Waldron v. Wild
Decision Date | 04 November 1983 |
Citation | 96 A.D.2d 190,468 N.Y.S.2d 244 |
Parties | Daniel J. WALDRON, Appellant, v. Michael P. WILD, Respondent. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Anthony J. Paris, Syracuse, for appellant.
Michael J. Pekarsky, Syracuse, for respondent.
Before CALLAHAN, J.P., and DENMAN, BOOMER, GREEN and SCHNEPP, JJ.
CALLAHAN, Justice Presiding:
Plaintiff, Daniel J. Waldron, commenced this negligence action to recover money damages for personal injuries he sustained as the result of an accident which occurred on May 25, 1980 when the automobile owned and operated by defendant, Michael P. Wild, in which he was a passenger, left the road and collided with a building and several parked cars. He was taken to the emergency room of the Community General Hospital in Syracuse where he was treated for his injuries and released.
After joinder of issue and pretrial discovery, defendant made a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 upon the ground that plaintiff's action was barred because he did not sustain a "serious injury" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law. In granting defendant's motion dismissing plaintiff's complaint, Special Term found that the facial injuries suffered by plaintiff did not qualify as a "significant disfigurement" within the threshold requirements of the No-Fault Law (Insurance Law § 671, subd. 4). Plaintiff appeals from that order.
Subdivision 1 of section 673 of the Insurance Law provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state, there shall be no right of recovery for non-economic loss [i.e., pain and suffering], except in the case of a serious injury ...." "Serious injury", as defined in subdivision 4 of section 671 means, inter alia, a personal injury which results in "significant disfigurement". Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the accident caused a "serious injury" as defined in subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law. Defendant contends that plaintiff's facial injuries are superficial and minor and do not fall within the threshold requirements of the statute. Thus, the issue for our resolution is whether the medical evidence in the record before Special Term on the motion for summary judgment is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with regard to plaintiff's claim of a "significant disfigurement".
In responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's affidavit asserts that he sustained "multiple lacerations on my face" which The emergency room record from the Community General Hospital reveals that upon examination, plaintiff suffered "[m]ultiple small facial abrasions and lacerations, the later of the gouge-type which do not require repairing". Plaintiff's doctor's report verifies that he had abrasions of the face and forehead when initially seen by him on June 3, 1980. A report submitted by defendant's doctor notes injuries to plaintiff's face as being . Concluding comments in this report state that Defendant relied upon the same medical reports and records together with his attorney's affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment. After examining the affidavits, records, reports and photographs of plaintiff's face, Special Term concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a "significant disfigurement" within the meaning of the No-Fault statute.
Summary judgment might be warranted in an appropriate case where the responding papers to the motion contain an unsubstantiated statement that plaintiff's injuries would constitute serious injury within the meaning of the Insurance Law (Matter of Perez v. Pearl-Wick Corp., 56 A.D.2d 239, 392 N.Y.S.2d 496), or where plaintiff fails to establish by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue, i.e., a "serious injury" within the meaning of subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law, requiring a trial, (Shaffer v. Kasperek, 79 A.D.2d 1092, 435 N.Y.S.2d 835). This is not such a case. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and, of course, should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue (Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231, 413 N.Y.S.2d 141, 385 N.E.2d 1068; Goldstein v. County of Monroe, 77 A.D.2d 232, 236, 432 N.Y.S.2d 966) or where the issue is "arguable" (Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 144 N.E.2d 387). On a motion for summary judgment the court should accept as true the opposing party's evidence and any evidence of the movant which favors the opposing party (Weiss v. Garfield, 21 A.D.2d 156, 249 N.Y.S.2d 458).
The No-Fault statute is silent as to the meaning of "significant disfigurement". Another court (Agudelo v. Pan American World Airways, 118 Misc.2d 186, 189, 460 N.Y.S.2d 416) in searching for the meaning, stated:
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... ... These are critical distinctions. See e.g Waldron v. Wild, 96 A.D.2d 190, 194, 468 N.Y.S.2d 244, 247 (4th Dept.1983) (facial scarring to be evaluated taking into account age, sex, and occupation of ... ...
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... ... These are critical distinctions. See e.g Waldron v. Wild, 96 A.D.2d 190, 194, 468 N.Y.S.2d 244, 247 (4th Dept. 1983) (facial scarring to be evaluated taking into account age, sex, and occupation of ... ...
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... ... Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 404, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 144 N.E.2d 387; Waldron v. Wild, 96 A.D.2d 190, 192, 468 N.Y.S.2d 244). All competent evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion ... ...