Wade v. State
| Decision Date | 06 November 1895 |
| Citation | 32 S.W. 772 |
| Parties | WADE v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Gonzales county; T. H. Spooner, Judge.
Seth Wade was convicted of robbery, and appeals. Reversed.
Burgess & Hopkins, A. B. Story, W. A. H. Miller, and Wm. F. Ramsay, for appellant. Mann Trice, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant in this case was tried in the court below on an indictment charging him with robbery, was convicted, and his punishment assessed at 10 years' confinement in the penitentiary, and from the judgment and sentence of the lower court he prosecutes this appeal.
The appellant assigns as error the overruling of his motion for a continuance. No such error appears as would authorize a reversal of this case on that account. Inasmuch, however, as this matter is not likely to come up in this shape again, it is unnecessary to discuss it.
Appellant also assigns as error the overruling of his challenge for cause to the jurors Young and Carraway. Both of said jurors on their voir dire examination stated that they had formed an opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of appellant. It is stated that they had formed such an opinion from general talk and rumor afloat in the county, and that they had a talk with a witness in the case, but that they could go into the jury box, and give appellant a fair and impartial trial, as if they had never heard of the case. The appellant challenged said jurors for cause, and then challenged them peremptorily, and afterwards exhausted his challenges, and was compelled to take a juror obnoxious to him, and he now assigns the action of the court in overruling his challenge for cause as error. In the case of Suit v. State, 30 Tex. Cr. App. 319, 17 S. W. 458, the juror stated that he had formed an opinion, that it would require evidence to remove his opinion, but that it would not influence him in rendering a verdict, and that he could render a fair and impartial verdict upon the evidence as testified to on the trial, and the law as given by the court, uninfluenced by his present opinion. His opinion, it seems, was formed from rumor, and not from having heard any evidence in the case, or from having talked with any witness about the case. In that case it was held that he was a competent juror. In Shannon v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 28 S. W. 540, the juror answered that he had formed an opinion which it would require evidence to remove, but that he could give defendant a fair and impartial trial according to law and the evidence. It was further disclosed that the juror had formed his opinion from having heard the evidence in the case at a former trial. The learned judge, in deciding the question as to the competency of said juror, draws a distinction between the former case of Suit v. State and the case of Shannon v. State, and predicates the distinction upon the fact that in the first case the juror had formed his opinion merely from hearsay and rumor, while in the latter case he had formed his opinion from having heard the evidence in the case; and it was held in the latter case that, under such circumstances, notwithstanding the juror qualified under the rule previously laid down in the Suit Case, yet it could not be said that he was a fair and impartial juror, his opinion being formed from having heard the sworn testimony in the case. In the case now before us it is disclosed that the jurors had talked with a witness in the case, but it is not disclosed what witness, whether he was a material witness in the case or not, or whether the conversation with such witness entered, in any respect, as a factor in the opinion formed by the juror. In our opinion, it was the duty of the appellant to have pushed the investigation further, and to have shown that the opinion so formed was, in part at least, formed from having talked with a witness about the facts of the case.
The other question presented in this case for our consideration is whether the allegation in the indictment descriptive of the property charged to have been taken by means of the robbery, is sufficiently set out. The allegation in the indictment in this regard is in the following language: "That the...
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Wood v. State, 67486
...360 S.W.2d 883 (1961); (Not sufficient) "one dollar in Mexican money" (distinguishing U. S. versus foreign money), Wade v. State, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 170, 32 S.W. 772 (1895). PROPERTY DESCRIPTION HELD INSUFFICIENT AND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO See, "barbed wire," Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.......
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Sims v. State
...should have stated the kind of watch, whether gold or silver; and in this connection we are referred to Wade v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 170 [32 S. W. 772, 60 Am. St. Rep. 31]. That case has no application. That was a case where the pleader attempted to state Mexican money in the indictment as......
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Johnson v. State
...that the pleader should have stated the kind of watch, whether gold or silver; and in this connection we are referred to Wade v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 170, 32 S. W. 772. That case has no application. That was a case where the pleader attempted to state Mexican money in the indictment as mon......
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