Waite v. Utah Labor Comm'n
| Decision Date | 01 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 20150384,20150384 |
| Citation | 416 P.3d 635 |
| Parties | James WAITE and Luis A. Ortega, Petitioners, v. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, Farr Better Premium Ice Cream, Sandy City, and Workers Compensation Fund, Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Phillip B. Shell, Nathan Whittaker, Murray, for petitioners
Jaceson R. Maughan, Salt Lake City, for respondent Utah Labor Commission
Hans M. Scheffler, Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Michael D. Karras, Sandy, for respondents Farr Better Premium Ice Cream, Sandy City, and Workers Compensation Fund
Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Tyler R. Green, Solic. Gen., Stanford E. Purser, Deputy Solic. Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for amicus State of Utah
Troy L. Booher, Beth E. Kennedy, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah State Board of Regents
Colin P. King, Charles H. Thronson, Paul M. Simmons, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah Association for Justice
¶ 1 Here we address the constitutionality of Utah Code section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii), a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) that limits the time an injured worker has to prove a claim. The section provides that an employee claiming compensation for a workplace injury must be "able to meet the employee's burden of proving that the employee is due the compensation claimed" within "12 years from the date of the accident." If the employee cannot, the claim is barred. Petitioners are two workers who were injured as a result of a workplace accident and filed claims to receive permanent total disability benefits more than twelve years after the original accident. Both had their claims denied and dismissed as untimely under section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii). In petitioning for review of the Utah Labor Commission's orders, they argue that this statute acts as a statute of repose and so is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. We conclude that while section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) is a statute of repose, it is nevertheless constitutional under the Open Courts Clause.
¶ 2 This consolidated petition stems from two separate orders of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) denying benefits to two different workers, James Waite and Luis Ortega (collectively, Petitioners). As we are called upon today to decide only questions of law, the facts underlying the Commission's orders will be discussed only briefly.
¶ 3 Each Petitioner was injured in a workplace accident, each filed a request for compensation within six years of the workplace accident in accordance with Utah Code section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(i), and each had his condition worsen after an initial determination of compensation. As a result, each filed for additional benefits after twelve years from the date of the original accident. Each Petitioner's claim was denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on the basis that he had failed to "meet the employee's burden of proving that the employee is due the compensation claimed" within the twelve-year period described in section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii). Each Petitioner requested the Commission review the ALJ's decision. Among the arguments each Petitioner asserted as a basis for reversal was the one on appeal here: that section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) operates as a statute of repose and so is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.
¶ 4 The Commission, in reviewing Petitioners' claims, noted in each case that the statute at issue appeared to operate as an invalid statute of repose, but concluded that it had no authority as an agency to decide whether the statute was constitutional. Both Petitioners petitioned the court of appeals for review of the Commission's orders. The court of appeals consolidated the petitions and certified the case to us pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(3) and rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
¶ 5 The Utah Administrative Procedures Act vests our court with "jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings."1 The Act empowers us to "grant relief" where "a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" because "the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied"2 or because "the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law."3 We first address whether the twelve-year limitations period created by Utah Code section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) should be properly understood as a statute of repose. Because we conclude that the section is a statute of repose, we then address whether it is facially unconstitutional under the Utah Open Courts Clause.4 The interpretation and constitutionality of a statute are questions of law that we review for correctness.5
¶ 6 There are two issues on appeal. First, whether Utah Code section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) should be read as a statute of limitation or a statute of repose. If it is the former, our analysis ends as Petitioners have not raised any argument that the section would be unconstitutional as a statute of limitation and, indeed, such an argument would likely be unavailing as "[s]tate legislatures possess the discretion to enact statutes of limitations, and these statutes are presumptively constitutional."6 If, on the other hand, we interpret the section as a statute of repose, we must then consider whether it is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Clause. We address each issue in turn and conclude that although the statute should be read as a statute of repose, it survives under the Open Courts Clause.
¶ 7 The first issue in this case is whether Utah Code section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) should be interpreted as a statute of limitation or as a statute of repose. This is a difficult question, but one that turns on when a "cause of action" accrues under the WCA, a question we have yet to resolve definitively. We address this issue at length in the companion case of Petersen v. Labor Commission.7
¶ 8 Section 34A-2-417(2)(a) reads as follows:
A claim [for disability benefits] is barred, unless the employee: (i) files an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication no later than six years from the date of the accident; and (ii) by no later than 12 years from the date of the accident, is able to meet the employee's burden of proving that the employee is due the compensation claimed under this chapter.
Thus, this section imposes two requirements on an injured worker who seeks disability benefits: First, the worker must file an application for a hearing within six years of the date of the accident giving rise to the injury for which the worker seeks compensation. Then, the worker must prove that he or she is entitled to compensation within twelve years of the injury.8
¶ 9 The initial filing of the application for a hearing invokes the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to hear and decide an employee's claims for compensation due to workplace injuries.9 Because the Commission's jurisdiction is continuing, the Commission, "[a]fter notice and hearing ... may from time to time modify or change a former finding or order" awarding compensation.10 We have "recognized two appropriate bases for reopening and reevaluating an award: (1) a change in condition or new development or (2) the inadequacy of a previous award."11 Ultimately, "the Commission may exercise its continuing jurisdiction where a claimant's medical condition deviates from its anticipated course."12
¶ 10 Prior to 1999, there was no limit on the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to revisit an award of compensation for permanent total disability. The WCA required only that the employee file within six years—not that he or she prove entitlement to benefits within a set timeframe. In 1998, the court of appeals specifically rejected a claim that the Commission's jurisdiction ended at the end of the six year filing period and held that the Commission's jurisdiction "in these cases is indefinite,"13 an interpretation we later affirmed.14 The next year, the legislature amended the WCA to include the requirement that the employee "meet the employee's burden of proving that the employee is due the compensation claimed" within twelve years from the date of the accident.15 As we stated in Ortega v. Meadow Valley Construction , by enacting this amendment, "the six-year limitation for filing an application for hearing was retained, and a twelve-year cap was established on the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission to reexamine the claim if the employee's physical condition worsened."16
¶ 11 Petitioners challenge this twelve-year timeframe as an unconstitutional statute of repose. The Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) contends that it is a statute of limitation. "Whether a statute that bars or terminates a claim for relief is a statute of limitations or a statute of repose depends on the nature of the statute and the manner in which it operates to cut off the legal right of a person to obtain a remedy for an injury."17 We described the difference between the two types of statutes in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , the seminal case addressing the constitutionality of statutes of repose.18 There we stated:
A statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived. A statute of repose bars all actions after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of action.... Therefore, a statute of repose may bar the filing of a lawsuit even though the cause of action did not even arise until after it was barred and even though the injured person was diligent in seeking a...
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