Walcott v. Brander

• Decision Date: 01 January 1853
• Citation: 10 Tex. 419
• Parties: WALCOTT v. BRANDER AND OTHERS.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

10 Tex. 419

WALCOTT

v.BRANDER AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1853.

Where a claim to property levied on by attachment is interposed by one who deraigns his title from the defendant in the attachment, it is not erroneous to permit the creditor, on the trial of the right of property, to introduce in evidence the judgment recovered by him in the attachment suit against his debtor, the claimant's vendor.

A purchase of property with knowledge that the vendor is selling to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, although for a valuable and adequate consideration, is void as against creditors. (Note 78.)

A charge that fraud could be proved by circumstances, and that the jury must look to all the circumstances connected with the transaction to arrive at a correct conclusion, was held to mean that the jury were to look to the circumstances in proof and therefore, not to be erroneous.

Error from Cass. Suit was instituted by attachment by the defendants in error against one Drake.

The attachment was levied on goods, &c., in the possession of the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff claimed the goods by purchase for value, in good faith, from Drake, and gave bond to try the right of property. The defendants in error alleged that the sale to the plaintiff in error was void, because it was made to hinder and delay the creditors of Drake, and that the defendant in error colluded with Drake. This was the issue. On the trial the defendants in error read to the jury the judgment which they had obtained in the attachment suit against Drake--the plaintiff in error excepting. The court charged the jury that, if they believed from the testimony in the case that Drake made the sale of the goods in question for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, or hindering or delaying the collection of his debts, and Walcott, the defendant, knew of said design on the part of Drake, then the sale was void. The court further charged the jury that fraud may be proved by circumstances, and that they must therefore look to all the circumstances connected with the transaction to arrive at a correct conclusion. Verdict and judgment for Brander, Williams & Co., the creditors of Drake. Motion for a new trial overruled.

T. J. Jennings and S. M. Hyde, for plaintiff in error. I. The plaintiff in error says that the court below, upon the trial of this cause, erred in permitting the judgment that had been recovered by the defendants in error against Reuben Drake, in the attachment suit, to be read in evidence after the same had been objected to. Now, that evidence was irrelevant to the points in issue, and did doubtless tend to mislead the minds of the jury off from the true issue before them. It was an unnecessary incumbrance of the minds of the jury with irrelevant matter. The only effect it was calculated to produce was confusion by the commingling the issues of two suits, one of which was not before the jury. This is conclusive from the fact that the jury found that the attachment was subject to a credit of one thousand dollars. When confusion is shown to have been produced by the introduction of irrelevant testimony, the court is bound to conclude that the verdict of the jury was subject to the same influence, and was a production of the same confusion. The face of the verdict shows that the jury believed that they were trying the question of the original indebtedness and payments of Drake, as well as the rights of property. One of the objects in making an issue is to narrow the questions in litigation down, so that the jury may readily see the application of the testimony. Hence the introduction of irrelevant matter, which is calculated to make the jury believe that different issues are raised, produces confusion and defeats that object. That the admission of this record in evidence did have that effect is conclusive from the verdict itself. In the case of Butler & Alford v. O'Brien, surviving partner, &c., 5 Ala. R., 322, the court, in its decision upon the proceedings had under a statute similar to our statute regulating the trials of the right of property, say: “It has been repeatedly held, where a third person claims property levied on by execution, and executes a bond for the trial of the right, that he shall not be permitted to object to the regularity of the judgment and execution, and that the plaintiff shall not be required to produce any evidence of the justness of his demand other than the execution affords. We think the same rule must apply where, instead of an execution, the property is seized by an attachment. The only question to be litigated is, whether the goods claimed really belong to the claimant or not, as against the plaintiff, a creditor; for the purposes of this controversy the plaintiff must be regarded as a creditor without the production of proof of indebtedness. The eleventh section of the attachment law, in providing for the trial of the right of property, and directing the same proceedings to be had as where a claim is interposed upon the levy of a fi. fa., together with the decisions which have been made touching the nature of such a controversy, seem to us to show not only that such evidence is unnecessary but irregular.”

II. The court erred in charging the jury “that if they believe from the testimony in the case that Drake made said sale of the goods in question for the purpose of defrauding his creditors or hindering or delaying the collection of his debts, and said Walcott, the defendant, knew of said designs on the part of Drake, then the sale was...