McBride v. J.L. Bedsole/Rotary Rehab. Hosp. & Mobile Infirmary Ass'n) (Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n)

• Decision Date: 10 September 2021
• Docket Number: 1200200
• Citation: 349 So.3d 842
• Parties: EX PARTE MOBILE INFIRMARY ASSOCIATION d/b/a J.L. Bedsole Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital and d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center (In re: John R. McBride v. J.L. Bedsole/Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital and Mobile Infirmary Association)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

349 So.3d 842

EX PARTE MOBILE INFIRMARY ASSOCIATION d/b/a J.L. Bedsole Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital and d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center(In re: John R. McBride

v.J.L. Bedsole/Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital and Mobile Infirmary Association)

1200200

Supreme Court of Alabama.

September 10, 2021

A. Edwin Stuardi III, Thomas Ryan Luna, and William W. Watts III of Helmsing, Leach, Herlong, Newman & Rouse, P.C., Mobile, for petitioners.

Adam Shea Gober, Spanish Fort, for appellee.

BRYAN, Justice.

Mobile Infirmary Association ("MIA"), doing business as J.L. Bedsole Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital ("Rotary Rehab") and doing business as Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("Mobile Infirmary"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to dismiss a complaint filed by John R. McBride alleging medical malpractice. For the reasons explained below, we grant the petition and issue the writ.

Background

On July 22, 2020, McBride filed a complaint in the circuit court, listing as defendants "J.L. Bedsole/Rotary Rehabilitation Hospital," "Mobile Infirmary Association," and fictitiously named defendants. According to McBride's complaint, he had undergone a craniotomy

, hospitalization, and treatment at Mobile Infirmary for a subdural hematoma he had suffered while at home. He alleged that, in early June 2018, he was transferred to Rotary Rehab "to receive skilled and specialized nursing, medical and rehabilitative therapy." McBride further alleged that, while he was a patient at Rotary Rehab, he "suffered a decubitus pressure ulcer to his left and right heels, causing severe pain and suffering, infection, hospital treatment, financial loss, emotional distress, and eventually amputation below his left knee." McBride's complaint asserted counts of negligence and wantonness against the defendants, based on several alleged breaches of the applicable standards of care.

MIA, in its capacity doing business as Rotary Rehab and in its capacity doing business as Mobile Infirmary, filed a motion to dismiss McBride's complaint,¹ arguing that his claims are barred by the limitations period set out in § 6-5-482(a), Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in relevant part: "All actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, medical institutions, or other health care providers for liability, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, must be commenced within two years next after the act, or omission, or failure giving rise to the claim ...." (Emphasis added.) MIA asserted:

"2. Here, [McBride]'s Complaint ... alleges that he was dismissed from Mobile Infirmary on June 2, 2018[,] and was dismissed from ... Rotary Rehab on June 20, 2018. Accordingly, the last date any claims against Mobile Infirmary could have accrued was on June 2, 2018. The last date any claims against ... Rotary Rehab could have accrued was on June 20, 2018.

"3. [McBride]'s Complaint was not filed until July 22, 2020, more than two years after the date of accrual of any potential claims against Mobile Infirmary or ... Rotary Rehab. Accordingly, these claims are barred pursuant to Alabama Code [1975,] § 6-5-482."

McBride filed a response and a supplemental response to the motion to dismiss. In summary, McBride argued that the legal injury forming the basis of his claims was the below-the-knee amputation of his left leg, which he contends occurred on July 23, 2018. Because he commenced this action within two years of the occurrence of that injury, McBride argued, his claims are not barred by § 6-5-482(a). MIA filed a reply to McBride's responses, arguing that, as opposed to the amputation of his lower left leg, McBride's actual legal injuries were the pressure ulcers

referenced in his complaint, which were present before July 22, 2018. Thus, MIA argued, McBride's claims accrued more than two years before he commenced this action on July 22, 2020, and are, therefore, barred by § 6-5-482(a).

After a hearing,² the circuit court entered an order denying MIA's motion to dismiss on November 20, 2020. MIA timely filed this petition for a writ of mandamus on December 29, 2020. See Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P.

Standard of Review

" ‘A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the petitioner can demonstrate: " ‘(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ " Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001) ).’

" Ex parte Watters, 212 So. 3d 174, 180 (Ala. 2016).

" ‘The general rule is that, subject to certain narrow exceptions, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by petition for a writ of mandamus.’ Ex parte Brown, [Ms. 1190962, Jan. 22, 2021] 331 So.3d 79, 81 (Ala. 2021). However,

" ‘[t]his Court has recognized that an appeal is an inadequate remedy in cases where it has determined that a defendant should not have been subjected to the inconvenience of litigation because it was clear from the face of the complaint that the defendant was entitled to a dismissal or to a judgment in its favor.’

" Ex parte Sanderson, 263 So. 3d 681, 687-88 (Ala. 2018) (citing Ex parte Hodge, 153 So. 3d 734 (Ala. 2014), and Ex parte U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 148 So. 3d 1060 (Ala. 2014) ). In particular, in Ex parte Hodge, this Court permitted mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss contending that the plaintiff's malpractice claim was barred by the four-year statute of repose contained in § 6-5-482(a), Ala. Code 1975, when the applicability of that statute was clear from the face of the complaint. Cf. Ex parte Watters, 212 So. 3d at 182 (denying a mandamus petition because ‘it [was] not abundantly clear from the face of [the plaintiff's] complaint whether the survival statute dictate[d] dismissal of the legal-malpractice claim because the issue whether the claim sound[ed] in tort, in contract, or in both for that matter, [was] sharply disputed by the parties’).

"With respect to evaluating a trial court's denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) [, Ala. R. Civ. P.,³ ] motion to dismiss,

" ‘[t]he appropriate standard of review ... is whether "when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [the pleader] to relief." Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) ; Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1985). This Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether the plaintiff may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299. A "dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299 ; Garrett v. Hadden, 495 So. 2d 616, 617 (Ala. 1986) ; Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496 So. 2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986).’

" Lyons v. River Rd. Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 260 (Ala. 2003)."

Ex parte Abbott Lab'ys, 342 So.3d 186, 193-94 (Ala. 2021).

Analysis

MIA argues that it is clear from the face of McBride's complaint that his cause of action accrued more than two years before he filed his complaint on July 22, 2020, and, consequently, is barred under the two-year limitations period imposed by § 6-5-482(a). MIA cites, among other cases, this Court's decision in Mobile Infirmary v. Delchamps, 642 So. 2d 954 (Ala. 1994). In Delchamps, the Court stated the following general propositions concerning the operation of the limitations period set out in § 6-5-482 :

"The limitations period of § 6-5-482 commences with the accrual of a cause of action. Street v. City of Anniston, 381 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1980) ; Bowlin Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1983) ; Ramey v. Guyton, 394 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1981). A cause of action ‘accrues’ under § 6-5-482 when the act complained of results in legal injury to the plaintiff. Grabert v. Lightfoot, 571 So. 2d 293, 294 (Ala. 1990) ; Colburn v. Wilson, 570 So. 2d 652, 654 (Ala. 1990). The statutory limitations period begins to run whether or not the full amount of damages is apparent at the time of the first legal injury. Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516, 518 (Ala. 1979). When the wrongful act or omission and the resulting legal injury do not occur simultaneously, the cause of action accrues and the limitations period of § 6-5-482 commences when the legal injury occurs.

Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc., 435 So. 2d 218, 219 (Ala. 1983) ; Ramey v. Guyton, 394 So. 2d 2, 4-5 (Ala. 1981)."

Delchamps, 642 So. 2d at 958 (emphasis added).

McBride's complaint lists the following injuries he allegedly suffered "[a]s a direct and proximate result of [the defendants’] negligent [and wanton] acts and omissions":

"a. A pressure ulcer

to his left heel,

"b. Severe pain and suffering,

"c. Infection,

"d. Wound deterioration,

"e. Loss of dignity, and

"f. Amputation of his left leg below the knee."

According to McBride's complaint, he was discharged from Rotary Rehab "[o]n June 20, 2018, ... with pressure ulcers

present on both his left and right heels. [McBride]’s left heel pressure ulcer was recorded as unstageable with dark gray eschar and erythema and edema surrounding the wound." His allegation is that, but for the negligent and wanton failure by the defendants to provide him with adequate care while he was a patient, he would not have suffered the injuries referenced in his complaint.

Thus, based on the allegations set out in McBride's July 22, 2020, complaint, it is clear that he commenced this action more than two years after the alleged negligence and wantonness that caused the "pressure ulcers

... on both his left and right heels" and "the dark gray eschar and erythema and edema surrounding the" left-heel pressure ulcer. See

Delchamps, 642 So. 2d at 958. Notwithstanding the...