Wadsworth v. Murray

• Decision Date: 09 January 1900
• Citation: 55 N.E. 910,161 N.Y. 274
• Parties: WADSWORTH v. MURRAY et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

161 N.Y. 274

55 N.E. 910

WADSWORTH

v.MURRAY et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 9, 1900.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Fourth department.

Action by James W. Wadsworth, individually and as trustee under the will of James Wadsworth, deceased, against Charles James Murray and others, to construe the will of said decedent. From judgment of the appellate divisin (51 N. Y. Supp. 1038) affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Treadwell Cleveland, J. B. Adams, and Edward P. Coyne, for appellants.

John G. Milburn, J. Breck Perkins, John R. Strang, John L. Cadwalader, and Lewis C. O'Connor, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

This case is brought before the court by three separate appeals. The first is taken by the defendant Charles James Murray, who, as the alien grandson of the testator, claims his mother's share in the property embraced within what is known as the ‘Brimmer Trust,’ under the will of his grandfather, James Wadsworth, deceased. The other two appeals refer to a different question, and will be considered later.

James Wadsworth, of Geneseo, in the county of Livingston, died on the 6th day of June, 1844, being the owner, at the time of his death, of a very large estate, consisting of real estate and personal property, and leaving a last will and testament. He left, him surviving, two sons, James S. and William W.; a daughter, Elizabeth; and a grandson, Martin Brimmer, Jr., the only issue of his deceased daughter Harriet. The will gave to the testator's two sons each one-quarter of the estate, both real and personal. It also created two trust estates, each consisting of one-quarter of the estate, real and personal. One of these trusts was in favor of testator's daughter Elizabeth, and the other for the benefit of Martin Brimmer, Jr., his grandson. The trustees designated to execute these trusts were Martin Brimmer, the son-in-law, and James S. Wadsworth and William W. Wadsworth, the sons of the testator. Martin Brimmer, Jr., was entitled to the rents, profits, and income of the real estate embraced in the trust for his benefit during his natural life. The disposition of the real estate and its proceeds in the trust after the death of Martin Brimmer, Jr., was as follows: ‘And in case the said Martin Brimmer, Jr., shall die leaving lawful issue him surviving, such issue shall take an estate in fee in the real estate hereby devised in trust for him, and the entire and absolute estate and interest in such accumulations as are hereinbefore provided for. And, in case the said Martin Brimmer, Jr., shall die, leaving no lawful issue him surviving, then, and in that, case, the estate in said lands, and the entire and absolute estate and interest in such accumulations, shall descend to and vest in my heirs at law in the same manner that it would have descended to and vested in them if this will had not been made, and the said Martin Brimmer, Jr., had died, without issue, before my decease.’ The personal property embraced in this trust vested in the beneficiary on his attaining the age of 21 years. At the time of testator's death, in 1844, his grandson, Martin Brimmer, Jr., was a minor, and his daughter Elizabeth was unmarried. Elizabeth, in 1850, married Charles Augustus Murray, a subject of Great Britain, and died intestate in 1851, leaving, her surviving, an only son, Charles James Murray, one of the defendants, who is an alien, and one of the appellants here. Martin Brimmer, Jr., survived until January, 1896, a period of 52 years after the death of testator.

The first and important question in this case is to determine who are the heirs at law referred to by the testator as being the remainder-men entitled to the real estate embraced in this trust upon the death of Martin Brimmer, Jr., the life tenant. It is insisted on the part of the respondent that the language already quoted from the Brimmer trust is clear, accurate, and needs no construction; that the heirs at law designated were those who answered that description at the time of testator's death. On behalf of the appellant Charles James Murray it is urged that he is entitled, as devisee, to one-third of the property held in trust for the benefit of Martin Brimmer, Jr., during his lifetime, he being one of the class of persons designated as heirs at law of testator; in other words, that the heirs at law of the testator are to be ascertained as of the time of the death of Martin Brimmer, Jr., and that Charles James Murray takes the entire share of his deceased mother, Elizabeth, the daughter of testator. The appellant starts out with the proposition that, there being no specific intent expressed, the court must apply the settled rules of construction, and construe the will in accordance with the dictates of reason and justice, imputing to the language of testator such a meaning as, under all the circumstances, will conform to his probable intention. We are of opinion that no such situation is presented; the language of the will is clear, and the meaning of the testator very obvious. When he states that, if Martin Brimmer, Jr., dies without issue, the property ‘shall descend to and vest in my heirs at law in the same manner that it would have descended to and vested in them if this will had not been made, and the said Martin Brimmer, Jr., had died, without issue, before my decease,’ there is no reason for misapprehending the precise meaning of the testator. If Martin Brimmer, Jr., had died before the testator, in 1844, and the latter had made no will, it is clear that his only heirs at law in that situation would have been his two sons, James S. and William W., and his daughter Elizabeth. When the testator employs language that is clear, definite, and incapable of any other meaning than that which is conveyed by the language used, there is no reason for resorting to the rules of construction that are invoked in the case of ambiguous wills.

The counsel for the respondent have cited many cases in England, in this state, and other states, which follow the well-settled general rule that where, on the termination of a life estate, a remainder is limited to the heirs of the testator, the will is deemed to speak as of the time of his death, and his heirs at that time take a vested remainder. We are of opinion that there is no occasion to resort to this rule, and we place our decision on the intention of the testator, manifested by language that requires no construction. It therefore follows that upon the death of the testator the remainder under the Brimmer trust vested in the testator's two sons and one daughter, subject to being devested if Martin Brimmer, Jr., died leaving issue.

This vested estate was descendible, devisable, and alienable. 1 Rev. St. p. 725, § 35. The daughter, Elizabeth Murray, was, therefore, seised of one-third of the estate in remainder at the time of her death, in 1851, seven years after her father's decease, and it descended to her brothers, James S. and William W., and to her nephew, Martin Brimmer, Jr., the son of her deceased sister, Harriet, as her own son was an alien, and could not, at that time, take by descent. The appellants argue that by the provisions of James Wadsworth's will his intention was clear to cut off Martin Brimmer, Jr., from receiving any portion of his estate. We regard those provisions as simply a declaration by the testator that his heirs at law at the time of his death were to become seised of the contingent estate in remainder under this trust, and ultimately of an absolute estate if Martin Brimmer, Jr., died without issue. It was in no sense an exclusion of Martin Brimmer, Jr., from any share in testator's estate as an heir at law of his aunt...