Wagner v. Wagner, 2015-CA-001024-MR

Decision Date02 November 2018
Docket Number NO. 2015-CA-001100-MR,NO. 2015-CA-001024-MR ,2015-CA-001024-MR
Parties Valerie P. WAGNER , Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Kevin J. WAGNER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE: William D. Tingley, Louisville, Kentucky.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT: Thomas M. Denbow, Louisville, Kentucky.

BEFORE: ACREE, D. LAMBERT AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.

OPINION

THOMPSON, JUDGE:

Valerie P. Wagner appeals from an order of the Jefferson Family Court denying her motion to hold Kevin J. Wagner in contempt for violation of a provision in the parties' property settlement agreement requiring Kevin to make the monthly mortgage payments on the marital residence and for failure to make property distribution equalization payments as required by the agreement. We conclude the settlement agreement is unambiguous as to when Kevin’s obligation to pay the mortgage terminated and the family court erred when it denied Valerie’s motion to hold Kevin in contempt. We affirm the family court’s denial of Valerie’s contempt motion as it relates to the property distribution equalization payments.

Valerie and Kevin were married in 1985 and have two children, who were ages fifteen and ten when the parties divorced in 2008. The parties entered into a property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce decree.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, each party agreed that in reaching the agreement they relied on the financial disclosures completed by each party. In those disclosures, it was stated that Valerie’s monthly income was $3,200 per month while Kevin’s was $6,000 per month. Kevin was to pay Valerie $150,000 as a property settlement equalization payment resulting from Valerie’s waiver of her interest in the parties' various businesses and assets. Kevin agreed to pay Valerie $50,000 upon execution of the property settlement agreement and pay the remaining $100,000 at the rate of $1,340 per month commencing December 1, 2007. The property settlement agreement also provided that Valerie would have exclusive use and control of the marital home and that Kevin "shall make the mortgage payments thereon until such time as Valerie decides to sell the property." Upon the sale of the home, the net proceeds were to be divided between the parties. In the agreement, Valerie waived maintenance.

In December 2008, the parties entered into an agreement wherein Kevin would quitclaim all his right, title and interest in the marital home for a credit of $75,000 towards the remaining balance on the original $150,000 equalization payment obligation and executed an acknowledgment of that agreement. Kevin executed a quitclaim deed to Valerie on December 4, 2008.

Valerie first listed the marital home for sale in August 2011, but did not receive an offer for her asking price and the house did not sell. After Kevin stopped making the mortgage payments in June 2013, the home was foreclosed upon and sold through a short sale for $420,000 on January 2, 2014.

On February 19, 2014, Valerie filed a motion for contempt against Kevin for failing to pay the mortgage, failing to make the property distribution equalization payments and failing to pay child support payments in violation of the property settlement agreement.

Valerie argued the phrase "until such time as Valerie decides to sell the property" means Kevin was required to pay the mortgage until she accepted an offer on the house or until the house actually sold. Kevin disagreed with that interpretation and argued that his obligation to make the mortgage payment ended when Valerie listed the house for sale in August 2011.

The family court held a hearing on the contempt motion. Approximately seven minutes into the hearing, Valerie’s counsel attempted to introduce evidence of the parties' income when the settlement agreement was reached as evidence that it could not have been the intent of the parties' that Valerie would pay the mortgage before the home sold because her income was below the monthly payment. The family court ruled that such evidence was irrelevant stating as follows:

The agreement says what it says. The agreement doesn't say ... I'm just saying it is very simple. She works for the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office. I mean whatever ... the agreement says that he continues to make the mortgage payments thereon until such time as she decides to the sell the property—not until she sells the property.

The hearing continued, and the following evidence was produced.2 Valerie listed the property for sale in 2011 and, after that time, Kevin continued to make the mortgage payment until June 2013. Kevin testified he did so not because of any obligation under the property settlement agreement, but because the children were living in the home and his name was on the mortgage note. The property was listed with three different listing agents before a short sale of the property was arranged. To satisfy the deficiency on the mortgage, Kevin paid $10,000 at the short sale closing and signed a promissory note for $29,124.64.

Valerie testified that in December 2008, she signed a document captioned "Acknowledgment" giving Kevin a $75,000 credit towards the remaining balance on his equalization payment in exchange for a quitclaim deed for his interest in the marital home. She testified she signed the acknowledgement because Kevin pressured her to sign the document and told her if she did not, she would likely lose the home because he was in financial crisis and creditors would place liens on the home. Valerie also testified to instances of domestic violence by Kevin and that his alcohol and drug problems caused her to divorce him. She testified she was afraid of Kevin and of losing the home. Valerie testified that after having the acknowledgment in her possession from August 2008 until December 2008, she signed the acknowledgment and the quitclaim deed in her home without a notary present. Kevin testified both instruments were signed at a bank by both parties with a notary present.

In its written order, the family court confirmed its bench ruling that the phrase "decides to sell" is unambiguous, ruling that "[t]he Agreement clearly states that Kevin will pay the mortgage until Valerie decides to sell the property-not until the property is sold." Consequently, the family court ruled that Kevin had no legal obligation to pay the mortgage after Valerie listed the home for sale in 2011, and he did not violate the settlement agreement. The family court further found that Valerie received more than $100,000 over six years and, therefore, Kevin did not violate the agreement by failing to make the property equalization payment as required.3

Valerie filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.04 requesting that the family court make a specific finding that "decides to sell" is unambiguous or is ambiguous. She further requested specific findings as to whether the acknowledgment was an arm’s length agreement that was open and fairly negotiated, voluntarily entered and conscionable.

The family court denied the motion to the extent that it requested additional findings regarding the phrase "decides to sell the property." The family court ruled that the issue of conscionability was not addressed at the hearing but made additional findings regarding the validity of the acknowledgment. The family court found that Valerie was a paralegal and understood the terms of the signed and notarized acknowledgment and had access to legal advice.

A property settlement agreement is a contract and, therefore, governed by contract law. Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc. , 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. 2003). "The primary object in construing a contract or compromise settlement agreement is to effectuate the intentions of the parties." Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 94 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky.App. 2002). "Any contract or agreement must be construed as a whole, giving effect to all parts and every word in it if possible." City of Louisa v. Newland , 705 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ky. 1986). When determining the parties' intent, certain rules of construction are applicable.

Where a contract is ambiguous or silent on a vital matter, a court may consider parol and extrinsic evidence involving the circumstances surrounding execution of the contract, the subject matter of the contract, the objects to be accomplished, and the conduct of the parties. Absent an ambiguity in the contract, the parties' intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.

Cantrell Supply, Inc. , 94 S.W.3d at 385 (citations omitted). An...

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6 cases
  • Marshall v. Marshall
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 2020
    ...REVIEW A property settlement agreement, as incorporated into a decree of dissolution of marriage, is a contract. See Wagner v. Wagner, 563 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App. 2018); see also KRS3 403.180(5); Money v. Money, 297 S.W.3d 69, 71 (Ky. App. 2009). "The interpretation of a contract is a matt......
  • Russelburg v. Russelburg
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • March 6, 2020
    ...property settlement agreement is interpreted under the same rules that govern the construction of other contracts. Wagner v. Wagner, 563 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky.App. 2018). Under Kentucky law, a contractual provision is only ambiguous if it is susceptible to multiple or inconsistent interpretati......
  • Cole v. Cole
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    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • September 15, 2023
    ... ... therefore, governed by contract law. See Wagner v ... Wagner, 563 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App. 2018) (citations ... omitted); KRS[2] ... ...
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    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • August 9, 2019
    ...duress is a question of law," while " ‘whether duress exists in a particular case is a question of fact.’ " Wagner v. Wagner , 563 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. App. 2018) (citations omitted). Of course, "[q]uestions of fact are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard." Id. (citing Mays v. Ma......
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