Walden v. Schweiker

• Decision Date: 05 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-7514,81-7514
• Citation: 672 F.2d 835
• Parties: Frances B. WALDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services for the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 835

672 F.2d 835

Frances B. WALDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services for the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81-7514.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 5, 1982.

Westmoreland, Patterson & Moseley, Rudolph N. Patterson, Margaret C. Johnson, Macon, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

Bernard E. Namie, Asst. U. S. Atty., Macon, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN ^*, District Judge.

PITTMAN, District Judge:

The district court summarily affirmed and upheld the administrative denial of the claimant's application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The claimant appeals.

The issue of this appeal is whether the District Court erred in affirming the finding of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the appellant was not disabled within the meaning of Sections 216(i)(1) and 223(d)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act and thus was not entitled to disability benefits. ¹ We hold that the ALJ was in error in several critical respects: application of an improper legal standard, failure to address appellant's testimony and evidence in regards to subjective pain, lack of findings in regards to credibility, failure to develop a full and fair record and a total disregard for unrefuted evidence. There is not substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision. The plaintiff made out a prima facie case, therefore, the burden of producing evidence shifted to the defendant. The defendant did not offer any evidence to discharge its burden.

Appellant is a sixty-one year old female possessing a tenth grade education whose prior occupation was that of a garment factory "bundle" girl and sewing machine operator. The job required her to push buggies filled with fabric from one point in the plant to where the sewing machines were located, after which she would unload and remove the buggies and return for additional fabric. Her duties also required her to operate a sewing machine, stitching pockets on men's trousers. This obviously required considerable dexterity of the hands and fingers. She testified that the bundle job demanded continuous walking, stooping and the lifting of bundles weighing twelve to fifteen pounds for a straight shift of eight hours a day.

In the late 1960s appellant began to suffer progressive physical deterioration from what was ultimately shown to be rheumatoid arthritis. The condition worsened until in September of 1969 she testified she was unable to perform her duties and had missed so many days from work due to her ailment that she was forced to resign her employment.

At the hearing ² before the ALJ, appellant testified that prior to her resignation her supervisor had been assisting her in her job duties, allowing her to sit and rest between trips to the sewing machines and generally watching out for her.

As to the physical manifestations of her condition and its deleterious effects, the appellant testified her knees and ankles became swollen to the point she could hardly stand. She could not grip with her hands due to swelling and pain. This condition also extended into her shoulders and was extremely painful. The pain was such that appellant would "go home at night and cry with my feet and soak 'em and everything before (she) could even fix supper for (her) family."

The only other witness at that time was appellant's daughter who was only asked the one question whether she had anything to add. She generally agreed with her mother's testimony.

The great bulk of the hearing consisted of the ALJ's admonitions to appellant as to the quality of her evidence. In pertinent part he addressed her as follows:

(W)e must have medical records showing what your condition was up until June of 1973. ³

I can ask you some questions asking you to relate back to what your condition was almost five years ago, but in the end I'm going to have to have medical records reflecting your state of health five or so years ago.

I'll ask you some questions ... but in the absence of medical records your answers would mean very little.

The appellant, post-hearing, submitted to the ALJ a statement from one of her physicians, Dr. A. L. Lawrence. By deposition Dr. Lawrence testified he first saw appellant on April 20, 1972. He saw her eight times from April, 1972 through June, 1973. At that time he diagnosed, through physical examination, progressive rheumatoid arthritis. According to him the physical manifestations of the disease were so obvious, laboratory or other clinical tests were unnecessary. He prescribed aspirin, the accepted treatment for arthritis. He further opined that "based on her inability to perform smaller movements and stand and to work and weight bear" appellant was disabled prior to June of 1973.

In his opinion denying the claim, the ALJ's findings were few. However, he did state the following:

It is well established that it is the duty of the claimant to provide objective clinical and medical findings and other evidence to prove entitlement.... (emphasis added).

None of the treating physicians were able to give an opinion of claimant's condition in June, 1973, when she last met the earnings requirements. Although it is their opinion that she is now disabled, the medical evidence shows she did not start receiving treatment for her rheumatoid arthritis prior to April, 1975. Dr. Andrew L. Lawrence did say that he saw the claimant in April, 1972, for pain in her feet, arms and shoulders. However, no objective or clinical findings are presented here.

Review of a case such as the one before us is exceedingly limited. This court's sole function is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Davis v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 1981); Flowers v. Harris, 616 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1980).

It is recognized that a very heavy burden rests upon the claimant to establish the existence of a disability. See Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1980). The burden is so stringent that it has been characterized as bordering on the unrealistic. Williams v. Finch, 440 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1971) (Ainsworth, J.). Notwithstanding this burden and the limited scope of review, the court can reverse a finding of the Secretary if not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ⁴ This does not relieve the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding. Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980). In its review, however, the court abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of the Secretary. Laffoon v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977).

Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. 'It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 505, 83 L.Ed. 660, 665 (1939), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126, 140 (1938); accord Anderson v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1981).

Therefore, this court, like the ALJ, must consider the evidence as a whole, Simmons v. Harris, 602 F.2d 1233, 1236 (5th Cir. 1979), including "(1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability as testified to by the claimant and corroborated by (a spouse), other members of the family, (her) neighbors and others who have observed (her), and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history." DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1972).

The initial erroneous premise of the ALJ upon which he based his decision was that the appellant did not make out a prima facie case of disability because she did not submit medical records of her pre-June, 1973 condition. To satisfy this primary phase of her burden the appellant is required to demonstrate that she is no longer capable of performing her past work. Perez v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1981). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503 et seq.

Appellant's testimony was that in 1969 she could no longer perform the tasks at her job and therefore resigned. Her physician, Dr. Lawrence, based his evaluation of her disability on the requirements of standing, stooping, lifting and walking. He further testified she was unable to perform gross manipulation due to pain and swelling in her hands. This testimony stands uncontradicted. An administrative law judge may not arbitrarily reject uncontroverted medical testimony. Goodley v. Harris, 608 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1979).

First the ALJ was in error in finding there were no objective or clinical findings to support the appellant's claim. The appellant's doctor described the appellant's condition after ...