Wade v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of Town of Hamden

• Decision Date: 28 October 1958
• Citation: 145 A.2d 597,145 Conn. 592
• Parties: Margaret WADE et al. v. TOWN PLAN AND ZONING COMMISSION OF TOWN OF HAMDEN et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 597

145 A.2d 597

145 Conn. 592

Margaret WADE et al. v. TOWN PLAN AND ZONING COMMISSION OF TOWN OF HAMDEN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 28, 1958.

David M. Reilly and Francis J. Moran, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

James P. Doherty, Hamden, and Bertrand B. Salzman, New Haven, for appellee (defendant Landmarks Holding Corporation).

Anthony E. Grillo, New Haven, for appellee (named defendant).

Before DALY, C. J., and BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ.

BALDWIN, Associate Justice.

The Landmarks Holding Corporation applied to the town plan and zoning commission of Hamden for a change of zone from residence AA to business CA-1 of four acres of land which the corporation owned at the intersection of Whitney Avenue and Haverford Street in Hamden. The commission granted the application and changed the zone, and the plaintiffs, property owners in the neighborhood who claim to have been aggrieved, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. The present appeal is from the judgment of that court dismissing their appeal.

The land involved has a frontage of 335 feet on the easterly side of Whitney Avenue and 490 feet on the southerly side of Haverford Street. The area to the north and east, and to the south in part, is zoned residence AA, and that across Whitney Avenue directly opposite is zoned residence B. The land adjoins, for approximately one-half of its southern boundary, a business A district. This business A district, which extends southward along both sides of Whitney Avenue for a distance of 600 feet, has been in existence for many years. The zoning regulations allow the occupancy of six families to an acre in a residence AA Zone, there being two other higher residential classifications, residence A-1 and residence A, limited, respectively, to two and four families to an acre. Hamden Zoning Regs., § 18 (1930, as amended). In a business CA-1 district, the uses allowed can be generally described as neighborhood commercial except that gasoline stations are not permitted, as they are in a business A district, and the lot area usable for buildings is limited to one-third. Id., §§ 6, 30.1, 30.6. The proposal of the Landmarks corporation was to construct stores for neighborhood patronage, with a large part of the lot which they were to occupy to be available for off-street parking.

The plaintiffs' claims can fairly be comprehended in the statement that the commission's action was arbitrary, illegal and in abuse of its discretion because (1) the commission's conclusion that the change was for the best interests of the town for the reason that the property involved was best suited for business and was unsuitable for further residential development is not supported by the facts before the commission; (2) the change constituted spot zoning; and (3) the commission was powerless to reverse the previous denials of applications for similar changes.

Our cases have repeatedly held that any act of a zoning authority, to be valid, must meet two basic tests: (1) It must promote the public welfare, and (2) it must do it in a reasonable manner. In the application of these tests, courts allow zoning authorities a wide and liberal discretion in determining what the public need is and how it can be met. This is so because local zoning authorities live close to the circumstances and conditions which create local zoning problems and shape the method of their solution. Levinsky v. Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 117, 125, 127 A.2d 822; Couch v. Zoning Commission, 141 Conn. 349, 359, 106 A.2d 173; Kutcher v. Town Planning Commission, 138 Conn. 705, 710, 88 A.2d 538. The commission based its decision to change the zone upon the ground that the land affected was more suitable for business than for residence and that its use for business would serve the best interests of the town. It was proper for the commission to consider what was an appropriate use for this land. Hills v. Zoning Commission, 139 Conn. 603, 609, 96 A.2d 212. And the determination of what the public interest required was well within its discretion. Winslow v. Zoning Board, 143 Conn. 381, 391, 122 A.2d 789; 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.) § 25.68. Upon the record returned by the commission and before the trial court and this court, the issues of what was the most appropriate use of the land and what the public interest required were fairly debatable, and under such circumstances courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the commission. Kutcher v. Town Planning Commission, supra, 138 Conn. 709, 88 A.2d 540. Since the record supports the conclusions of the commission that the change was in the public interest and allowed the...