Waite v. McKelvy

• Decision Date: 12 January 1898
• Docket Number: 10,920 - (218)
• Citation: 73 N.W. 727,71 Minn. 167
• Parties: MARIA D. WAITE v. JAMES E. McKELVY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

73 N.W. 727

71 Minn. 167

MARIA D. WAITE v. JAMES E. McKELVY

Nos. 10,920 - (218)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 12, 1898

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Stearns county, Baxter, J., denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, after a verdict for plaintiff by direction of the court. Reversed.

SYLLABUS

Statute of Frauds -- Oral Contract of Sale -- Acceptance of Goods -- Evidence.

Held that the evidence in this case did not show, as a matter of law, that a verbal contract for the sale of the chattels in question was made and so far executed as to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, and that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.

Statute of Frauds -- Delivery to Carrier Designated by Buyer.

The mere delivery of personal property to a carrier designated by the buyer does not authorize the carrier to accept it, so as to take an oral agreement for the sale of it out of the statute of frauds.

Statute of Frauds -- Defense of the Statute -- Availability to Third Persons -- Sheriff -- Levy on Execution.

The rule that the defense of the statute of frauds is personal to the parties to the oral contract has no application to the sheriff, where he levies on the chattels, which are the subject of the contract, before the requirements of the statute necessary to a valid sale have been satisfied.

Calhoun & Bennett, for appellant.

J. D Sullivan, for respondent.

OPINION

*T, C.J.

This was an action of claim and delivery to recover possession of a car load of wheat, rye, buckwheat, flour, chicken feed and sweepings, which was conceded to be at one time the property of Clarke Waite, a son of the plaintiff, but which was sold by him to the plaintiff, as she claims, before it was levied upon by the defendant, as sheriff, by virtue of a writ of attachment issued in an action against him as his property.

The only issue in the case which it is necessary here to consider is the ownership of the property. The trial court, at the close of the evidence, directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff for the property, and the defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The assignments of error raise the general question whether the evidence showed conclusively, and as a matter of law, that the title of the property had passed from the son to the mother before it was seized by the defendant. The evidence is undisputed that Clarke Waite, for some ten months prior to November 16, 1896, the day on which the defendant took the property, was in the milling business at Cold Springs, Stearns county, operating a flour mill belonging to the plaintiff, and became indebted to her for rent in a sum in excess of the value of the property. The plaintiff claims that the property was delivered to her on board of the cars at Cold Springs, pursuant to an agreement between herself and son that he should deliver it in part payment of the rent due her.

The evidence in support of this claim may be summarized as follows: The son testified, when first on the stand, that he loaded the property in a car on the side track at the Cold Springs station, and took a way bill from the railway company, in which the consignee and destination named were "M. D. Waite [the plaintiff], St. Cloud, Minn., via Great Northern Railway." That the property, among other articles, consisted of 18,000 pounds of chicken feed and 1,500 pounds of sweepings; also wheat and rye, and flour of each, and corn meal, -- all of which was his property when taken from the mill. That it was so loaded and billed, pursuant to an agreement he had with his mother, in payment on rent he owed her, but the terms of the agreement he did not state. That he obtained the way bill about six o'clock in the evening, and has ever since retained it. That the next morning the defendant took the property from the car, it still remaining on the track. The plaintiff, in her examination in chief, testified as follows as to the contract:

"Clarke Waite, my son, never paid me any rent for the use of that mill while he had it. He promised to turn me over flour or feed to apply on the rent. It might have been a couple of weeks before he quit there, -- two or three weeks, -- I don't remember as to the time; two or three weeks before he quit up there at Cold Springs. I saw him about it at St. Cloud. I was not at Cold Springs. He never paid me anything else on the rent."

And on her cross-examination she testified as follows:

"Q. There were no particular sacks of flour, or anything of that kind, mentioned? A. Well, what we could use upon the farm." "Q. And he was to do the selecting? A. Yes, sir." "Q. All the talk there was, he said he would send a car load of flour and feed to apply on rent? A. Yes, sir." "Q. You contemplated that he was going to break up business? A. I suppose so; I don't know as it was decided. Q. You expected to get a car load when he broke up business? A. I expected it in part payment for the rent. Q. This car load was to be sent to you when he broke up business? A. It was to be sent to me when he could. I didn't know at that time whether it was decided he was going to break up. I don't know that we knew at that time what would be done with the mill. Q. There was no specific amount of flour and feed mentioned? A. What he could get in a car. Q. Was there anything said about how much flour or how much feed there should be? A. Only that there should be a car load. I didn't know how many pounds constituted a car load. He was to send me a car load. Q. In this talk with Clarke about turning over flour and feed, there was nothing said about how much of the car should be flour, and how much should be feed? A. No, sir; what I could make use of he was to send me." "Q. What else was spoken of? A. I told him whatever we could make use of that he should send; to make out the car load for me, -- what he could send in a car." "Q. And that is all the talk there was, substantially? A. That is all I remember about. Q. You never gave him any receipt for rent, or anything of that kind? A. No, sir. Q. No writings ever passed between you at all in regard to this matter in any way? A. I except the lease. Q. Except the lease, that was all? A. Yes, sir. I did not receive the car. I could not give him a receipt for that which I did not receive."

The son was recalled, and testified that the "car load of stuff" was to be delivered on the track...