Walbridge v. Hall

• Decision Date: 01 February 1830
• Parties: STEBBINS WALBRIDGE v. HILAND HALL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

3 Vt. 114

STEBBINS WALBRIDGE v. HILAND HALL

Supreme Court of Vermont, Bennington

February, 1830

[Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Action of assault and battery and false imprisonment, wherein the plaintiff declared that the defendant, without any reasonable or probable cause, had made an assault on the plaintiff, and committed him to the common jail in Bennington, and there imprisoned him for the space of ten months and fifteen days. The defendant pleaded, 1st. the general issue; 2d. accord and satisfaction; and 3d. That at the term of the Supreme Court holden at Manchester in the county of Bennington, in February, 1827, he the defendant recovered a judgement against said Walbridge, in an action of trover, for $ 5143,90 damages, and for $ 175,80 costs of suit; that execution was issued thereon, signed by the clerk of said court, on which said Walbridge was, within the life of it, duly committed to jail, and that said execution was afterwards, and within sixty days from its date, returned to the office of the clerk of said court from whence it issued; and that Walbridge was by virtue of said execution, and for the cause therein specified, kept and detained in prison for the space of time mentioned in the declaration; and that this was the same trespass and imprisonment complained of by him. The plaintiff in his replication traversed the plea of accord and satisfaction, and pleaded nul tiel record to the third plea. The decision of the cause depended wholly on the validity of the judgement mentioned in the third plea. The action in which that judgement was rendered was entered in the county court, June term, 1822, and a judgement was rendered at the same term for the defendant on the general issue. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, and the appeal was entered there at the February term, 1823; at which term a judgement was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant had leave to review the cause. At the next term, February 1824, the parties agreed on a stated case, containing certain depositions which were to be considered a part of it. While the action was thus pending in the Supreme Court on this stated case, the legislature passed an act reorganizing the county and Supreme Courts, altering their jurisdiction, and directing that certain matters and causes pending in either court should be removed to, and tried by, the county court as established by said act, and " That all suits in chancery, all writs of error, and suits and appeals, where matters of law are to be litigated, which shall be pending in, or returnable to, the Supreme Court in any county when this act shall come in force, shall be heard and determined, and the parties thereto shall appear and have day in court and attend to the same, at the next term of said Supreme Court, to be holden in such county, according to the provisions of this act." The cause was retained by the Supreme Court, and was tried at February term, 1827, on the case stated and agreed to, as before mentioned; both parties submitting to its jurisdiction of the cause without objection. The defendant, at the trial in the county court, in support of the issue on his part, offered in evidence the record of the said judgement; which the plaintiff objected to on the ground that, by the act aforesaid, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction of the cause. But the objection was overruled, and the record admitted, the court being of opinion that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, and that said judgement and proceedings thereon were a bar to a recovery in the suit. The case was reserved for the consideration of this Court.

Argument for the plaintiff.--It is contended that the record of the judgement set forth in the plea in bar was inadmissible on the ground that, from the record it appears the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction of the case, but that, under the statute of 1824, it was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the county court. From the record offered it appears that cause was pending in the Supreme Court in the year 1824, under the plea of " not guilty," closed to the court; and no question can be made but that the case should have passed to the county court under the 9th section of the act, unless the case agreed upon by the parties will enable the Supreme Court to retain jurisdiction of the same. The 11th section of the act is the only one upon which it can be contended that the Supreme Court could retain the case within their jurisdiction. This section provides, " that all suits in chancery, writs of error, and suits and appeals, where matters in law are to be litigated," shall be retained by the Supreme Court. The two first cases, to wit, " suits in chancery and writs of error," do not pass to the county court by the 9th section. The whole case then depends upon the construction to be given to the words " suits and appeals, where matters in law are to be litigated." The rational construction of this statute is, that when all the facts are judicially found, and have become a part of the record, it is a case of law, and could be retained by the Supreme Court. That the facts in this case were not judicially found, and were not a part of the record, is apparent from the fact, that a writ of error could not be sustained on such a case.--9 Mass. 329; --11 Mass. 394. The only method of making a case of law within the meaning of the act was--1. by a bill of exceptions; 2. by the jury signing a verdict subject to the opinion of the court as to the law upon the facts agreed; 3. by a special verdict. It cannot be pretended that this case can fall within the two first, for in those cases the issue was found between the parties, and the court sits to revise the proceedings, and see whether the verdict was correctly rendered: but in this case the issue was not found, but open as if pending before a jury. Neither can it fall within the third case; for in cases of special verdicts the facts are judicially found, and are obligatory upon the parties. But in this case, the facts agreed to were not obligatory, and had the case gone for trial to the county court, or any subsequent term of the Supreme Court, the parties could have objected to the conclusiveness of the facts agreed to, and required the issue to be proved by competent and legal testimony.--2 N.H. 181. It will not be pretended, but that, at the time the statute came into operation the case belonged exclusively to the county court. The case was then in the county court by operation of the statute without any act to be done by the court; for their order and duty were purely ministerial. The fact that the issue of not guilty was joined by the pleadings, and no verdict or judgement had been rendered upon the issue, is, it is believed, conclusive upon the question; for under that issue, before the facts were agreed to, the parties could require the introduction of the best evidence the nature of the case demands: and this agreement of facts amounts to no more nor less than the introduction of secondary evidence to maintain the issue.

Again, as a conclusive answer on this point of the case, it appears that the facts in the case were not all agreed to by the parties, and, for this purpose, the depositions of different individuals were filed containing much conflicting testimony upon material facts in the case. If it be true that under the statute of 1824, the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction of the case, but the same was within the jurisdiction of the county court, it is contended, that this action is sustainable upon the most plain and settled rules of the common law, that where the court, under whose judgement the party justifies, has not jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, or, having jurisdiction over the subject matter, their proceedings are such as render them coram non judice, the same is void, and the party acting under them is a trespasser.--8 Term Rep. 425, Brown v. Compton; --10 Coke. 76 (a) 6; --2 Blac. Rep. 845, Parsons v. Lloyd; --1 Chitty's Plead. 168; --2 Sel. N. P. 546.

Argument for the defendant.--Defendant justifies under an execution issued upon a judgement of the Supreme Court, February term, 1827. It appears by the record that the case was agreed to by the parties, and tried by the court by consent. It is objected by the (now) plaintiff that the case embraced questions of fact; that the court at the time of rendering the judgement was not authorized to try matters of fact, that, therefore, the proceedings of the court were coram non judice, and the party executing the judgement a trespasser. The defendant contends--

I. That the case was properly tried by the Supreme Court: 1. At the time of making the case (February, 1824) the court was specially authorized by st...