Wainwright v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1918
• Docket Number: 4893.
• Citation: 253 F. 459
• Parties: WAINWRIGHT v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

253 F. 459

WAINWRIGHT v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. 4893.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

October 22, 1918

Brownrigg Mason & Altman, of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff.

Fordyce Holliday & White, of St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.

E. H Seneff and D. P. Williams, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., amici curiae.

TRIEBER District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The demurrer to the plea raises two questions of law: (1) Assuming that the act of Congress authorizes the President and the agencies appointed by him to make these regulations, is the act warranted by the Constitution? (2) Does the act vest the power to make these regulations in the President or the Director General?

At the outset of this opinion it is proper to state that, as this action was originally instituted in a court of the United States, the question whether Congress may authorize the general orders in question to apply to the courts of the states is not involved, and therefore cannot be determined in this proceeding. What is stated in this opinion is necessarily intended to apply solely to actions instituted in the national courts. Whether, under the war power, Congress may enact laws affecting the maintenance of actions in the state courts, can only be determined when it properly comes before the court. To express an opinion on that question in the instant case would be clearly obiter, and the court, for this reason, limits this opinion to actions instituted in the national courts.

Has Congress the power to enact this legislation, assuming that it vests the power claimed on behalf of the defendant?

That Congress possesses the power to enact legislation of this nature, under the Constitution, cannot be questioned at this day. There are several grounds upon which it must be sustained.

1. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (4 L.Ed. 579), Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion of the court, it was held as a proper canon of the interpretation of the powers of Congress under the national Constitution, among others:

'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.'

This rule of construction has never been doubted or questioned by any subsequent decision, but has been uniformly followed, whenever it has been before the courts, and must therefore be accepted as elementary in the construction of the national Constitution. That there is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting Congress from determining the venue in civil actions is beyond question.

Article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 11, of the Constitution, grants Congress the power to declare war, and clause 12 of that section empowers it to raise and support armies. That, by virtue of these provisions of the Constitution, Congress may use all means which are, in its opinion, appropriate to that end and not prohibited by some provision of the Constitution, has, under the rule established in McCulloch v. Maryland, been settled in Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 20 L.Ed. 135, and Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506, 507, 20 L.Ed. 176; reaffirmed in Mayfield v. Richards, 115 U.S. 137, 5 Sup.Ct. 1187, 29 L.Ed. 334. In Stewart v. Kahn it was held:

'The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrection are not defined. The decision of all such questions rests wholly in the discretion of those to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the Constitution. In the latter case the power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.'

The same principle was recognized in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 539 (20 L.Ed. 286), where it was held:

'Before we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we must be convinced they were not appropriate means, or means conducive to the execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government, not appropriate in any degree (for we are not judges of the degree of appropriateness), or we must hold that they were prohibited. This brings us to the inquiry whether they were, when enacted, appropriate instrumentalities for carrying into effect or executing any of the known powers of Congress, or of any department of the government. Plainly to this inquiry, a consideration of the time when they were enacted, and of the circumstances in which the government then stood, is important. It is not to be denied that acts may be adapted to the exercise of lawful power, and appropriate to it, in seasons of exigency, which would be inappropriate at other times.'

See, also, the address of former Justice Hughes on the War Powers under the Constitution, 42 American Bar Association, 232.

Whether the exigencies existed when Congress enacted this statute was for that body to determine, and cannot be questioned by the courts, if there is any substantial ground therefor. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra; Lottery Cases, 188 U.S. 321, 355, 23 Sup.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 128, 33 Sup.Ct. 431, 57 L.Ed. 754, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 984, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39. That there was substantial ground for the enactment of the statute requires no argument. The conditions so graphically described in the Legal Tender Cases (79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 540, 20 L.Ed. 286) prevail now, and it will conduce to brevity to refer to what was there said, without quoting it in this opinion.

That the act was enacted under the war power is not only apparent from its context, but it is expressly declared in section 16 of the act 'to be emergency legislation, enacted to meet conditions growing out of war,' and section 14 provides that the federal control of railroads shall continue not exceeding one year and nine months after the ratification of the treaty of peace.

2. Another ground upon which the act must be sustained is that the right to maintain an action in any particular court is always subject to the legislative will. It is only when one is deprived of all rights to maintain an action for the redress of his wrongs that the statute would be obnoxious to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Congress has uniformly exercised that power by providing in what courts suits may be maintained, and in no instance has such an act been held void. Among the many is Act March 3, 1873, c. 226, 17 Stat. 509, authorizing the Attorney General to institute suits against the Union Pacific Railroad Company, for certain acts, in any Circuit Court of the United States. The constitutionality of this act was sustained in United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 25 L.Ed. 143. The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, approved June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 595, c. 3591, Sec. 7, pars. 11, 12 (Comp. St. 1916, Secs. 8604a, 8604aa)), authorizes an action against the receiving carrier, regardless of the fact that the loss or damage sued for was caused by a connecting carrier. Its constitutionality was sustained in Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 31 Sup.Ct. 164, 55 L.Ed. 167, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 7. Act Feb. 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 6923), vested the exclusive jurisdiction of actions on bonds of contractors for the construction of public works in the courts of the district in which said contract was to be performed and executed. The validity of the act was sustained in United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 U.S. 199, 203, 32 Sup.Ct. 44, 56 L.Ed. 163, Hopkins v. Ellington & Guy, 246 U.S. 655, 38 Sup.Ct. 423, 62 L.Ed. 924, and Ex parte Southwestern Surety Ins. Co., 247 U.S. 19, 38 Sup.Ct. 430, 62 L.Ed. 961. The Clayton Act, approved October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730, 737, c. 323, Sec. 12 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 8835k)), expressly authorizes an action by the government, not only in the district whereof the defendant corporation is an inhabitant, but in any district where it may be found or does business. Section 15 of that act (section 8835n) authorizes service of process on other parties than the offending corporation, who are properly joined, in any district where found. The validity of these provisions was sustained in Southern Photo Material Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (D.C.) 234 F. 955.

Every state of the Union has provided by statute the venue for civil actions in its courts. In some states actions may be brought only in the county where the defendant resides; in some, where the defendant resides or may be found. Some actions can only be maintained in the county in which the cause of action accrued; others, where the subject-matter of the action is situated; and in some states actions may be maintained in the county where either plaintiff or defendant resides. The various acts are referred to in 22 Encyc. of Pl. & Pr. 790 et seq. In United States v. Crawford (C.C.) 47 F. 561, 565, Judge Parker said:

'I have no doubt that Congress may provide for service of process out of the district, as this is a regulation of practice and subject to the legislative control.'

This was cited with approval by Judge Morrow in United States v. American Lumber Co. (C.C.) 80 F. 309, and in Sidney L. Bauman, etc., Co. v. Hart, 192 F. 498, 113 C.C.A. 104.

3. Another ground upon which this provision of the act must be upheld is that the courts of the United States, inferior to the Supreme Court, are not established by the Constitution but owe their existence and powers to Congress alone. That they possess no powers not granted by an act of Co...