Waite Park v. Mn. Office of Admin. Hear., No. A07-2438.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. A07-2438.
• Citation: 758 N.W.2d 347
• Parties: CITY OF WAITE PARK, petitioner, Respondent, Richard G. Heid, et al., intervenors, Respondents, v. MINNESOTA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

758 N.W.2d 347

CITY OF WAITE PARK, petitioner, Respondent Richard G. Heid, et al., intervenors, Respondents, v. MINNESOTA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Appellant.

No. A07-2438.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

December 16, 2008.

Brandon M. Fitzsimmons, Christopher M. Hood, Flaherty & Hood, P.A., St. Paul, MN, for respondents.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by HUDSON, Presiding Judge; KALITOWSKI, Judge; and JOHNSON, Judge.

OPINION

HUDSON, Judge.

This matter was previously appealed to this court after the district court granted mandamus compelling appellant Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to allow annexation of certain land by respondent City of Waite Park (city). We affirmed that decision without remanding to the district court, and there was no petition for further review. City of Waite Park v. Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings, No. A05-1888 (Minn.App. July 18, 2006). OAH promptly ordered the annexation of the property in compliance with this court's opinion. Two months after this court's decision, respondents Richard G. Heid and Robert P. Herges (Heid and Herges) filed with the district court a "claim for damages and interest" exceeding $2 million. OAH moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing both immunity and that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The district court denied the motions, and this appeal follows. Because we conclude that no claim for damages was pleaded, that the earlier decision finally determined the district court action, and that the absence of a remand to the district court extinguished the claim for damages that Heid and Herges now seek to assert, we reverse.

FACTS

In 2001, the city and the Township of St. Joseph (township) approved and adopted a joint resolution for orderly annexation that set forth the terms and conditions under which the city could annex land within the township. See Minn.Stat. § 414.0325 (2000). In 2004, Heid and Herges petitioned the city for the annexation of property they intended to develop and for a connection to the city sewer and water services. The city council approved the annexation, but the township objected. OAH concluded that there was a genuine dispute about whether the proposed annexation was in accord with the joint resolution, directed the parties to attempt to resolve their disputes, and indicated that the matter would be referred for a hearing before an administrative law judge, if necessary.

Before any administrative hearing was held, the city brought mandamus proceedings in district court. Heid and Herges intervened in the mandamus proceeding. Their "verified pleading and statement of reasons for intervention" adopted "the allegations in the [city's] petition." Their prayer for relief sought a writ of mandamus compelling OAH "to order annexation," an award of "statutory costs and disbursements," and "such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable." The district court ruled in favor of the city and Heid and Herges, concluding that OAH had a duty to order the annexation, and it issued a writ of mandamus.

OAH appealed to this court and the district court stayed enforcement of its writ pending the outcome of the appeal. This court questioned whether the order granting mandamus had disposed of all claims in the underlying action and whether judgment had been entered, and ordered the parties to file jurisdiction memoranda. Heid and Herges did not file a memorandum or otherwise respond to this court's order questioning jurisdiction. OAH responded and argued that the order, writ, and judgment in the district court finally disposed of all pending claims, aside from the taxation of costs and disbursements. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 104.02 (providing that time to appeal from final judgment "shall not be extended by the subsequent insertion therein of costs and disbursements"). The city agreed that costs and disbursements were still pending, but argued that the decision was final and appealable. The city indicated that it might pursue a request for attorney fees, although no such request was then pending, and it cited a case that held that district courts have "continuing jurisdiction" to decide the amount of attorney fees, even after an appeal has been taken from a judgment on the merits, although the preferred course is for the district courts "to rule on such claims as soon as possible after entry of judgment on the merits or to not enter judgment on the merits until the fees issue has been finally resolved." Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 825-26 (Minn.1984). A special term panel of this court concluded that (a) the pending request for costs and disbursements did not affect the finality of the decision, and (b) because no request for attorney fees was actually pending in the district court, the appeal was properly taken from a final decision in a special proceeding. No party sought further review of that special term order. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 117, subd. 1 (requiring that any petition for further review by the supreme court be served and filed within 30 days after filing of this court's decision).

In their brief in the first appeal, Heid and Herges urged this court to "uphold" the district court's grant of mandamus. The city urged this court to "affirm ... the order granting the writ." (Amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities also requested "that the district court's decision be affirmed.") No party sought a remand to the district court. This court affirmed the district court without remanding the matter, there was no petition for further review, and judgment was entered on this court's opinion. City of Waite Park v. Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings, No. A05-1888 (Minn.App. July 18, 2006); see Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 136.02 (staying entry of judgment on appellate decision until expiration of time to seek further review in the supreme court).

Two months after this court's opinion, Heid and Herges brought a "claim for damages and interest" in the original district court mandamus file. The district court denied motions by OAH to dismiss or for summary judgment on the basis of immunity or lack of jurisdiction. This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court have jurisdiction to consider a newly pleaded claim for damages, which was asserted after an appeal from a final decision in a special proceeding, and which did not result in a remand from the appellate court?

ANALYSIS

If a decision on appeal has "finally concluded" a matter, the district court will thereafter be "without jurisdiction to entertain" post-appeal motions for additional relief. Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 414 N.W.2d 717, 718 (Minn.1987). While it may be tempting "to frame the threshold issue in terms of res judicata and law of the case," the supreme court has held that "[n]either doctrine quite fits." Id. at 719. Appellate decisions, whether in the form of an affirmance, reversal, or modification, are generally intended "to dispose of the case as completely and finally as possible." Id. at 720. "If complete finality cannot be accomplished ... the appellate court will ordinarily so indicate, usually by a remand with directions or a mandate which the trial court must follow." Id. Determining the finality of a decision and the intent of the appellate court is based on "what the court's decision says." Id. Whether the district court has jurisdiction to entertain a specific claim for relief or should have granted summary judgment without reaching the merits of claims that are allegedly not properly before the court is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn. 2002); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Minn.App.2003).

OAH argues that the district court no longer had jurisdiction because (1) money damages were not sought in the initial pleadings and the issue of damages was not raised in the first appeal; (2) the filing of the first appeal deprived the district court of further jurisdiction over the matter (and the district court did not regain jurisdiction upon affirmance); and (3) the district court's final decision granting mandamus did not contain an award of damages or any reservation of jurisdiction. We agree.

Initial pleadings

OAH argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because no claim for money damages was included in Heid and Herges's initial pleadings. The mandamus statute provides that "[a] plaintiff who is given judgment [in a mandamus action], shall recover the damage sustained, together with costs and disbursements." Minn.Stat. § 586.09 (2006) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that "[a]n appeal from the district court shall lie to the Court of Appeals in mandamus as in other civil cases." Id. When a statute indicates that proceedings "shall be conducted in the same manner as in a civil action," the statute is construed as if it adopts the rules of procedure by reference in the absence of specific statutory provisions that are inconsistent with such a reading. Nationwide Corp. v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 266, 87 N.W.2d 671, 680 (1958). The rules of civil procedure require that a pleading must "contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought." Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. If money damages of less than $50,000 are sought, the amount sought must be stated in the pleading, and if more is sought "the pleading shall state ... that recovery of reasonable damages in an amount greater than $50,000 is sought." Id.

Heid and Herges's "verified pleading" as intervenors did not include a demand for money damages. The prayer for relief in that pleading sought a writ of mandamus, plus costs and disbursements, but not money damages. In their "statement of reasons for intervention," Heid and...