Wade v. Warden of State Prison

• Citation: 73 A.2d 128,145 Me. 120
• Parties: WADE v. WARDEN OF STATE PRISON.
• Decision Date: 10 April 1950
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Page 128

73 A.2d 128

145 Me. 120

WADE v. WARDEN OF STATE PRISON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 10, 1950.

Richard S. Chapman, Portland, for petitioner.

Daniel C. McDonald, County Attorney for Cumberland County and State of Maine, for respondent.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

FELLOWS, Justice.

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus of Franklin Delano Wade of Portland, Maine who brings the petition by Catherine A. Wade his mother. Franklin Delano Wade is a child under the age of seventeen years.

The petition comes to the Law Court on report upon facts agreed, Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 91, Section 14, and certified for immediate decision, by agreement of counsel. Welch v. Sheriff, 95 Me. 451, 454, 50 A. 88. The Law Court is to determine whether or not the writ shall issue.

The facts are these: Franklin Delano Wade was born in Portland, Maine on July 27, 1933. He was 16 years old when the offense was alleged to have been committed, and when he was arrested upon a complaint and warrant issued November 22, 1949 from the Portland Municipal Court. He was charged with manslaughter. The record of the Municipal Court shows 'Date of hearing--November 22, 1949. Plea--Not guilty--waived reading and hearing. Judgment of Court--Probable cause. Result in Full--Bound over to the January Term of the Superior Court, A. D. 1950--Bail--$5000.'

The stipulation made by counsel says that the Judge of the Municipal Court 'refused to exercise jurisdiction over the offense with which the Defendant was charged, and rendered judgment of 'Probable Cause'.'

Wade was indicted for manslaughter at the January Term, 1950 of Superior Court for Cumberland County, to which indictment he pleaded not guilty. He was placed on trial and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. He was sentenced by the Presiding Justice to a term of not less than seven years nor more than fourteen years in the State Prison, where he is now held under warrant of commitment issued by the Superior Court.

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleges that Wade is now unlawfully imprisoned by the Warden of the State Prison because, in the words of the petition, 'the offense for which he was charged, not being one the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to try and sentence him upon the indictment which was returned against him, but that the exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense with which he was charged in said Complaint and Warrant and in the Indictment returned in the Superior Court, was and now is in the Portland Municipal Court as a Juvenile Court.'

The statutes under consideration are Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 133, Section 2 and Section 6, as amended by Chapter 334, of the Public Laws of 1947. The pertinent parts of these sections, as amended, are as follows:

'Section 2. 'Judges of municipal courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses, except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years, committed by children under the age of 17 years, and when so exercising said jurisdiction shall be known as juvenile courts.' Any adjudication or judgment under the provisions of sections 4 to 7, inclusive, shall be that the child was guilty of juvenile delinquency and no such adjudication or judgment shall be deemed to constitute a conviction for crime.

'Section 6. A municipal court may place children under the age of 17 years under the supervision, care and control of a probation officer or an agent of the department of health and welfare or may order the child to be placed in a suitable family home subject to the supervision of a probation officer or the department of health and welfare or may commit such child to the department of health and welfare or make such other disposition as may seem best for the interests of the child and for the protection of the community including holding such child for the grand jury or commitment of such child to the Pownal State School upon certification of 2 physicians who are graduates of some legally organized medical college and have practiced 3 years in this state, that such child is mentally defective and that his or her mental age is not greater than 3/4 of subject's life age nor under 3 years, or to the state school for boys or state school for girls; but no boy shall be committed to the state school for boys who is under the age of 9 years and no girl shall be committed to the state school for girls who is under the age of 9 years, and no municipal court shall sentence a child under the age of 17 years to jail, reformatory or prison; any child or his next friend or guardian may appeal to the superior court in the same county in the same manner as in criminal appeals, and the court may accept the personal recognizance of such child, next friend or guardian, and said superior court may either affirm such sentence or order of commitment or make such other disposition of the case as may be for the best interests of such child and for the peace and welfare of the community.

'Where, however, an appeal is taken and the offense is one that must be prosecuted by indictment, the county attorney shall submit the evidence relating to such crime to the grand jury convening at the original term at which the appeal is to be heard, and if the grand jury return an indictment for such offense the accused may, in the discretion of the court, be tried on such indictment, or the court may order it placed on file, or make such other disposition thereof as it may determine, including the dismissal thereof, and proceed to hear the appeal, and either affirm such sentence or order of commitment, or make other disposition of the case in accordance with the provisions relating to appeal hereinbefore provided.'

The above statute makes every municipal court a juvenile court when exercising its exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses committed by a child under the age of seventeen years. It has such jurisdiction over all offenses committed by such children 'except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or for any term of years.' The sixteen year old petitioner stands committed to the State Prison by the Superior Court for the offense of manslaughter. He was so committed without prior action by the municipal court acting as a juvenile court. We must therefore determine whether or not manslaughter is a crime 'the punishment for which may be * * * for any term of years,' as that phrase is used in the foregoing exception to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

The punishment for murder, kidnapping, and for treason, is imprisonment for life. Such offenses are clearly excepted from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. What crimes are excepted by the phrase 'the punishment for which may be * * * for any term of years'? Does it, as claimed by the State, except all crimes which may be punished by a term of years, a term of years being two years or more? Or does it except only those crimes which may be punished by a term of years, the length of which term is limited only by the discretion of the judge imposing sentence? In other words, does the phrase in the foregoing exception have the same meaning as when used in the statutes to fix punishment for many serious offenses like robbery, Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 117, Section 16; rape, Chapter 117, Section 10; corrupting water, Chapter 124, Section 1; burglary, Chapter 118, Section 8; perjury, Chapter 122, Section 1; burning of buildings in the night time, Chapter 118, Section 2; counterfeiting, Chapter 120, Section 5; depositing bomb to cause injury, Chapter 117, Section 22; conviction of felony after prior conviction and sentence, Chapter 136, Section 3, in all of which foregoing offenses the punishment is 'any term of years?' State v. Fraizer, 143 Me. ----, 64 A.2d 179.

For some felonies like manslaughter, Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 117, Section 8, the punishment is restricted to not more than so many years, and in a multitude of other offenses the amount of punishment is restricted, and varies from months to years, depending on whether made a misdemeanor or a felony. There are very few felonies, if any, where punishment for the felony has been restricted to a period of less than two years.

The purpose of juvenile courts, and laws relating to juvenile delinquency, is to carry out a modern method of dealing with youthful offenders, so that there may be no criminal record against immature youth to cause detrimental local gossip and future handicaps because of childhood errors and indiscretions, and also that the child who is not inclined to follow legal or moral patterns, may be guided or reformed to become, in his mature years, a useful citizen.

The work of the judge of a municipal court, sitting as the judge of a juvenile court, is vitally important to the welfare of our state. He does not pass upon the crimes and misdemeanors of childhood wholly from the legal standpoint. The basic and primary idea of the legislature is salvation, not punishment. The nature of juvenile work is more philanthropic than the work of the common law jurist. The legislature of Maine has therefore placed this authority in the hands of men who know humanity and can inspire the child with confidence and with a desire, in most instances, to become an upright citizen.

The history of the juvenile law in Maine shows that there is now a growing tendency in legislation to enlarge the jurisdiction and authority of juvenile courts, and if possible to save every child from a criminal record. The age of the child has been increased from 15 to 17 years, and jurisdiction has been extended from misdemeanors to some felonies. The jurisdiction has been enlarged from concurrent to exclusive and...