In re Dexter

• Decision Date: 08 May 1919
• Citation: 107 A. 134,93 Vt. 304
• Parties: IN RE ANNA FELCH DEXTER
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

107 A. 134

93 Vt. 304

IN RE ANNA FELCH DEXTER

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 8, 1919

February Term, 1919.

PETITION for writ of habeas corpus brought to the Supreme Court for Orange County, and heard on the petition.

Because of this, and pursuant to the provisions of the statute above noticed, the prisoner will be admitted to bail if a sufficient amount thereof is offered with sufficient sureties. Such bail not being offered here, the prisoner is remanded to her former custody, with an order that she be held to bail in the sum of five thousand dollars, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, the recognizance or bond to be conditioned as provided by law in criminal cases pending in county court, for her personal appearance before the county court next to be held at Chelsea in the County of Orange, on the first Tuesday of June, 1919, and from term to term thereafter, to answer to the indictment there pending against her for the crime of murder, in accordance with the law in such case made and provided, to be admitted to bail as aforesaid, pursuant to the provisions of section 2236 of the General Laws of the State.

R A. Hoar, A. G. Fay, and Hale K. Darling for the Relator.

Present WATSON, C. J., POWERS, TAYLOR, and MILES, JJ., and FISH, SUPR., J.

OPINION

MILES

The relator was acquitted by a jury on the charge of murder, and the case was brought to this Court on exceptions by the State before judgment, pursuant to G. L. 2598. After a full hearing certain of the exceptions were sustained, the verdict was set aside, and the cause remanded for a new trial. Error was found in the exclusion of certain evidence, and in the conduct of respondent's counsel in repeating a question after the same had been excluded by the court. It was not found necessary to decide whether the former error was sufficiently harmful to require a reversal, as it was found that the latter clearly constituted harmful and reversible error. See State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 A. 23.

The relator's argument in support of the complaint assumes that the only error on which the reversal can be predicated relates to the conduct of her counsel at the trial. Her claim is that this Court did not have jurisdiction to order the remand, for that by G. L. 2598, it can hear and determine only questions of law decided against the State by the trial court; and that the exception on which the case was reversed was not within the purview of the statute, as it was not to the decision of the court but to the conduct of counsel. Granting for the sake of the argument, though by no means conceding, that the sole basis of the reversal was as the relator assumes, we come to the consideration of the various claims advanced by the relator why her complaint should be sustained.

Relator's counsel recognizes the limitations of these proceedings (as to which see In re Turner, 92 Vt. 210, 214, 102 A. 943), and rely solely upon the claim that this Court was without jurisdiction in State v. Felch to render judgment setting the verdict aside and remanding the cause for a new trial on the exception to the conduct of counsel. But this proceeding calls that judgment in question collaterally, and it is well settled that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be given the effect of a writ for the correction of errors or irregularities. In re Turner, supra; In re Fitton, 68 Vt. 297, 300, 35 A. 319. Manifestly the judgment of a court of last resort cannot be attacked by this writ, for a single justice of this Court, the county court, or a superior judge are given jurisdiction of the writ; and, if open to such attack, we would have the absurdity of an inferior court sitting in review of the judgment of a court of last resort. It belongs exclusively to this Court to examine into and decide upon the regularity of its own proceedings, which it will always do on proper application. See Walbridge v. Hall, 3 Vt. 114.

The relator's claim that the jurisdiction of this Court is not general, but special and limited, cannot be sustained. It has plenary jurisdiction as a court of error when its jurisdiction is properly invoked, with full power to try and determine questions brought before it "pursuant to law. " G. L. 1578. Its jurisdiction is in no way modified or controlled by anything contained in G. L. 2598. That statute prescribes in what case the State may have exceptions, and, if an exception is taken and allowed without right, it would be a fatal objection to the exception, if properly raised and presented in this Court. But the objection does not go to the Court's jurisdiction. If the question is brought up on a proper bill of exception, viz., "pursuant to law," the Court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the exception. Manifestly, it would have authority to overrule the exception; and by the same token, if it erroneously sustained the exception, it would not act without jurisdiction.

In State v. Felch the jurisdiction of this Court was invoked in a legal manner. Confessedly certain of the questions raised by the State's exceptions were brought before the Court "pursuant to law." Though the validity of the verdict was challenged on several grounds, the subject-matter of the proceeding in error was single and entire, viz., the verdict which it was sought to set aside. See Kramer v. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Ohio St. 436, 42 N.E. 252. No question was then made that the exception now challenged was not properly before the Court for consideration equally with the others; indeed, it was argued by both sides. By hearing and deciding the question thus presented, the Court took jurisdiction of it. Jurisdiction thus assumed will be presumed and is not open to collateral attack. Necessarily the court of last resort must be the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction. 15 C. J. 1026, § 445. The judgment of such a court is never void, but is regular for every purpose until set aside by it in some proper proceeding for that purpose. Walbridge v. Hall, supra. It was held in Hathaway v. Holmes, 1 Vt. 405, 418, that the judgment of a court of record, acting within its jurisdiction, is conclusive until set aside by error or other proper proceeding; and it cannot be vacated, nor its merits examined into, on habeas corpus.

Nor can we agree with the relator's contention that the point on which the case was reversed did not involve a ruling of law against the State. This depends upon the construction to be given the statute. It is urged on the one hand that the statute is in derogation of the common law, and should be construed strictly, while on the other hand it is said that it is remedial, and so entitled to a liberal construction.

It is an established principle that the rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implications, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language (State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 171, 50 A. 863); and the rule is equally well established that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally to effectuate their purpose. State v. C. V. Ry. Co., 81 Vt. 459, 71 A. 193, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 949. The relator takes the anomalous position that, if the statute is remedial (and so within the latter rule), nevertheless it is to be strictly construed because it is in derogation of the common law. But rightly understood there is no conflict between these rules of construction. A remedial statute asserted as modifying the rule of the common law must receive a strict construction on the question whether it does modify it; but if found, when so regarded, that it was intended to replace a common-law rule, in whole or in part, it must be given the same effect by liberal construction as it would otherwise have. See Archer v. Equit. Life Assur. Assn., 218 N.Y. 18, 112 N.E. 433. That the statute in question modifies the common law will at once be conceded, and that it is remedial in character is quite apparent. A remedial statute is one designed to cure a mischief or remedy a defect in existing laws (City of Montpelier v. Senter, 72 Vt. 112, 114, 47 A. 392); and a statute for the correction of errors is of this character. White County v. Key, 30 Ark. 603, 36 Cyc. 1173. Plainly enough the Legislature acted upon the belief that the rule of the common law which denied the State exceptions in criminal cases was mischievous--was a defect in criminal procedure for which a remedy was demanded. It follows that the construction of the statute should be liberal and, within its language, commensurate with its purpose.

The section in question, in substance, provides that questions of law decided against the State by the court in criminal trials shall, upon exceptions taken by the State, be allowed and placed upon the...