Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., Civ. No. H-90-481 (AHN).

• Decision Date: 17 August 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-90-481 (AHN).
• Citation: 800 F. Supp. 1061
• Parties: Donald and Irene WAHLSTROM, Administrators of the Estate of Scott Wahlstrom, Plaintiffs, v. KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp., U.S.A., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

800 F. Supp. 1061

Donald and Irene WAHLSTROM, Administrators of the Estate of Scott Wahlstrom, Plaintiffs, v. KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp., U.S.A., Defendants.

Civ. No. H-90-481 (AHN).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

August 17, 1992.

Richard L. Newman, Cohen & Wolf, Danbury, Conn., for plaintiffs.

William I. Garfinkel and Trudie R. Hamilton, Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, Conn., for defendants.

NEVAS, District Judge.

After review and over objection, the Magistrate's Recommended Ruling is approved, adopted and ratified.

SO ORDERED.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LATIMER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this diversity action, cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), as administrators of the estate of Scott Wahlstrom, their 17-year old son who died leaving no dependents. They seek wrongful death damages under the Connecticut Product Liability Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-572m, et seq., including punitive damages, from the defendant Kawasaki companies that designed, manufactured and distributed the rented jet ski their son was using when he was killed in a collision with a motor boat on the Thames River, in Ledyard, Connecticut. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, cf. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., arguing that plaintiffs' state law claim must be dismissed because the instant action involves a collision between two pleasure craft on navigable waters, and is therefore governed by this court's admiralty jurisdiction. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1); see also Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990). With admiralty jurisdiction controlling, defendants further argue that the general maritime law, a uniform body of tort common law identified by the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), must be applied — meaning in this case that pertinent federal decisional law would apply, automatically precluding any reliance on Connecticut state tort law. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959); Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F.Supp. 862 (E.D.La.), aff'd, 889 F.2d 273 (5 Cir.1989). Defendants also assert that when the general maritime law is applied to the present case, recovery of any wrongful death damages is barred because plaintiffs are not dependents of the decedent, see Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F.Supp. 929 (E.D.La.1987) and punitive damages are also barred since no such award can be made when compensatory damages are unavailable, see Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 873. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

As a threshold matter, defendants are correct that plaintiffs' attempted wrongful death claim is governed by admiralty because this case, involving a collision between a jet ski and a motor boat, satisfies the Supreme Court's twofold jurisdictional test: (1) the alleged tort occurred on a navigable waterway; and (2) it bears a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity. Cf. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). First, it is undisputed that the Thames River is a navigable waterway for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, as it is capable of serving as "a highway for maritime commerce". The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870). Second, contrary to plaintiffs' position, it makes little difference that the decedent was killed while operating a recreational jet ski: such a craft can and properly should be defined as a "vessel" under current maritime jurisdictional analysis. See 1 U.S.C. § 3 ("the word `vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water"); cf. also Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225 (11 Cir.1990); Matter of Guglielmo, 897 F.2d 58 (2 Cir.1990). In this regard, the operation of a motorized jet ski, like a small motor boat, sufficiently implicates traditional maritime activities. Foremost, supra, 457 U.S. at 676, 102 S.Ct. at 2659. As plaintiffs' complaint essentially alleges that decedent was killed as a result of "a collision between two vessels on navigable waters ... it properly states a claim within the admiralty jurisdiction of this federal court", id. at 677, 102 S.Ct. at 2659; see also Sisson, supra, 497 U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 2897 (holding that "navigation is an example, rather than a sole instance, of conduct that is substantially related to traditional maritime activity"). It is important to note that this conclusion is not affected by either: (1) plaintiffs' deliberate reliance on diversity of citizenship, and not admiralty, as a basis of federal jurisdiction, because maritime principles would govern in any event, cf. Kermarec, supra, 358 U.S. at 628, 79 S.Ct. at 408; or (2) plaintiffs' specific assertion of a product liability claim, as that theory of liability is currently incorporated within the law of admiralty, cf. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986).

Finding that admiralty jurisdiction exists here does not, however, require that defendants' "automatic preclusion" argument be addressed at this time. Admittedly, defendants do offer strong reasons for establishing a bright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, "it appears that that choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of the now pending summary judgment motion ... because plaintiffs' state claims are not permitted in any event where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law". Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn. 1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that "reverse-Erie" doctrine requires that substantive remedies afforded by state law conform to federal maritime standards); Complaint of DFDS Seaways (Bahamas) Ltd., 684 F.Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y.1987) ("It is well settled that federal maritime law is to be applied to the exclusion of conflicting state law even in state courts" (emphasis in original and citations omitted)). In other words, defendants' call for preemption is mandated here not by application of abstract choice-between-laws principles but by the force of the Supremacy Clause standing alone. Cf. U.S. Const. art. VI. As defendants correctly point out, Connecticut state tort law permits the recovery of damages brought by the beneficiaries of a decedent without regard for dependence. Cf. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-572m, et seq. In contrast, the general maritime law does not allow the nondependents of a decedent who is not a seaman to recover wrongful death damages for his death arising in state territorial waters. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whittaker, Corp., 692 F.Supp. 764, 770-773 (W.D.Mich.1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 894 F.2d 804 (6 Cir.1990) (nondependent parents of two recreational boaters killed after their boat capsized on Lake Michigan cannot recover wrongful death damages in the form of loss of society); Truehart, supra at 936-938 (nondependent parents and siblings of pleasure boat passenger killed within navigable waters cannot maintain action for loss of society). This federal law difference is independently sufficient to require dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims "as a matter of law", Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.

At common law, it was assumed that all personal injury actions died with the plaintiff. Recognizing the unfairness of such an inflexible rule, state legislatures began to enact wrongful death statutes. These wrongful death statutes permitted the survivors of a decedent to seek damages for the loss they suffered as a result of the death. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 584, 94 S.Ct. 806, 814, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974). Such recovery typically included pecuniary damages in the form of loss of support and services, medical and funeral expenses, and non-pecuniary damages such as loss of society. Id. In turn, courts in admiralty often applied these state statutes to preserve suits for death at sea. In The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358 (1886), the Supreme Court acknowledged this statutory trend but adhered to the position that in the absence of such an applicable statute, the general maritime law does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death. The practical effect of this decision was to foreclose recovery by representatives of a decedent killed on the high seas due to a breach of general maritime law, but allow recovery for those killed on territorial waters where state tort law generally applied. Adding further to this confusion was the fact that even where a state statute applied, the action was still subject to the many substantive limitations imposed by state law. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 L.Ed.2d 524 (1959) (state statute denying a cause of action based on unseaworthiness, i.e., a form of strict liability for shipowners).

In 1920, Congress attempted to provide uniformity with respect to certain federal maritime interests by passing the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761, et seq., ("DOHSA") and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. Under the DOHSA, Congress bypassed the rule in The Harrisburg by establishing a statutory right of action for loss of pecuniary damages by the beneficiaries of a decedent killed outside state...