Wabash R. Co. v. Sharpe
| Decision Date | 18 April 1906 |
| Citation | 76 Neb. 424,107 N.W. 758 |
| Parties | WABASH R. CO. v. SHARPE. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
The general rule is that a common carrier of goods insures their safe delivery to the consignee against loss or injury from whatever cause arising, except only the act of God or the public enemy.
A common carrier is responsible for injury to goods where the goods were exposed to injury by the carrier's inexcusable detention, and the carrier cannot in such case plead the act of God as a defense.
Commissioners' Opinion. Department No. 2. Error to District Court, Lancaster County; Cornish, Judge.
Action by Morton R. Sharpe against the Wabash Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.F. M. Hall and C. C. Marley, for plaintiff in error.
Mockett & Polk and O. B. Polk, for defendant in error.
May 19, 1903, Morton R. Sharpe delivered to the Wabash Railroad Company at Lafayette, Ind., 5,400 pounds of household goods for shipment to Lincoln, Neb. The goods were shipped from Lafayette on the 21st of May, were delayed in Hannibal, Mo., 24 hours for rebilling, and were delivered to the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, a connecting carrier at Kansas City, on May 26th and held in the yards by the latter company until May 31st, where they were practically destroyed by the great flood occurring at that time. The goods finally reached Lincoln June 18th, but in such condition as to be useless. This action was brought to recover the value of said goods, and judgment went in favor of the plaintiff for $865.80, from which judgment the company has taken error to this court.
It is claimed by the railroad company that they shipped the goods within a reasonable time and delivered them to the connecting carrier at Kansas City in good condition. This may all be true, and still it is no answer to the plaintiff's claim. The common carrier of goods insures their safe delivery to the consignee against loss or injury from whatever cause arising, excepting only the act of God and the public enemy. The delivery of the goods to the carrier in good order, and their arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes a prima facie case against the carrier. It then devolves upon it to show that the loss or damage was caused by the act of God or some other cause which would exempt it from liability. It may be conceded in the present case that the flood by which the goods were practically destroyed was an act of God, which, under ordinary circumstances, would relieve the company; but we think the rule supported by the weight of authority is that a common carrier is responsible for injury to goods by act of God, if he departs from his line of duty, and while thus in fault, and in consequence of that fault, the goods are injured by an act of God which would not otherwise have produced the injury. Or, as stated in one of the cases, a common...
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