Waithe v. Arrowhead Clinic, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CV 409-021 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | KENNETH WAITHE and LINDA WAITHE, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated Plaintiffs, v. ARROWHEAD CLINIC, INC., ARROWHEAD MANAGEMENT, INC., HARRY W. BROWN, INC., H. BROWN MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, HARRY W. BROWN, JR., LEGAL COUNSEL, INC., ROBERT D. STEIN d/b/a/ ROBERT D. STEIN & ASSOCIATES Defendants. |
Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Arrowhead Clinic, Inc. ("ACI"), Arrowhead Management Inc. ("AMI"), Harry W. Brown, Inc. ("HWBI"), and H. Brown Management Company, LLC ("Brown Management") (collectively referred to as "Brown-Arrowhead"). Brown-Arrowhead's Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 101. Also before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Robert D. Stein d/b/a/ The Law Offices of Robert D. Stein and Legal Counsel, Inc. (collectivelyreferred to as "Stein"). Stein's Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 103. Linda and Kenneth Waithe ("Plaintiffs") have also moved for summary judgment. Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 104. For the reasons stated below, the Court orders Plaintiffs' Motion DENIED, Brown-Arrowhead's Motion GRANTED, and Stein's Motion GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs were involved in a car accident on January 1, 2005. Pls.' Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 6. Soon after the accident, Plaintiffs sought chiropractic treatment at the Arrowhead Clinic in Hinesville, Georgia. L. Waithe Dep. 33:20, Dkt. No. 101, Ex. C. During the initial visit, Plaintiffs met with a representative from Stein, who initiated a legal representation contract. Id. at 78:16. The circumstances of how the Plaintiffs and the Stein representative met are in dispute. Plaintiffs assert that upon arrival at the clinic they filled out several basic medical information forms. Id. at 35:4. Plaintiffs then participated in an initial consultation in an examination room with someone they were told was a doctor. Id. at 35:19. The doctor discussed spinal injuries and showed Plaintiffs a few exemplar spinal x-rays. Id. According to the Plaintiffs, the doctor told them that in order to receive treatment from the clinic Plaintiffs would need a lawyer. Id.at 35:23, Plaintiffs claim they questioned this requirement, but the doctor confirmed that it was necessary that the Plaintiffs have legal counsel in order to receive treatment. Id. The doctor then said, "It just so happens I have someone here from the Stein firm." Id^ at 36:3. Plaintiffs claim that the Stein representative was referred to as an "investigator." Id. at 79:3. According to Plaintiffs, the investigator had the Plaintiffs fill out a number of forms connected with the Stein firm including a contract for legal representation. Id. at 50:4. Among the documents signed by the Plaintiffs was an "Attorney Recommendation" form, indicating that they asked their doctor to recommend a lawyer. Attorney Recommendation Form 2, Dkt. 101, Ex. G. Plaintiffs state that they did not actually ask Brown-Arrowhead to recommend counsel, as the form indicates, but signed the form because they thought that they would not receive treatment unless they agreed to meet with Stein. L. Waithe Dep. 126:22, Dkt. No. 101, Ex. C.
Plaintiffs' sole payment to Brown-Arrowhead was a $100 payment for each Plaintiff made during that first visit to the clinic. Id. at 69:23. Although Plaintiffs visited the clinic several more times for treatment, they were never asked to make any additional payments. Plaintiffs' bills indicate that their insurance companies made various payments to the clinic. Brown-Arrowhead's Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 101, Ex. J. Plaintiffs hadlittle contact with Stein during this time, other than phone calls during settlement negotiations. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs received approximately $7,750 each in settlement of their claims against the other driver, of which approximately forty percent went to Stein for fees. L. Waithe Dep. 96:1, Dkt. No. 101, Ex. C.
Several months after the culmination of Brown-Arrowhead's chiropractic treatment and Stein's legal representation of the Plaintiffs', Plaintiffs' current counsel contacted Brown-Arrowhead about the likelihood of the present lawsuit. Soon after that contact, Brown-Arrowhead sent Plaintiffs a $200 check, apparently as a refund for any payments (or overpayments) made by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cashed the check without question. Id. at 70:13. This lawsuit followed.
Plaintiffs testified that they felt that Stein misled them into believing that Stein would try to get the best possible settlement for the Plaintiffs. Id. at 134:11. Linda Waithe felt that the Stein firm harmed them by "not providing [Plaintiffs] with the best possible representation." Id. at 136:23. Kenneth Waithe believed he was harmed by the fact that Stein misrepresented its interactions with Brown-Arrowhead (including the exchange of information between the parties), by not being generally truthful in their dealings, and becauseStein did not "really [go] all out for [Plaintiff]." K. Waithe Dep. 61:24, 64:6, Dkt. No. 103, Ex. 6.
Plaintiffs filed suit against Brown-Arrowhead and Stein based on a number of different theories of liability.1Plaintiff's initial Complaint consisted of eight separate counts. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Count One asserted a claim of professional negligence against Stein, and Count Two asserted a claim of professional negligence against Brown-Arrowhead. The remaining six counts were asserted against both sets of Defendants. Count Three alleged fraud and constructive fraud arising from Defendants' failure to disclose to Plaintiffs the relationship between the Defendants. Count Four alleged fraud and constructive fraud for the failure to properly credit Plaintiffs' patient accounts. Count Five alleged ordinary negligence by Stein based on its duty to insure adequate representation and not to "solicit, harass and invade the privacy of potential clients," and negligence by Brown-Arrowhead based on its duty to "protect and respect [patient's] privacy, and to adequately maintain their patient accounts." Count Six claimed that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties toPlaintiffs. Counts Seven and Eight claimed a right to attorney's fees and punitive damages, respectively.2
Brown-Arrowhead moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on various grounds. Brown-Arrowhead's Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 7. The Court granted Brown-Arrowhead's motion with regards to Counts Two (Professional Negligence), Four (Fraud/Constructive Fraud), and Six (Breach of Fiduciary Duty). Dkt. No. 55. Although the Court stated that Count Three (Fraud/Constructive Fraud) failed to state a claim as pled, the Court granted Plaintiffs additional time to amend their Complaint in order to cure the defects. Id. The Court denied Brown-Arrowhead's motion regarding Count Five (Negligence), Seven (Attorneys' Fees), and Eight (Punitive Damages). Id.
Plaintiffs took advantage of the extra time afforded to amend Count Three, and filed "Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as to Count Three - the Fraud Count." Pls.' Second Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 59. Brown-Arrowhead, moved to dismiss the amended Count Three and argued that all other counts had been abandoned by the Plaintiffs because they failed to include them in the amended complaint. Brown-Arrowhead's Second Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 63. Stein moved to dismiss the amended CountThree and Count Four as it pertained to Stein. Stein's Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 65. The Court held that the amended Count Three remained impermissibly vague, and dismissed the claim with regards to both sets of Defendants. Dkt. No. 122. The Court rejected Brown-Arrowhead's argument that Plaintiffs abandoned the other claims. Id. Finally, the Court explicitly dismissed Count Four as it related to Stein, relying on the same reasoning for dismissing Count Four with regards to Brown-Arrowhead in its earlier order. Id.
As the case stands now, one claim against Brown-Arrowhead and three claims against Stein remain unresolved. The sole remaining claim against Brown-Arrowhead is Count Five which claims that Brown-Arrowhead was negligent in failing to protect the Plaintiffs' privacy and in failing to adequately maintain the Plaintiffs' patient accounts. The three remaining claims against Stein are as follows: Count One asserts that Stein committed professional negligence by requiring Plaintiffs to sign a contract for representation that authorized Stein to pay all of the client's medical expenses, and by wrongfully soliciting clients in the physical confines of a medical provider; Count Five asserts that Stein was negligent in soliciting, harassing, and failing to adequately represent the Plaintiffs, as well as invading Plaintiffs' privacy; and Count Six alleges that Stein breached its fiduciary duty to adequatelyprotect the interests of its clients by "receiving private information concerning a potential client, without authorization, and using it to their economic advantage."3 Both sets of Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment.4Brown-Arrowhead's Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 101, Stein's Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 103. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment on their claims. Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 104. The Court now considers the parties' summary judgment motions.
LEGAL STANDARD
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Collins v. Homestead Correctional Inst., 2011 WL 4584817, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011) (quoting Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990)). The court must view the evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the...
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