Wade & Dunton Inc. v. Gordon.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1949 |
| Citation | 64 A.2d 422 |
| Parties | WADE & DUNTON, Inc. v. GORDON. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Androscoggin County.
Action by Wade & Dunton, Inc. against Reuel W. Gordon for breach of contract with automobile dealer not to sell or transfer title to automobile purchased for six months without first offering it to dealer at price paid less depreciation. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.
Benjamin L. Berman and David V. Berman, both of Lewiston, for plaintiff.
John G. Marshall, of Auburn, for defendant.
Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, MURCHIE, TOMPKINS, FELLOWS and MERRILL, JJ.
Defendant's exceptions in this case, heard by a single Justice of the Superior Court without the intervention of a jury, with the right of exceptions reserved on questions of law, allege as errors that there was no consideration for what was found to be a contract justifying the recovery allowed and that the provision of that contract for the payment of the $400 awarded as liquidated damages imposed a penalty having no connection with actual damages, none such having been suffered.
A breach of contract by the defendant is undoubted, if there was a contract. The plaintiff is an automobile dealer, holding the Studebaker franchise, so called. The defendant ordered a Studebaker car on August 16, 1946, signing a New Car Order and making a deposit of $50 against a purchase price which could not be determined until a car was available for delivery and decision was made as to what extra equipment, if any, was to be installed. The order was not binding upon the plaintiff until accepted by one of its officers, but there was express recital that the plaintiff might retain ‘deposits sufficient to cover liquidating damages' if it was cancelled by the defendant. When the order was signed the plaintiff was not requiring those to whom cars were sold to contract against their resale within a stated period, but that policy had been adopted some months prior to the sale in question.
The defendant's order was never accepted by the plaintiff unless acceptance is to be inferred from the fact that approximately 20 months after it was signed the plaintiff notified the defendant that a car was available. The date of the notification is not given in the testimony but the defendant's wife called at the plaintiff's place of business on Thursday, June 17, 1948, saw the car and ordered extra equipment. On June 19, 1948, the defendant wrote the plaintiff saying that he would be unable to take the car and would appreciate being advised when another was available.
The plaintiff received the letter on June 21, 1948. Later that day the defendant appeared, paid for the car, signed a contract undertaking not to sell or transfer title to it for a period of 6 months without first offering it to the plaintiff at the price paid ‘less depreciation’ at a stated rate, drove it away, and sold it in direct disregard of the contract. These facts are stipulated. The defendant did not take the stand. The record is silent as to the price obtained or the identity of the purchaser paying it.
The action was brought on the contract, quoted verbatim in the declaration. According to a recital of its preamble the defendant executed it ‘as a part of the consideration’ of the sale. The plea was the general issue with a brief statement describing the instrument signed as ‘a document’ and alleging that it was signed after the purchase of the car was completed; that it ‘provides for a penalty’; and that the plaintiff ‘has suffered no damages'.
While two issues are raised, one of them must be resolved within the established principles that factual decisions made by a trier of facts are conclusive, if there is any evidence to support them, Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me. 403, 84 A. 892; Graffam v. Casco Bank & Trust Co., 137 Me. 148, 16 A.2d 106; and that where no specific findings are made it must be assumed that a decision carries such findings as are necessarily involved in it. Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, supra. This disposes of the consideration issue. Assuming that the evidence would have supported a finding that the defendant had purchased and paid for the car...
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Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
...to sustain the factual findings. Rioux v. Employers Liability Assurance Co., 134 Me. 459, 465, 187 A. 753; Wade and Dunton, Inc. v. Gordon, 144 Me. 49, 51, 64 A.2d 422; Picken v. Richardson, 146 Me. 29, 32, 77 A.2d 191; D'Aoust Appellant, 146 Me. 443, 444, 82 A.2d 409; Central Maine Power C......
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Pacheco v. Scoblionko
...is a question of law and is reviewed accordingly by the Law Court. Interstate Industrial, 355 A.2d at 921; Wade & Dunton, Inc. v. Gordon, 144 Me. 49, 52, 64 A.2d 422, 423 (1949). On the facts of this case the Superior Court did not err in finding that the clause was unenforceable. The Scobl......
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Interstate Indus. Uniform Rental Service, Inc. v. Couri Pontiac, Inc.
...is to be treated as liquidated damages and so enforced, or as a penalty and disregarded, is a question of law (Wade & Dunton, Inc. v. Gordon, 144 Me. 49, 64 A.2d 422 (1949)) and we review accordingly. This Court has often said that an agreement made in advance of breach, fixing the damages ......
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Danby v. Hanscom
... ... Richardson v. Richardson, 146 Me. 145, 147, 78 A.2d 505; Wade & Dunton Inc. v. Gordon, 144 Me. 49, 51, 64 A.2d 422; Ayer v. Androscoggin ... ...