Waites v. State, 31929

• Decision Date: 06 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 31929,31929
• Citation: 235 S.E.2d 4,238 Ga. 683
• Parties: Charlie Glenn WAITES v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 4

235 S.E.2d 4

238 Ga. 683

Charlie Glenn WAITES v. The STATE.

No. 31929.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 6, 1977.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1977.

Sidney A. Emeson, Public Defender, Gregory A. King, Asst. Public Defender, Decatur, for appellant.

Charlie Waites, pro se.

Randall Peek, Dist. Atty., Calvin A. Leipold, Asst. Dist. Atty., Decatur, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Kirby G. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

JORDAN, Justice.

The indictment against Charlie Glenn Waites charged him in the first count with the murder of John Robert Dobbs, and in the second count with cruelty to the same child by burning him with a curling iron. He was convicted of both offenses, and consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and five years were imposed. He appeals these convictions.

1. The appellant enumerates as error the denial of the general grounds of his motion for new trial.

The deceased child, whose age was between two and three years, was the stepson of the appellant. Under the medical testimony, the child's death was caused by a blunt force blow to the head. The child also had burn injuries and multiple bruises.

The circumstantial evidence and the incriminating admissions of the appellant authorized the finding by the jury that the appellant was guilty under both counts of the indictment.

2. The appellant enumerates as error the denial of his motion to sever the two counts of the indictment for the purposes of trial.

Code Ann. § 26-506 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1267) provides that where several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except that the court "in the interest of justice" may order that one or more of the charges be tried separately. This Code section was designed to protect an accused against the harassment of multiple prosecutions arising from the same conduct.

In Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 412(1), 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975), the accused was charged with the kidnapping, armed robbery, aggravated assault and murder of the victim. These crimes were all said to arise from the same conduct, and it was held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to sever the crimes for trial. Consideration was given in that case to the fact that the same circumstantial and confession evidence would have been admissible in separate trials for the different crimes if severance had been granted. It was there noted that the determination of the question of severance was to be made "in the interest of justice" (Code Ann. § 26-506(c)) and that the interests of the accused are to be balanced with the interests of the state.

In Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 557, 216 S.E.2d 782 (1975), the accused was charged with armed robbery, rape, kidnapping, motor vehicle theft, and escape. It was held that all the crimes were a part of a continuous transaction and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying severance of the crimes for trial.

In Goughf v. State, 232 Ga. 178, 181, 205 S.E.2d 844 (1974), where the evidence...