Wigfall v. State
Decision Date | 14 November 1997 |
Docket Number | CR-96-1701 |
Citation | 710 So.2d 931 |
Parties | Nathaniel WIGFALL v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Thomas Smith, Dothan, for appellant.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and P. David Bjurberg, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Nathaniel Wigfall, was convicted of two counts of first-degree robbery, a violation of § 13A-8-41, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for each count, those sentences to run concurrently.
The evidence presented at trial established that on the evening of November 1, 1994, 14-year-old Joe Flucker and 15-year-old Carl Brown were walking home from basketball practice. As they walked home, a white Buick Park Avenue automobile with tinted windows passed them at least twice. A short time later, the driver of the Buick stopped the vehicle, and one of the passengers asked the boys where the nearest Hardee's restaurant was located.
As Flucker and Brown gave directions, two passengers got out. While one of the individuals pointed a gun at Flucker and Brown, the other individual robbed Flucker of his tennis shoes, a denim jacket, and a book bag containing a pair of jeans, several books, keys, and a lunch card. Brown was similarly relieved of his book bag, which contained shorts, a T-shirt, socks, books, keys, and a lunch card. The individuals got back into the Buick and sped away. As the vehicle fled the scene, Brown noted the car's tag number.
Brown and Flucker ran home and telephoned the police to report the incident. Capt. Neil Forrester of the Headland Police Department traced the Buick's tag number to Serena Reeves, the appellant's sister. Ms. Reeves advised Forrester that she had lent her car to the appellant on November 1, 1994. She further advised Forrester that her brother still lived with their mother, and gave him the address where the appellant could be found.
Forrester went to the residence of Christine Wigfall, the appellant's mother. He advised Ms. Wigfall that he believed that her son had been involved in a robbery that he was investigating. After Forrester left, Ms. Wigfall questioned her son, and he produced some of the stolen items. Ms. Wigfall then contacted Forrester.
On November 10, 1994, Forrester returned to the Wigfall home to interview the appellant. He first advised the appellant, who was 16 years old, of his constitutional rights under Miranda 1 and Rule 11, Ala.R.Juv.P. The appellant then executed a waiver of rights form and made a statement admitting his involvement in the robbery of Brown and Flucker. Specifically, the appellant told Forrester that he was the driver of the car. The appellant's mother was present when the appellant was advised of his rights. She also signed the waiver of rights form, and was present while the appellant gave a recorded statement. The appellant was subsequently charged with two counts of first-degree robbery.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for youthful offender status because, he says, the trial court based its decision solely on the charge itself, instead of considering all relevant factors.
We would first note that the appellant did not object to the trial court's denial of his application for youthful offender status. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See Ford v. State, 645 So.2d 317, 318 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); Carter v. State, 627 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), aff'd, 627 So.2d 1030 (Ala.1993).
Moreover, even if this issue had been properly preserved, the appellant's contention must fail.
Reese v. State, 677 So.2d 1239, 1240 (Ala.Cr.App.1995)
The record does not support the appellant's contention that the trial court considered only the offense itself in determining whether to grant youthful offender status. Indeed, it is clear to us that the trial court considered the facts upon which the robbery charge was based, as well as other factors. During the hearing on the appellant's youthful offender application, the trial court heard argument on the seriousness of the charge, the nature of the circumstances upon which the charge was based, the appellant's age, and other relevant factors concerning the appellant and his home life. Where the record does not support the contention that youthful offender status was denied solely on the basis of the crime charged, this court will not reverse the trial court's decision to deny youthful offender status. Burks v. State, 600 So.2d 374, 378 (Ala.Cr.App.), opinion after remand, 600 So.2d 387 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's application for youthful offender status.
The appellant also argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress the recorded statement that he gave to Captain Forrester on November 10, 1994. We disagree. Our examination of the record clearly establishes that the appellant's statement was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
It has long been the law that a confession is prima facie involuntary and inadmissible, and that before a confession may be admitted into evidence, the burden is upon the State to establish voluntariness and a Miranda predicate. Jackson v. State, 562 So.2d 1373, 1380 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). A two-pronged test is used to determine whether an accused's statement is admissible. First, the trial court must determine whether the accused was informed of his Miranda rights. Second, the trial court must determine whether the accused voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before making his statement. Holder v. State, 584 So.2d 872, 878 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); Carpenter v. State, 581 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Ala.Crim.App.1991).
When the accused is a juvenile, the procedure varies slightly. "An extrajudicial statement made by a child may be admissible if given by the child in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution and the prevailing case law as expressed by the appellate courts." Rule 21, Ala.R.Juv.P. Before obtaining any statement from a juvenile defendant, law enforcement officers must meet certain requirements: (1) the juvenile must be informed of his or her Miranda rights; (2) the interrogating officer must ensure that the juvenile both understood those rights and voluntarily waived them; and (3) the interrogating officer must advise the juvenile that if a parent is not present, the juvenile has a right to communicate with a parent. See Rule 11, Ala.R.Juv.P.; Cauley v. State, 681 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Ala.Cr.App.1996).
In this case, Capt. Forrester testified that the appellant was informed of his Miranda rights, as well as his rights under Rule 11, Ala.R.Juv.P. A copy of the explanation of rights and the accompanying waiver of rights form was introduced into evidence during the appellant's trial, and is contained in the record on appeal. Indeed, the appellant does not appear to dispute that he was informed of his rights. Thus, the first prong of the test was established.
Once the first prong of the test is met, the court's attention must then turn to whether, after having been informed of his rights, the accused made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. The appellant contends that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights because his waiver and his subsequent statement were based on Capt. Forrester's promise that if he made a statement and returned the victim's property, then he would not be prosecuted. This issue was recently addressed by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Gaddy, 698 So.2d 1150 (Ala.1997):
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