Wacaster v. Wacaster

Decision Date13 March 1969
Docket NumberNo. 2219,2219
PartiesByron Eugene WACASTER, Appellant, v. Patricia Ann WACASTER, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Hal H. McCaghren, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Frederick E. Hollingsworth, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CROSS, Judge.

Appellant-defendant, Byron Eugene Wacaster, appeals an order entered in favor of the appellee-plaintiff, Patricia Ann Wacaster, on a petition for modification of a final decree relating to custody and support of children. We affirm.

The petition filed on behalf of plaintiff sought custody of a minor child of the parties previously awarded to the defendant by a final decree in a divorce proceeding, and in addition thereto support money therefor, as well as support money for a child born subsequent to the entry of the final decree. The petition for modification set forth as changed circumstances neglect of medical care and sexual molestation.

The defendant also by petition sought modification of plaintiff's visitation rights on grounds that plaintiff had sexually molested the child.

The trial court placed the child in the custody of the maternal grandparents, and ordered the defendant to pay $25 per week, $15 of which was for the support of the child previously awarded to the defendant, and $10 for support of the child born subsequent to the final decree.

On appeal the defendant questions the award of support money for the child born subsequent to the entry of the final decree, contending paternity and support therefor had been made an issue in the original divorce proceeding and is now res judicata.

Res judicata is a term which has been given a good many different meanings. Current usage apparently gives it a broad meaning which covers all the various ways in which a judgment in one action will have a binding effect in another. This includes the effect of the former judgment as a bar or merger where the latter action proceeds on all or part of the very claim which was the subject of the former. It also includes what has come to be known as 'collateral estoppel', the effect of a former judgment in a later action based upon a different claim or demand.

The most famous formulation of the distinction was made by Justice Field in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 1876, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195:

'In the former case the judgment if rendered on the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. * * * Such demand or claim having passed into judgment cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.

'But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only to those matters in issue or points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.'

The term 'merger' is used to describe the effect of a judgment in the plaintiff's favor. Restatement of Judgments § 45(a), comment a. The term 'bar' is used to describe the effect of a judgment on the merits for the defendant. Restatement of Judgments § 45(b), comment b. The concepts of bar and merger are sometimes referred to as the rule against splitting a single cause of action.

The term 'collateral estoppel' is used to describe the effect of a judgment as described in the second paragraph quoted above from Cromwell. Thus, it can be seen that the effect of a former judgment is a great deal broader in the second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.

Where the actions are upon different claims, the former operates as an estoppel only as to...

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12 cases
  • Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • July 22, 2010
    ...specifically to claim preclusion or it can refer generally to the preclusive effect of earlier litigation. See Wacaster v. Wacaster, 220 So.2d 914, 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (“Res judicata is a term which has been given a good many different meanings. Current usage apparently gives it a broad......
  • Willers ex rel. Powell v. Willers
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1998
    ...have been treated as supplementary petition). See, e.g., Marriage of Nelson, 27 Or.App. 167, 555 P.2d 806 (1976); Wacaster v. Wacaster, 220 So.2d 914 (Fla.App.1969); Wiles v. Wiles, 211 Or. 163, 315 P.2d 131 (1957); Effland v. Effland, 171 Kan. 657, 237 P.2d 380 (1951); Mack v. Mack, 91 Or.......
  • Mason v. Cuisenaire
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • February 9, 2006
    ...have been treated as supplementary petition). See, e.g., Marriage of Nelson, 27 Or.App. 167, 555 P.2d 806 (1976); Wacaster v. Wacaster, 220 So.2d 914 (Fla. App.1969); Wiles v. Wiles, 211 Or. 163, 315 P.2d 131 (1957); Effland v. Effland, 171 Kan. 657, 237 P.2d 380 (1951); Mack v. Mack, 91 Or......
  • Diplomat Electric, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Sup. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 29, 1970
    ...v. Hanscome, 158 U.S. 216, 221, 15 S.Ct. 816, 39 L.Ed. 956. 5 Chandler v. Chandler, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 697, 699; Wacaster v. Wacaster, Fla.App.1969, 220 So.2d 914, 916; Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, supra, at 333. 6 Wacaster v. Wacaster, Fla.App.1969, 220 So.2d 914, 916; Tomlinson v. Le......
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