Hurley v. Barnhart, No. 6:03 CV 1624 ORL JGG.
| Citation | 385 F.Supp.2d 1245 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:03 CV 1624 ORL JGG. |
| Parties | Daniel F. HURLEY, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Robert F. Sprick, Law Office Of Robert F. Sprick, Orlando, FL, for plaintiff.
Plaintiff Daniel F. Hurley ["Hurley"] appeals to the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [the "Commissioner"] denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. See Docket No. 1 (complaint). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
On March 30, 2000, Hurley filed a claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming disability as of February 28, 2000. R. 18, 180-85, 347-50. On April 17, 2002, the Honorable Philemina M. Jones, Administrative Law Judge ["ALJ"], held a hearing on Hurley's claim in Orlando, Florida. R. 38-79. Hurley testified, and his attorney, Robert F. Sprick, appeared with him at the hearing.
On June 27, 2002, the ALJ ruled that Hurley was not entitled to benefits. R. 117-23. The ALJ found, inter alia, that Hurley retained the Residual Functional Capacity ["RFC"] to perform a full range of sedentary work. Accordingly, the ALJ applied Medical-Vocational Guidelines ["Grids"] Rules 202.21 — 201.22, which directed a finding of not disabled. R. 123, Findings 12-13.
Hurley timely appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council. R. 152-60. On November 1, 2002. the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded the case to the ALJ. In its remand order, the Appeals Council noted. in relevant part:
[t]he medical evidence shows that the claimant may have a mental impairment, but the current evidence of record is not sufficient to properly assess the nature and severity of that condition.... Regardless, the evidence of record as a whole suggests that the claimant may have a significant mental impairment that requires further evaluation.
... The [hearing] decision states that [Hurley's] nonexertional limitations would not significantly diminish the claimant's capacity for the full range of sedentary work; however, this conclusion is not supported by expert vocational evidence ....
The hearing decision indicates ... that the claimant's subjective complaints are beyond what would reasonably be expected in terms of intensity ... but does not address whether the claimant has an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment ....
R. 162-63. Therefore, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to 1.) obtain additional evidence concerning Hurley's impairments, including updated records from Hurley's treating sources, a consultative orthopedic exam, and a consultative psychiatric exam: 2.) if necessary, obtain medical expert testimony to help clarify the severity of Hurley's mental impairments; 3.) give further consideration to Hurley's subjective complaints; 4.) obtain evidence from a vocational expert; and 5.) if warranted, conduct further proceedings to determine whether alcoholism is a contributing factor material to a finding of disability. R. 163-64.
On May 14, 2003, Judge Jones held a supplemental hearing on Hurley's claim in Orlando, Florida. R. 80-106. Hurley testified, and his attorney, Robert F. Sprick. appeared with him at the hearing. The ALJ also heard testimony from vocational expert ["VE"] Robert San Filippo. On May 29, 2003. the ALJ issued her second decision that Hurley was not entitled to benefits. R. 18 — 28. Following a review of the medical and other record evidence, the ALJ found that although Hurley has severe impairments, he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment. R. 27, Findings 3-4. The ALJ also found that Hurley's subjective complaints including allegations of incapacitating pain and mental limitations were not fully credible. R. 27, Finding 5. Further, the ALJ determined that Hurley was incapable of performing his past relevant work, but that he retained the RFC to perform a limited range of light work.1 R. 27 — 28, Findings 8 and 12. Accordingly, the ALJ applied Grids Rules 202.20 — 202.22 as a framework and relied on VE testimony to determine that Hurley was not disabled. R. 28, Findings 13 — 14.
Subsequently, Hurley appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council. R. 13-14 Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Appeals Council denied review on October 23, 2003. R. 8-12. On November 13, 2003, Hurley timely appealed the Appeals Council's decision to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Docket No. 1. On May 6, 2004. Hurley filed an amended memorandum of law in support of his appeal of the denial of review.2 Docket No. 19. On June 2, 2004, the Commissioner filed a memorandum in support of her decision that Hurley was not disabled. Docket No. 20. The appeal is ripe for determination.
Hurley assigns four errors to the Commissioner's decision: 1.) failing to develop the record concerning Hurley's allegations of pain; 2.) presenting to the VE a hypothetical question not supported by substantial evidence; 3.) failing to consider Hurley's combination of impairments: and 4.) improperly according weight to the opinions of Hurley's medical providers. Pl.'s Brief at 7 — 17.
The Commissioner responds that her decision was supported by substantial evidence and was decided by proper legal standards. The Commissioner asserts that: 1.) Hurley's allegations of disabling pain were embellished and unsupported; 2.) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's hypothetical questions; 3.) the ALJ properly evaluated Hurley's impairments; and 4.) the ALJ properly accorded weight to Hurley's treating and non-treating sources. Def.'s Brief at 9-17.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir.1995), citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir.1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); accord, Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991).
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir.1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord, Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.1992) (); Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir.1986) ().
Congress has empowered the district court to reverse the decision of the Commissioner without remanding the cause. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(Sentence Four). The district court will reverse a Commissioner's decision on plenary review if the decision applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the district court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.1994); accord, Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir.1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). This Court may reverse the decision of the Commissioner, and order an award of disability benefits, where the Commissioner has already considered the essential evidence and it is clear that the cumulative effect of the evidence establishes disability without any doubt. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 534 (11th Cir.1993); accord, Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 631, 636 — 37 (11th Cir.1984).
The district court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); or under both sentences. Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1089 — 92, 1095, 1098 (11th Cir.1996). To remand under sentence four, the district court must either find that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. Jackson, 99 F.3d at 1090 — 91 (); accord Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688. 690 (5th Cir.1980) (remand appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm, but also was insufficient for district court to find claimant disabled).
Where the district court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a sentence-four remand may be appropriate to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for his decision. Falcon v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 827, 829 — 30 (11th Cir.1984) () (treating psychologist acknowledged that claimant had improved in response to treatment and could work in a supportive, non-competitive, tailor-made work environment). On remand under...
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