Waggener v. Haskell

• Decision Date: 09 April 1896
• Parties: WAGGENER et al. v. HASKELL et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 1

35 S.W. 1

WAGGENER et al. v. HASKELL et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 9, 1896.

Certified question from court of civil appeals of Fourth supreme judicial district.

Action by J. M. Waggener and others against H. N. Haskell and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal to the court of civil appeals, which certifies certain questions to the supreme court.

K. R. Craig, for appellants.

DENMAN, J.

The court of civil appeals for the Fourth district have certified to us the following question and explanatory statement:

"Haskell and wife, constituting the family, owned the greater portion of a block in a city, whereon they had their dwelling, barn, horse lot, cow lot, hog pens, garden, orchard, and sorghum patch, all of which was inclosed. They had other lots in the immediate neighborhood in same city, separated, however, from their dwelling place by streets. A creditor, on May 30, 1892, recovered a judgment against Haskell, and had an abstract thereof entered in the county clerk's office of the county on August 8, 1892. One of the detached lots he cultivated yearly, generally in corn and small grain, but in 1892 he had it cultivated in Irish potatoes. Another of the detached lots he cultivated yearly in corn and small grain, and in 1891 and 1892 it was planted principally in wheat. The above is the testimony respecting the use of two of the detached lots, and it was testified to by Haskell that these crops were raised for home consumption.

"Question: Was the use of said lots, or either of them, under the facts above given, such use as would make them exempt under the provision of our present constitution requiring the use to be for the purposes of a home?"

The constitutions of 1845, 1861, 1866, and 1869 declared that "the homestead of a family," not to exceed certain acreage in the country and certain valuation in a city or town, should be exempt from forced sale. They did not, however, undertake to define the word "homestead," and therefore it devolved upon the courts to determine its meaning, as there used, in attempting to ascertain whether a given piece of property was or was not included in the exemption. In Pryor v. Stone, 19 Tex. 371, this court, in an opinion delivered by Hemphill, C. J., in 1857, said: "All that, by fair construction of the language, is required to entitle the property to exemption, is, that the property should be used for the convenience or uses of the head or members of the family. The exemption should not be construed as reserving merely a residence where a family may eat, drink, and sleep, but...