Wagner v. Jones
| Decision Date | 25 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1650.,13–1650. |
| Citation | 758 F.3d 1030 |
| Parties | Teresa R. WAGNER, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Carolyn JONES, Dean Iowa College of Law (in her official and individual capacities); Gail B. Agrawal, Dean Iowa College of Law (in her official and individual capacities), Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen T. Fieweger, argued, Moline, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
George A. Carroll, AAG, Jordan G. Esbrook, AAG, argued, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Teresa Wagner appeals from the district court's denial of her motion for new trial, arguing that significant errors in the verdict formulation process entitle her to a new trial. Under the standard we apply today, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Wagner's motion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
This case returns to us for the second time following reversal and remand of the district court's initial summary judgment ruling. See Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 275 (8th Cir.2011) (). The facts pertinent to the instant appeal are set forth below.
On January 20, 2009, Wagner commenced action against Carolyn Jones, then Dean of the Iowa College of Law (the “College of Law”) in her individual capacity. She alleged claims associated with her candidacy as a legal writing instructor at the College.1 Wagner subsequently amended her complaint, seeking injunctive relief in the form of employment from the current College of Law Dean, Gail B. Agrawal, in her official capacity. On October 15, 2012, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wagner's trial commenced in Davenport, Iowa, on two constitutional claims-political discrimination and equal protection.
On October 22, 2012, the jury began deliberations. Deliberations continued on October 23, with a magistrate judge presiding over the deliberations by consent of the parties.2 At 9:00 a.m., on October 24, the jury sent the magistrate judge a note, inquiring, “What happens if we cannot come to an agreement?” After the magistrate judge conferred with the parties and, by telephone, with the district judge, the magistrate judge directed the jury to continue with deliberations in an attempt to arrive at a unanimous verdict.
Roughly two hours after submitting their first question, the jury sent the magistrate judge another note, signed by all twelve jurors, stating, “We are unable to come to a unanimous verdict for either the Plaintiff, Teresa Wagner, nor Defendant, Carolyn Jones.” Subsequently, the district court held a telephone conference with the magistrate judge and the parties, discussing how to proceed. During this discussion, the district court recognized that “we don't know if [the note] pertains to one of the submitted counts or both of the submitted counts,” but the court clearly operated at that time under the assumption that both counts were at issue in the jury notes.3 At this point, the district court asked the parties whether they thought it appropriate to give the jury a so-called Allen4 charge. Wagner desired such a charge, but the appellees objected to giving the instruction.
Pursuant to the district court's instructions, a little after 1:00 p.m., the magistrate judge convened the jury in open court and read them the Allen charge. At 3:24 p.m., through email, Wagner's counsel requested that the district court discharge the jury and order a new trial. A short time after 4:00 p.m., the jury sent the court another note, indicating that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict and predicting, “I DO NOT SEE U.S. EVER AGREEING.” After receiving this note, the magistrate judge again convened the jury in open court without counsel present. The magistrate judge questioned the jury about the note, and each juror confirmed that the note reflected his or her individual view as to the state of deliberations. The magistrate judge, then, declared a mistrial, asked the jury to later complete and return a post-trial assessment, and thanked the jury for their service. The magistrate judge finally excused the jury and the members retired from the courtroom at 4:35 p.m. according to the clerk of court's minutes.
Then, after having discharged the jury, the magistrate judge reassembled the previously dispersed members in the courtroom.5 According to the clerk of court's minutes, this occurred at 4:37 p.m. The magistrate judge, out of the presence of the parties and their lawyers, then engaged in the following colloquy with the jury:
What I failed to ask you for on the record was there were two counts in the Complaint filed by Ms. Wagner against the Defendants and the indication of the jury was that you were unable to reach an agreement. Was that as to both Counts 1 and 2?
The foreperson replied that the jury had reached a verdict on Count I, but not Count II. Specifically, the foreperson indicated that the jury had found for defendant Jones on Count I.6 The magistrate judge polled each juror, and the jurors confirmed the verdict on Count I. After this, the magistrate judge amended the previous mistrial ruling, now limiting it to Count II, and ordered the foreperson to sign the verdict form and again excused the jury. On October 25, 2012, the clerk entered judgment on the verdict on Count I in favor of Jones and noted that the court declared a mistrial on Count II.
On November 1, 2012, the appellees moved for judgment as a matter of law on Count II—the equal protection claim. On November 20, 2012, Wagner moved for a new trial on the basis that the magistrate judge lacked authority to reconvene the jury and accept a verdict after he had already declared a mistrial. The district court granted the appellees' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Count II and denied Wagner's motion for new trial, among other rulings. Wagner now appeals.7
Wagner raises many issues in this appeal. However, we substantially limit our review to a single matter: whether the district court erred in denying her motion for new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) due to errors in the verdict process.8 “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for a clear abuse of discretion, with the key question being whether a new trial is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir.2013) (internal quotation omitted). Although our standard of review is deferential, “we may reverse a district court's denial of a Rule 59 motion where its judgment rests on an erroneous legal standard.” Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 656 (8th Cir.1995). Indeed, the abuse of discretion standard “does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996).
Wagner asserts that she is entitled to a new trial because the magistrate judge, after declaring a mistrial, had no legal authority to reconvene the jury and accept an unsigned verdict in favor of Jones on Count I. In ruling on Wagner's motion, the district court found legal authority for the magistrate judge's conduct in the “numerous federal courts that have held a jury remains ‘undischarged’ and subject to recall by the court under such circumstances.”
Generally, with some factual distinctions, precedent falls within two camps on whether a jury may be recalled after discharge, especially a discharge such as we have in this case. One line of authority—followed by the district court here—requires a case-specific analysis of “whether the jurors became susceptible to outside influences” and beyond the control of the court once discharged. United States v. Figueroa, 683 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir.2012). Many of the cases that adhere to this rule draw support from Summers v. United States, where the Fourth Circuit observed that a jury “may remain undischarged and retain its functions, though discharge may have been spoken by the court, if, after such announcement, it remains an undispersed unit, within control of the court, with no opportunity to mingle with or discuss the case with others.” 11 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir.1926). Although the court in Summers determined that a nominally discharged jury that stayed in the courtroom remained undischarged for the purposes of correcting an error, see id. (), a few courts have extended Summers to apply to situations where the court announces discharge and the jury retires to the deliberating room, see, e.g., Figueroa, 683 F.3d at 72; United States v. Rojas, 617 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir.2010); United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir.1994). In those situations, even though discharged and outside the presence of the court, the jury remains subject to recall, the Third Circuit has reasoned, as long as “[t]he jurors did not disperse and interact with any outside individuals, ideas, or coverage of the proceedings.” Figueroa, 683 F.3d at 73. Thus, according to this view, if a jury remains within the court-imposed “protective shield,” it is subject to recall after discharge. People v. McNeeley, 216 Ill.App.3d 647, 159 Ill.Dec. 119, 575 N.E.2d 926, 929 (1991).
The equally established competing view is that “[w]hen the court announces [the jury's] discharge, and they leave the presence of the court, their functions as jurors have ended, and neither with nor without the consent of the court can they amend or alter their verdict.” Melton v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 703, 111 S.E. 291, 294 (1922); see Nails v. S & R, Inc., 334 Md. 398, 639 A.2d 660, 667 (1994) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Dietz v. Bouldin
- Rhoades v. Dormire
- Dietz v. Bouldin
- State v. Platero