Waldrop v. State
Decision Date | 01 December 2000 |
Docket Number | CR-98-2316 |
Parties | Bobby Wayne Waldrop v. StateALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court (CC-1998-162)
On Return to Remand
On June 30, 2000, we remanded this cause to the trial court for that court to reweigh the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and then to issue a new sentencing order. Waldrop v. State, [Ms. CR-98-2316, June 30, 2000] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2000). The trial court has complied with our order, issued a new sentencing order, and sentenced Waldrop to death. When we issued our June 30 opinion, we deferred addressing the other issues Waldrop raised on appeal, pending the trial court's compliance with our directions on remand. We will now address those issues.1
The appellant, Bobby Wayne Waldrop, was convicted of three counts of capital murder: two counts of murder committed during a robbery in the first degree, see § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975; and one count of murder where two or more persons are murdered, see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975. The jury, by a vote of 10-2, recommended that Waldrop be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court imposed the death sentence.
Waldrop was convicted of murdering his grandparents, Irene and Sherrell Prestridge. The facts surrounding the murders are detailed in our June 30, 2000, opinion.
Waldrop raises several issues, many of which were not presented to the trial court. Waldrop, however, was sentenced to death; therefore, his failure to raise these claims at trial does not prevent our review of them. It does weigh against Waldrop as to any claim of prejudice he now makes on appeal. See Burgess v. State, 723 So. 2d 742 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990), aff'd, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 886, 112 S.Ct. 242, 116 L.Ed.2d 197 (1991). Additionally, "'the plain error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result."'" Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 641, 645 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), aff'd, 651 So. 2d 659 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 1973, 131 L.Ed.2d 862 (1995), quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Brady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)).
"In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the appellant."
Accordingly, we will now address the issues raised by Waldrop.
Waldrop contends that the trial court abused its discretion by, he says, failing to conduct an investigation and to consider certain factors in denying his application for youthful-offender status. He raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Thus, we will review his contention for plain error. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P.
In Reese v. State, 677 So. 2d 1239 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995), this Court stated:
677 So. 2d at 1240. See also Wigfall v. State, 710 So. 2d 931, 934 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (where trial court heard, during youthful- offender hearing, argument on the seriousness of the charge, evidence indicating the nature of the circumstances upon which the charge was based, evidence of the defendant's age, and other relevant factors concerning the defendant and his home life, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying youthful offender status); Robinson v. State, 728 So. 2d 650, 653 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) ( ).
On January 7, 1998, a hearing was conducted addressing Waldrop's application for youthful-offender status. The record indicates that, during the hearing, the trial court read the allegations contained in the indictment and reviewed the application. The application revealed Waldrop's family history and indicated that Waldrop had previously been adjudicated guilty as a youthful offender of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, and that he had been convicted of second-degree theft of property. Additionally, the application addressed Waldrop's educational background, indicating that he had completed ninth grade and that he was able to read and write. The application further revealed that, although Waldrop had experimented with marijuana and cocaine, he had never suffered from a serious mental illness and had never been under the care of a psychiatrist. At the hearing, Waldrop indicated that the information contained in the youthful-offender application was substantially correct. Testimony during the hearing further established that Waldrop was 19 years old when the offenses occurred. In an order dated January 13, 1999, the trial court stated, "Based on the matters presented to the Court, the defendant's application for treatment as a youthful offender is hereby denied." (C. 31.)
Given that the record does not support Waldrop's contention that youthful-offender status was denied solely on the basis of the offenses charged, this Court will not reverse the trial court's decision to deny youthful-offender status. See Wigfall, 710 So. 2d at 934. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Waldrop's application for youthful offender status.
Waldrop maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to the police. (Issue V in Waldrop's brief to this Court at p. 75.) Specifically, he claims that he was unable to understand his Miranda2 rights and that he did not voluntarily waive those rights because, he says, at the time of the interrogation, he was under the influence of crack cocaine, he had been deprived of food and sleep, and he was emotional.
In Maples v. State, [Ms. CR-97-0548, March 26, 1999] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), this Court stated:
It has long been the law that a confession is prima facie involuntary and inadmissible, and that before a confession may be admitted into evidence, the burden is upon the State to establish voluntariness and a Miranda predicate. Jackson v. State, 562 So. 2d 1373, 1380 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). A two-pronged test is used to determine whether an accused's statement is admissible. First, the trial court must determine whether the accused was informed of his Miranda rights. Second, the trial court must determine whether the accused voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before making his statement. Holder v. State, 584 So. 2d 872, 878 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Carpenter v. State, 581 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991).
This Court addressed the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights in Click v. State, 695 So. 2d 209 (Ala.Crim.App. 19...
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