Wagner v. Unemployment Compensation Com'n

• Decision Date: 09 December 1946
• Docket Number: 39692
• Citation: 198 S.W.2d 342,355 Mo. 805
• Parties: Dorothy V. Wagner v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, a Corporation, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

198 S.W.2d 342

355 Mo. 805

Dorothy V. Wagner v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, a Corporation, Appellants

No. 39692

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 9, 1946

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court; Hon. Edward T Eversole, Judge.

Reversed.

Joseph W. Hardy, John L. Porter and John F. Sloan Assistant Counsel, for appellant; Michael J. Carroll of counsel.

(1) The trial court erred in ruling that the claimant was eligible for benefits with respect to the weeks of July 16, 23, 30 and August 6, all in 1944, and that these benefits were properly allowed in the original decision, and that the later decision of the Commission that the claimant was not entitled to said award was erroneous. Partain v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, (Commerce Clearing House Michigan, 1940, Report No. 378, p. 25,583 -- See Appendix to brief). Huiet v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 70 Ga.App. 233, 28 S.E.2d 83; Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77; Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S.E.2d 743; W.T. Grant Co. v. Bd. of Review, 129 N.J.L. 402, 29 A.2d 858; Donnelly Garment Co. v. Keitel, 193 S.W.2d 577; Sec. 9430 (c), R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, p. 566, sec 7, Laws 1943, p. 917 sec. 5. (2) The trial court erred in holding that the decision of the deputy of the Unemployment Compensation awarding benefits to the claimant for the weeks ending July 16, 1944, July 23, 1944, July 30, 1944 and August 6, 1944, became final under the provisions of Section 9432, Revised Statutes 1939 as amended, that the deputy had no power to reconsider said decisions and to deny benefits, after benefits had been paid to the claimant pursuant to said decisions, and that neither the Referee nor the Commission, on appeal, whose jurisdiction is derivative, had any more power than did the deputy. Smith v. Department of Labor & Industries, 8 S.W.2d 587, 113 P.2d 57; State ex rel. Saunders v. Workmen's Comp. Comm., 333 Mo. 691, 63 S.W.2d 67; Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 203 Cal. 522, 265 P. 195; Peerless Fixture Co. v. Keitel 355 Mo. 144; State ex rel. School District of Sedalia v. Harter, 188 Mo. 516, 87 S.W. 941; Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77; Lefman v. Schuler, 317 Mo. 671, 296 S.W. 808; Arnold v. Hanna, 315 Mo. 823, 290 S.W. 416, affirmed 48 S.Ct. 212, 276 U.S. 591; Schaefer v. Buffalo Steel Car Co., 250 N.Y. 507, 166 N.E. 183; Crisco v. Edgewater Sawmills Co., 198 A.D. 458, 191 N.Y.S. 316; Partain v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission (Commerce Clearing House, Michigan 1940, Report No. 378, p. 25,583 -- See Appendix to brief); Ewasko v. Murphy, 267 A.D. 845, 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 840; Skutnik v. Corsi as Industrial Commissioner, 268 A.D. 357, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 711; State v. Cooper County Court, 17 Mo. 507; Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary; 36 Words and Phrases, p. 524; Sec. 9432 (b) and (c), R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, sec. 9, p. 566; Secs. 3730, 3732, R.S. 1939; Sec. 9440 (d) and (f), R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, sec. 16, p. 566.

Van Osdol, C. Bradley and Van Osdol, CC., concur.

OPINION

VAN OSDOL

Appeal from an order and judgment of reversal and remand rendered in an action to review the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri denying unemployment benefits to an employee, plaintiff-respondent.

Plaintiff-respondent employee, Dorothy V. Wagner, is hereinafter referred to as "Claimant"; defendants-appellants, members of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, are referred to as "Commission"; and defendant-appellant employer Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, as "Glass Company."

July 3, 1944, Claimant filed her claim for benefits with Commission stating she was unemployed, able to work and available for work and had last worked for Glass Company at Festus. Her claim was assigned to Commission's claims deputy for determination. Section 9432 R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., as amended, Laws of Missouri 1941, p. 616. The deputy determined Claimant to be eligible for benefits. She was credited with a waiting week for the week ending July 9th and was paid benefits of $ 12.50 for each of the weeks ending July 16th, 23rd, 30th and August 6th. Further benefits were withheld pending an investigation with respect to an offer of work said to have been made by Milius Shoe Company of Festus and refused by Claimant on August 8th. Claimant reported to an office of Commission and claimed weekly benefits to August 27, 1944. October 4th, Claimant was notified that the deputy had reconsidered his decision with respect to her eligibility; that she was being declared ineligible from the time she filed her first claim on the ground that she was not "available for work"; and that she had "received benefits amounting to $ 50.00 to which she was not entitled."

October 10th, Claimant filed notice of appeal. She was contending she had been eligible for benefits because unemployed, able and "available for work" until and including the week ending August 27th. A hearing was had December 7th before an appeals referee. Evidence was heard, findings made, and the deputy's decision affirmed. An application for further appeal to Commission was denied January 8, 1945, and the decision of the appeals referee was deemed to be that of Commission. Section 9432, as amended, Laws of Missouri 1941, p. 618. The instant action for review was thereafter instituted. The reviewing circuit court found that substantial evidence supported the deputy's determinations that Claimant was eligible for benefits for the weeks ending July 16th, 23rd, 30th and August 6th; and that the decision of the deputy upon reconsideration, the order of the appeals referee affirming the latter decision and the order denying the appeal whereby the order of the appeals referee became the decision of Commission were erroneous. The court declared Claimant ineligible for benefits for the weeks ending August 13th, 20th and 27th, however. The court further declared that the first decisions of the deputy became final under the provisions of Section 9432, supra, as amended, and the deputy had no power to reconsider the decisions and to deny benefits after the benefits had been paid; that neither the "Referee nor the Commission, on appeal, whose jurisdiction in this case is derivative, had any more power than did the Deputy"; and that Commission was in error in finding Claimant had received benefits to which she was not entitled.

Some sets of facts under which claims for unemployment benefits have been denied on the theory the unemployed claimant was not "available for work" as disclosed in cases of other jurisdictions were discussed in the case of Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. 540 at pages 545 and 546, 183 S.W. 2d 77 at page 81. And this court in that case noted that Section 9430 (c) R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., as amended, Laws of Missouri 1941 at page 608, required an unemployed person, in order to be eligible to receive benefits, must be "able to work" and "available for work." By applying accepted rules of construction of statutes, in the light of the evil which the Unemployment Compensation Law purposed to remedy and in the light of the conditions existing when the Law was enacted, the court observed the word "unemployment" (as used in Section 9422 R.S. 1939, Mo. R.S.A., as amended, Laws of Missouri 1941, p. 569) meant "unemployment resulting from the failure of industry to provide employment." And the court drew the conclusions that, in "providing that 'an unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the commission finds that . . . he is able to work, and available for work,' the Legislature required a sufficient showing of evidence to support a finding by the commission, and a finding by the commission, that the claimant was during said week 'capable of being used to accomplish a purpose' for work; that he was 'at disposal; accessible or attainable' for work; and that he was 'ready, handy, convenient, usable and obtainable' for work. See Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition." See also Donnelly Garment Co. v. Keitel, 354 Mo. 1138, 193 S.W. 2d 577. But, after the decision of the Haynes and Donnelly Garment Company cases, "available for work" has been given a more positive construction of meaning by legislative enactment. The 62d General Assembly further amended the Section 9430 (c), as amended in 1941, to contain the further clause, "provided, however, that no person shall be deemed available for work unless he has been and is actively seeking work." Laws of Missouri 1943, p. 934. So it is required that a person able to work (and "available for work" as defined in the Haynes case) must (in order to be deemed "available for work" as now construed in accordance with legislative mandate) have been and be "actively seeking" work, that is, not passively available and waiting for work, but actively "in search of" work. Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition, p. 2266.

In the instant case, Claimant was the only witness examined and it is apparent from the findings of fact that her testimony was considered true. The facts not being in dispute, the question presented here is one of law upon the undisputed facts. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, supra. Was Claimant "available for work"?

Claimant was laid off because of lack of work and was told by her employer, Glass Company, "they thought they were going to call the girls back . . . They didn't say how soon but they thought it wouldn't take so terrible long, they would be called back." She had worked for Glass Company about three months. Prior to her employ with Glass Company, Claimant had worked a...