labeling food jars. All necessary tools or equipment were provided by Hoey.
On September 24, 2011, Armbruster, while driving a hay ride wagon, became involved in an accident which caused her to sustain a permanently paralyzing spinal injury from the waist down.
At the time of the accident, Hoey had maintained a commercial general liability insurance policy that had been issued to him by Western World. This policy provided that Western Worldwould cover Hoey for any "bodily injury" damages for which he became legally obligated to pay. It also acknowledged a duty to defend him against any lawsuit arising out of those damages. However, the coverage was subject to the following exclusions; namely, (1) employee or volunteer worker bodily injury exclusion; (2) temporary worker bodily injury exclusion; and (3) independent contractor's exclusion. The employee or volunteer bodily injury exclusion states as follows:
The temporary worker bodily injury exclusion similarly states that the insurance policy does not apply to any claim arising out of bodily injury to a temporary worker. The independent contractor exclusion also states that the insurance does not apply to any claim arising out of the operation of an independent contractor.
Special definitions are included for the following relevant terms that are found within the language of the exclusions:
After her accident, Armbruster filed a negligence action against Hoey and Lambers in Washtenaw County Circuit Court of Michigan. Soon thereafter, Armbruster, Hoey, and Lambers sought a declaration that Western World must provide indemnification, as well as a legal defense for them. On the same day, Western World filed a similar declaratory action in this Court, looking for a declaration that would determine that it is not obligated to provide indemnification or a defense in this litigation. Thereafter, Armbruster's previously filed state court declaratory action was consolidated into the action that is now pending before this Court.
The purpose of the summary judgment rule, as reflected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The entry of a summary judgment is proper only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is 'material' for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties." Aqua Grp., LLC v. Fed. Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citing Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)). In order for a dispute to be genuine, it must contain evidence upon which a trier of the facts could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2004). When assessing a request for the entry of a summary judgment, a court "must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987). The entry of a summary judgment is appropriateif the nonmoving party fails to present evidence which is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Thus, the moving party has the initial obligation of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of a material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must "come forward with some probative evidence to support its claim and make it necessary to resolve the differences at trial." Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The presence or the absence of a genuinely disputed material fact must be established by (1) a specific reference to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or (2) a "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a request for declaratory judgment relief, jurisdiction is not automatic. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J & L Lumber Co., 373 F.3d 807, 812 (6th Cir. 2004). A court is permitted to decline jurisdiction "even [if the lawsuit] otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites." Adrian Energy Assocs. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 481 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995)). In the context of insurance coverage diversity cases, the Sixth Circuit has declared that "declaratory judgment actions seeking an advance opinionon indemnity issues are seldom helpful in resolving an ongoing action in another court." Bituminous, 373 F.3d at 812 (quoting Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1986)). The potential danger of federal courts treading on states' efforts to regulate insurance companies has led the Sixth Circuit to "[hold] on a number of occasions that a district court should stay or dismiss complaints filed by insurance companies seeking a declaratory judgment as to their underlying state court lawsuits." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Professional Associates, PLC, 495 F.3d 266, 273 (6th Cir. 2007).
In order to assist a district court in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action, the Sixth Circuit has identified the following five factors for consideration:
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