Waldron v. Lancaster Cnty. Deputy Sheriff James Roark, S-16-676.

• Decision Date: 13 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. S-16-676.,S-16-676.
• Citation: 298 Neb. 26,902 N.W.2d 204
• Parties: Marilyn WALDRON, appellant, v. Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff James ROARK, individually and in his official capacity, appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

298 Neb. 26

902 N.W.2d 204

Marilyn WALDRON, appellant,

v.Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff James ROARK, individually and in his official capacity, appellee.

No. S-16-676.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed October 13, 2017

Vincent M. Powers, of Vincent M. Powers and Associates, Lincoln, for appellant.

Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, David A. Derbin and Ryan M. Swaroff for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Kelch, and Funke, JJ.

Per Curiam.

I. INTRODUCTION

Marilyn Waldron brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights by Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff James Roark when he entered Waldron's home to serve a warrant on Waldron's grandson, Steven Copple. Waldron argues that in doing so, Roark violated the knock-and-announce rule. Waldron also argues that her arrest was unreasonable and unconstitutional because there was no probable cause to arrest her and because Roark used excessive force in handcuffing her.

In Waldron v. Roark ( Waldron I ),¹ we found that material issues of fact existed as to Waldron's knock-and-announce and excessive force claims and remanded the cause. On remand, following additional argument on the issues of qualified immunity and sovereign immunity, the district court again granted Roark's motion for summary judgment, on the basis that Roark was entitled to qualified immunity. In this appeal, we now analyze Waldron's claims within the framework of the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Because we find that Waldron did not meet the burden of showing that Roark violated a clearly established right in any of Waldron's claims, we affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity.

II. BACKGROUND

In September 2013, Waldron filed a complaint against Roark, alleging that Roark violated Waldron's civil rights under § 1983, resulting in her injuries. Forming the basis of this action are the events that happened on February 22, 2012, when Roark and his partner, Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff Amanda May, went to Waldron's home to serve an arrest warrant on Copple. The specific allegations regarding what happened during this event are set forth in more detail in Waldron I and are discussed further in the analysis section below.

In November 2014, Roark filed a motion for summary judgment. In December 2014, Waldron filed an amended complaint against Roark, in his individual and official capacities. The district court eventually granted the motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that the deputies' entry into Waldron's home was proper, that Waldron obstructed the work of the deputies, and that Roark's use of force was objectively reasonable.

On appeal in Waldron I , we reversed the district court's order and remanded the cause for further proceedings. We held that summary judgment on Waldron's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim was not proper because there were issues of material fact as to (1) whether Roark properly displayed notice of his office or authority when he entered Waldron's home, (2) whether Roark's entry was reasonable, and (3) whether the force Roark used was excessive.

Following the issuance of our opinion in Waldron I , the parties again addressed Roark's motion for summary judgment. In its second order granting the motion, the district court found that Roark was entitled to qualified immunity and that the record was sufficiently developed to render a separate trial or evidentiary hearing unnecessary. The court specifically found that (1) Roark was entitled to qualified immunity on Waldron's knock-and-announce claim because sufficient exigent circumstances existed from Roark's perspective to warrant his entry without a proper announcement, (2) Roark was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because (a) Roark had probable cause to arrest Waldron and (b) Waldron's right to be free of excessive force was not clearly established, and (3) Roark was entitled to judgment in his favor as to Waldron's claims against him in his official capacity. Waldron appeals.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Waldron assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district court erred in finding that (1) Roark was entitled to qualified immunity on Waldron's knock-and-announce claim, (2) Roark was entitled to qualified immunity on Waldron's unlawful arrest claim because (a) Roark had probable cause to arrest Waldron and (b) Waldron's "right to be free of the excessive force used by ... Roark was not clearly established," (3) there was no evidence to support Waldron's claim that a policy or custom of Lancaster County caused her damages, and (4) Roark was entitled to summary judgment in his official capacity.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.² When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendant violated clearly established law.³

V. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue regarding any material fact or the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.⁴ In the summary judgment context, a fact is material only if it would affect the outcome of the case.⁵ If a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment may not properly be entered.⁶

1. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have repeatedly " ‘ "stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." ’ "⁷ This is because those entitled to qualified immunity hold more than a mere defense to liability; they "hold ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’ "⁸ If a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial, then qualified immunity is effectively lost.⁹

Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) that the right was " ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct."¹⁰ In evaluating whether the right was "clearly established," the question is not whether the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but whether " ‘[t]he contours of [the] right [were] sufficiently clear’ " at the time of the challenged conduct that "every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that [the challenged conduct] violates that right.’ "¹¹ A case does not need to be directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the constitutional question beyond debate.¹² The dispositive question is "whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established."¹³ This inquiry " ‘ "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." ’ "¹⁴ Put frankly, plaintiffs in a § 1983 action have a steep burden of showing that a right is clearly established.¹⁵ The " ‘clearly established’ " standard " ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments' by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. ’ "¹⁶ Even if a public official has engaged in unlawful conduct, the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity analysis protects him or her from suit so long as the official reasonably believed such conduct to be lawful.¹⁷ If a reasonable official could have believed the conduct was lawful, the official's conduct does not violate clearly established law.¹⁸

First, we address whether Roark is entitled to qualified immunity on Waldron's knock-and-announce claim.

(a) Waldron's Knock-and-Announce Claim

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures...."¹⁹ Among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure is the "method of an officer's entry into a dwelling."²⁰ Under certain circumstances, "an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."²¹ The rule that officers should knock and announce their purpose and be denied admittance prior to entering a dwelling has been codified in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-411 (Reissue 2016).²²

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that not every entry must be preceded by an announcement.²³ "The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests."²⁴ "[I]f circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in."²⁵

We view the evidence surrounding Roark's entry into Waldron's home in the light most favorable to Waldron. According to Waldron, she "cautiously opened the door" and immediately noticed that "people were pushing on it." Waldron claims that she tried to, but could not, hold the door closed. According to Waldron, it was only "after they got in[to]" Waldron's home that Roark announced that he and his partner, May, were deputies and that they were looking for Copple. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Waldron, we assume that Roark entered Waldron's home without knocking and announcing his purpose.

In order to justify a " ‘no-knock’ " entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, for example by allowing the destruction of evidence.²⁶ "[The Court] require[s] only that police ‘have a...