Wagner v. City of St Louis

• Decision Date: 15 September 1920
• Parties: ROBERT WAGNER, Doing Business as WAGNER BROS. STORAGE & MOVING COMPANY, v. CITY OF ST LOUIS et al., Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

224 S.W. 413

284 Mo. 410

ROBERT WAGNER, Doing Business as WAGNER BROS. STORAGE & MOVING COMPANY, v. CITY OF ST LOUIS et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

September 15, 1920

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Glendy B. Arnold Judge.

Reversed.

Charles H. Daues and H. A. Hamilton for respondent.

(1) The City of St. Louis, is authorized by its charter to regulate all persons and corporations engaged in any business occupation, profession or trade, and do all things expedient for promoting the comfort, morals, peace, government, welfare and trade of the city or its inhabitants. Charter, art. I sec. 1, cls. 23, 25, 33 and 35. (2) The city, under its police power, may regulate the business of moving property from one location in the city to another by requiring the persons engaged in such business to make report thereof, for thereby frauds and crimes may be prevented and detected. St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo. 630; St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo. 111; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99; St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543; Lawson v. Connolly, 175 Mich. 375; Sanning v. Cincinnati, 81 Oh. St. 142; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678; Railway Co. v. Drainage Comrs., 200 U.S. 561. (3) The regulation of a business under the police power is not illegal because such regulation may entail expenses or result in pecuniary loss to the persons engaged in such business. St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543; Haller Sign Works v. Training School, 249 Ill. 436; L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587. (4) The Municipal Assembly of St. Louis is vested with the power of determining the necessity of regulating business in said city, and courts will not ordinarily review the exercise of its discretion. An ordinance passed in the exercise of legal authority will not be declared void on the ground of unreasonableness unless no difference of opinion can exist upon the question, and a clear case must be made to authorize a court to interfere on that ground. St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Gratiot v. Railroad Co., 116 Mo. 450; Chillicothe v. Brown, 38 Mo.App. 609; Kansas City v. Sutton, 52 Mo.App. 398; Monett v. Campbell, 204 S.W. 32.

Spencer & Donnell for respondent.

(1) Police ordinances are always subject to the construction of the courts. Cape Girardeau v. Railey, 72 Mo. 223; Carthage v. Block, 139 Mo. App., 391; Corrigan v. Gage & Ladd, 68 Mo. 541. (2) The ordinance involved is invalid because it is not within the scope of the legislative power of the City of St. Louis. Charter, art. I, sec. 1, cls. 23, 25, 33 and 35; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 137; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 220; State ex rel. Chillicothe v. Wilder, 200 Mo. 97; Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo. 557; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; Knox City v. Thompson, 19 Mo.App. 523; Joplin v. Jacobs, 119 Mo.App. 134; Clinton v. Phillips, 58 Ill. 102; State v. Vanderslaus, 42 Minn. 131. (3) The ordinance involved is invalid because it is unreasonable. St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 224; Carthage v. Block, 139 Mo.App. 391; St. Louis v. Nash, 266 Mo. 523; Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1; Long v. Taxing District, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 134; Sallsbury v. Equitable Purchasing Co., 177 Ky. 348; Ex parte Goldberg, 200 S.W. 386; Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 542; Lane v. Concord, 70 N.H. 485; People v. Armstrong, 2 L. R. A. 721; Atkinson v. Transportation Co., 60 Wis. 160; State v. Ray, 131 N.C. 814; Waters v. Leach, 3 Ark. 110; Buell v. State, 45 Ark. 336; Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628; Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 85 F. 19; Lawson v. Connelly, 175 Mich. 375; Scanning v. Cincinnati, 81 Ohio State, 142; St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543; St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588; Phillips v. State, 77 Ohio St. 217. (4) The ordinance involved is invalid because it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consitution of the United States, and Section 30 of Article II of the Constitution of the State of Missouri. St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; State v. Scougal, 3 S.D. 55; Bonnett v. Valliers, 136 Wis. 193.

MOZLEY, C. White, C., concurs; Railey, C., not sitting.

OPINION

MOZLEY, C. --

Injunction instituted in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, having for its purpose the perpetual prevention of the enforcement, by the city authorities, of Ordinance No. 28367, designed to regulate the moving of household goods, furniture, pianos, stock, fixtures, equipment, personal property and effects from one location to another within the City of St. Louis, or to or from any location within said city, requiring the owner or person in charge or control of the vehicles used to transport such property, to notify the City Register of such removal, and requiring him to keep an appropriate public record of such information. Said ordinance reads as follows:

"Be it ordained by the City of St-Louis as follows:

"Section One. It shall be the duty of all persons, firms, or corporations, owning or operating, any moving van, furniture car, transfer wagon, delivery wagon, express wagon or any other vehicle, who shall haul or move, or cause to be hauled or moved, any article of household goods, furniture, pianos, stock, fixtures, equipment, personal property and effects from one location to another within the City of St. Louis, or to or from any location within the City of St. Louis, where it shall be the intention of the owner, or person having the charge, custody, possession and control of such property, to change the residence or place of business of such person, firm or corporation, to notify the City Register of the City of St. Louis, within ten days after such removal, of the name of such person, firm or corporation owning, or having the custody, possession and control of such property, the street address or location from and to which such property was removed, a brief, general description of the property removed, the date of such removal, and the name and address of the person, firm or corporation, owning or operating vehicles used in such transportation.

"Section Two: It shall be the duty of the City Register to furnish the blanks necessary for making such reports, which shall be uniform and may be in the form prescribed by him, and he shall provide and maintain in his office a proper register, book, card index, or other appropriate record of such reports, which records shall be open to the public at all reasonable hours.

"Section Three: It shall be the duty of every person, firm or corporation, to provide and give true information to the person, firm or corporation owning or operating the vehicles used in the transportation of property as contemplated by this ordinance, such as will enable such owner or person in charge of such vehicles to effectually comply with the giving of the notices and filing of the reports required by this ordinance.

"Section Four: Any person, firm or corporation, violating any of the provisions of this ordinance, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, for each and every offense.

"Section Five: All ordinances, or parts of ordinances in conflict with this ordinance, to the extent of such conflict, are hereby repealed." Approved November 26, 1915.

Said ordinance is assaulted in plaintiff's petition as being invalid because it contravenes the Federal and State constitutions, Article 4, section 1, and Article 2, section 30, respectively, which provide that no citizen shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. It is further asserted that neither the laws of the State nor the city charter authorize the adoption of said ordinance by the municipal assembly and the mayor of said city, and that it is unreasonable and oppressive.

The petition then proceeds to allege that although said ordinance is invalid the city authorities are threatening to enforce the same, and to prosecute plaintiff, his agents and servants; that the enforcement thereof and such prosecution would result in irreparable damages to plaintiff and his business and property; that he has no adequate legal remedy to which he may resort and is, therefore, remediless in the premises unless he may resort to the equity side of the court and by injunction permanently restrain and enjoin all concerned from in anywise interfering with plaintiff, his agents and servants in the conduct of his business, and from arresting and prosecuting plaintiff, his agents and servants in the event they be of the notion to disregard the provisions of said ordinance, and for all additional relief the court may, in right and justice, think he should have.

Defendants raised no question as to the sufficiency of the petition, but answered to the merits by a general denial of all averments of the petition, except it was admitted that said city was a municipal corporation duly organized under the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri; admitted the official capacity of defendants, admitted the due adoption of said ordinance and that its violation subjected the offender, upon conviction thereof, to prosecution and fine.

Defendants plead, affirmatively, that the City of St. Louis was authorized and had the power under the Constitution of Missouri, and under its charter powers and other laws, to enact, through its board of aldermen and mayor, the said Ordinance No. 28367, and that said ordinance was duly enacted as aforesaid pursuant to said powers, and pray to be hence dismissed without day and that the costs be adjudged against plaintiff.

The case was tried before Judge Glendy B. Arnold who sustained plaintiff's petition; made said injunction perpetual decreed said...