Wade v. American Nat. Ins. Co.

Decision Date23 October 2000
Docket NumberNo. A00A1206.,A00A1206.
Citation540 S.E.2d 671,246 Ga. App. 458
PartiesWADE et al. v. AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Cross & Rosenzveig, John P. Cross II, Bette E. Rosenzveig, Decatur, for appellants.

Finley & Buckley, Atlanta, Jerald R. Hanks; Hull, Towill, Norman, Barrett & Salley, James S. Weston, Augusta, for appellees.

SMITH, Presiding Judge.

In this "dog bite" case, Sherman and Cathy Wade filed an action on behalf of their minor son Matthew Wade after Matthew was bitten by a guard dog at the softball complex where Matthew and Sherman Wade worked. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, American National Insurance Company d/b/a Softball Country Club and Weston Management Corporation. The Wades appeal. Because we conclude that the record does not show the defendants had superior knowledge of a vicious temperament on the part of the dog, we affirm.

Construed in favor of the Wades as non-movants on motion for summary judgment, the following evidence was presented in the trial court. Sherman Wade was employed as a security officer by Softball Country Club. His 13-year-old son Matthew also worked part-time in the batting cage. On the night of the incident, Sherman accompanied Charlie Rogers, the club's assistant league director, into the club's office area to help Rogers count money received that night. Matthew was also present. This was the "normal routine" followed by Rogers and Sherman and Matthew Wade at the end of the evening. Rogers allowed. A dog "Champ," was used by the complex to guard equipment inside a fenced area. As he had done on prior occasions, Rogers allowed Champ into the room while Sherman and Matthew were present. Matthew rubbed Champ's back as the dog passed by him, and Champ lay on the floor approximately three or four feet from Matthew. A short time later Matthew began to stand up, and Champ jumped up and bit him on the face. The Wades then filed this action.

In a lengthy and detailed order, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court concluded that the Wades' claim could not survive because they failed to show that Champ had bitten anyone before the attack on Matthew or alternatively because they failed to show superior knowledge by the owners that the dog had a vicious propensity. We agree that summary judgment was warranted.

1. In Georgia, a dog owner will be liable for damages only if the owner has knowledge that the "dog has the propensity to do the particular act (biting) which caused injury to the complaining party." (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga.App. 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998). Under this test, the plaintiff must show whether the dog had the propensity to do the act that caused the injury and, "if so, whether the owner had knowledge of that propensity. [Cit.]" Id.

Sherman Wade, himself an employee of the club, testified on deposition that before Matthew's attack, he had never seen Champ growl at anyone or charge the fence where he was kept. When asked whether he had observed Champ exhibiting aggressive tendencies, he stated that the dog would sometimes bark but that "[w]e'd always speak to him, and he'd just go off wagging his tail." When Wade petted Champ on prior occasions, Champ wagged his tail and never growled at Wade or showed his teeth. He stated he would not have had any reservation about being alone with Champ based on his previous contact with the dog and that "the doggone dog was just a big pet." Sherman Wade also testified he had seen Matthew pet Champ and that Champ never reacted aggressively. Champ would simply "[w]ag his tail, lick his hand, just as docile and as calm as he could be." According to Sherman Wade, Champ and Matthew had been together in the same room while money was being counted, and on those occasions, Champ had never growled. He had no reason to believe Champ was a threat.

Matthew Wade similarly testified that he had been in the office with Champ four or five times while his father helped count money and had petted the dog. Champ had never growled or bared his teeth at Matthew but simply wagged his tail. Matthew was not afraid of Champ and had even fed him through the fence. He testified that he had never seen Champ attack any person or any animal.

Rogers testified on deposition that on the night of the attack, he opened the door to allow Champ to enter the office because he wanted to be sure that Champ saw him before the dog saw anyone else. He stated that "[i]f the dog saw me first, he wouldn't bother anybody." Also, as correctly pointed out by the Wades, he stated that it "was just a natural" to make sure that no one went into Champ's enclosure alone or that the dog was not "turned out" when other people were around. But Rogers also testified that as long as Champ was with him, the dog "was fine." We note that when asked whether Champ had displayed "aggressive behavior such as growling, chasing, any sort of threatening actions toward any other people," Rogers acknowledged that the dog "would do that anytime a stranger walked up to the fence." But Rogers also recounted an incident when a man had walked into Champ's enclosure. While the man's presence in the fenced enclosure incident "scared [Rogers] to death," Champ did not attack or even bother the man. Rogers further testified that he had known Champ to escape his fenced enclosure and that to his knowledge, Champ had never attacked anyone before the incident at issue here.

The evidence presented in the trial court shows that the defendants did not have knowledge of any propensity of Champ to bite. The testimony of Sherman Wade, an employee of the defendants for approximately three years before the incident, showed he had never known the dog to act aggressively. And we cannot conclude that Rogers's testimony created issues of fact as to the defendants' knowledge concerning the dog's propensity to act viciously. He indeed testified that he took precautions such as allowing Champ to see him first so Champ would not "bother" anyone, and he stated that it was "natural" for him not to allow other people to be alone with the dog.

But the record also shows Rogers's knowledge that Champ exhibited aggressive behavior only to strangers when they walked up to his enclosure. Even then, under Georgia law, a dog's aggressive or menacing behavior alone is not sufficient to place its owner on notice of a propensity to bite. Hamilton, supra, at 636, 510 S.E.2d 120. Even though evidence was presented that Champ barked and growled at strangers at the fence, the record is devoid of evidence of previous attacks on people or animals. Furthermore, Rogers believed Champ would not harm anyone while Rogers was nearby. The record is clear that Matthew was not a stranger to Champ, nor was he alone with Champ inside Champ's enclosure. Instead, Rogers was present in the same small office with Champ, Sherman Wade, and Matthew. Summary judgment in the defendants' favor was therefore warranted.

The defendants were entitled to summary judgment for another reason. A central theory of liability advanced by the Wades is that because Champ was a guard dog, the defendants should have known that he had a vicious propensity. But both Sherman and Matthew Wade also knew Champ was a guard dog. Sherman Wade acknowledged that he had made the "basic assumption" that Champ was a guard dog with the intended task of guarding equipment in the compound where he was housed. Matthew also assumed that Champ was a guard dog and might bite someone who came into the area he was to protect. Whether their cause of action is based on the premises liability statute (OCGA § 51-3-1) or the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Green v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 2015
    ...to do the act that caused the injury and, if so, whether the owner had knowledge of that propensity.Wade v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 246 Ga.App. 458, 459(1), 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000) (citations and punctuation omitted) (addressing claims made under both the dangerous animal liability statute, O......
  • Steagald v. Eason
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 6, 2017
    ...763 (1), 678 S.E.2d 206 (2009) ; Custer v. Coward , 293 Ga.App. 316, 319 (1), 667 S.E.2d 135 (2008) ; Wade v. American Nat. Ins. Co. , 246 Ga.App. 458, 460 (1), 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000) ; Durham v. Mooney , 234 Ga.App. 772, 773 (1), 507 S.E.2d 877 (1998). Cf. Supan v. Griffin , 238 Ga.App. 404......
  • Johnston v. Warendh
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 30, 2001
    ...knowledge of the dangerous propensity must be greater than any such knowledge possessed by the plaintiff. Wade v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 246 Ga.App. 458, 461(1), 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000). In 1985, the General Assembly expanded upon the scienter rule, also known as the "first bite rule," by am......
  • G&e Constr., LLC v. Rubicon Constr., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 2020
    ...in scope of his employment, entitling defendant to summary judgment on respondeat superior claim); Wade v. American Nat. Ins. Co. , 246 Ga. App. 458, 462-463 (3), 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000) (defendants rebutted any presumption that they had superior knowledge of dog's propensity to bite, entitli......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Torts - David A. Sleppy and Lisa J. Bucko
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 54-1, September 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...Harvey v. Buchanan, 121 Ga. 384, 385, 49 S.E. 281, 282 (1904)). 151. Id. at 676, 556 S.E.2d at 870 (citing Wade v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 461, 540 S.E.2d 671, 673-74 (2000)). 152. Id. 153. Id. 154. Id. 155. Id. at 677, 556 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Roswell, Ga., Code Sec. 4-29).......
  • Torts
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 64-1, September 2012
    • Invalid date
    ...owner had a pit bull named Cujo. Id. at 710, 716 S.E.2d at 797. 62. Id. at 712, 716 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Wade v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 461, 540 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2000)).63. 312 Ga. App. 493, 718 S.E.2d 851 (2011).64. Id. at 494-95, 718 S.E.2d at 852.65. 313 Ga. App. 699, 722......
  • Torts - Deron R. Hicks and Jacob E. Daly
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 53-1, September 2001
    • Invalid date
    ...124. Id. Sec. 50-21-24(7). 125. 273 Ga. at 717, 545 S.E.2d at 877. 126. Id. 127. Id. 128. W.,545 S.E.2dat878. 129. Id. 130. Id. 131. 246 Ga. App. 458, 540 S.E.2d 671 (2000). 132. Id. at 462, 540 S.E.2d at 674. 133. Id. at 458-59, 540 S.E.2d at 672. 134. Id. at 459, 540 S.E.2d at 672. 135. I......
  • Torts
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 68-1, September 2016
    • Invalid date
    ...778 S.E.2d at 367-68.150. Id. at 113, 778 S.E.2d at 367.151. Id.152. Id. at 115, 778 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting Wade v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 246 Ga. App. 458, 460, 540 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2000)).153. Id. at 114-15, 778 S.E.2d at 368.154. Id. at 115, 778 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting Rowlette v. Paul, 219 ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT