Waldrop v. State
| Decision Date | 17 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 58483,58483 |
| Citation | 544 So.2d 834 |
| Parties | Ray M. WALDROP, a/k/a David Ray Walters v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
J.P. Coleman, Ackerman, Gene Stringer, Louisville, for appellant.
Mike Moore, Atty. Gen., by John R. Henry, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and ANDERSON, JJ.
This case was first before this Court in Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss.1987). This Court held that the appellant's conviction for the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug pursuant to § 41-29-115 Miss.Code Ann. (Supp.1988), should be reversed for a new trial, largely on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 276. The second trial was held in the Circuit Court of Leake County; Waldrop was again convicted of the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine and sentenced to thirty (30) year term in the Department of Corrections without probation or parole. On appeal to this Court, he assigns as error the following:
(1) The consent to search the trailer signed by Mary Lube was invalid.
(2) Waldrop has standing to challenge the legality of the consensual search of the trailer.
(3) The police officers trespassed on Waldrop's land in order to gain access to the trailer.
(4) The trial court erred in admitting into evidence the substance found on the property in front of the trailer.
I.
For purposes of this appeal, the facts at issue are largely the same as those contained in the first opinion, as follows:
On September 14, 1984, Leake County Sheriff Joe Mack Thaggard and four state criminal investigators, arrested Ray M. Waldrop on a parole violation, pursuant to a teletype from the National Crime Information Center, (NCIC). Prior to the arrest, police also had information that Waldrop was an acquaintance of an area resident, Mary Lube, and ran a drug laboratory.
A few hundred yards from the arrest scene, a home construction site, police passed a mobile home where Lube's automobile had previously been seen parked in the drive. Louisiana State Police reported that the mobile home, owned by Lube, was Waldrop's residence before its move to Mississippi in August, 1984. On the day of the arrest, police again passed the mobile home from which emanated a "terrible odor", similar to ether, a compound See Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273 (Miss.1987).
in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Only a few hundred yards from the arrest scene was a mobile home, at which Mary Lube's car had been parked. The windows of the mobile home were covered with aluminum foil and there were no electric or water lines running from the mobile home. On the day of the arrest, police passed the mobile home and noticed that a terrible odor seemed to be coming from it. The smell coming from the trailer appeared to be ether, a compound used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Following Waldrop's arrest, he claimed that the trailer belonged to Mary Lube although he possessed the keys. Following the receipt of this information, Deputy Bobby Brown transported Lube to the sheriff's office, where she was given her Miranda warnings. Following the giving of these warnings, she signed a consent form to search the trailer. The police claimed that at this time they did not consider Ms. Lube to be under arrest. It is also true however, that she was transported to the sheriff's office in a patrol car.
Having obtained Mary Lube's consent to search the trailer, the police entered the mobile home, finding various laboratory equipment as well as five doughy balls, resembling biscuit dough in consistency. These balls contained methamphetamine that had been manufactured within the prior 24 hour period. Waldrop admitted to the police that he had been in the mobile home as recently as three hours prior to his arrest, and 6 hours prior to the search. He denied that there had been any laboratory equipment or odor present at that time. Expert testimony at trial revealed that the 5 balls were indeed methamphetamine, and furthermore, the glassware and other objects found in the trailer were sufficient to manufacture methamphetamine. An amount of gray powdery material visible to the naked eye was found on the ground approximately 20 feet from the trailer and was identified at trial as being a by-product resulting from the methamphetamine manufacturing process. After all testimony was heard, the appellant was once again convicted of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-115 (Supp.1988). He received a thirty (30) year sentence in the Mississippi State Penitentiary pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(b)(1) without parole, suspension or reduction as a habitual offender, pursuant to § 99-19-81 of Miss.Code Ann. (Supp.1988).
On remand from this Court, an extensive hearing was held in the trial court on the appellant's motion to suppress the result of the search of the mobile home. The proof presented in that hearing revealed that at about 1:30 p.m. on the afternoon of September 14, 1984, Sheriff Thaggard began searching for the appellant to arrest him for a parole violation. The sheriff and several other officers searched the area around the mobile home but were unable to find the appellant. At that time however, they noticed a strong smell emanating from the trailer, which seemed to be ether. The officers then drove to a house located approximately 200 yards from the trailer. The appellant was seen walking away from the house and placed under arrest; he was also advised of his Miranda rights at this time. When asked about the trailer, the appellant told the officers that Mary Lube owned it, and gave them a key to the trailer.
At about 2:00 p.m. Deputy Bobby Brown was instructed by Thaggard to ask Mary Lube to come to the police station to speak to Thaggard. Lube agreed to accompany Brown to the police station and Brown testified that he did not force her to go with him, nor did he threaten her or promise anything to her in order to obtain her consent to see Thaggard. She was also not placed under arrest at that time. At the police station, Lube admitted she owned the trailer and signed a written consent form, allowing the officers to search the trailer. Several other officers corroborated Brown's version of this story at the suppression hearing and at trial. It is also true that Lube was later arrested, put in jail and kept overnight until bail could be supplied. However, she was never indicted or prosecuted for her involvement in the appellant's crimes.
It appears from the appellant's brief that the source of his claim that the consent given by Mary Lube was invalid is the fact that she had been arrested without probable cause. This Court holds that the appellant does not have standing to question Ms. Lube's arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and may not be asserted vicariously. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court held that standing to invoke Fourth Amendment rights requires a finding that the proponent of the rights has an alleged injury in fact, and that the proponent is asserting his legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties. This Court has adopted this view. See Ware v. State, 410 So.2d 1330, 1331, 1332 (Miss.1982). If Mary Lube had been prosecuted for a crime arising from the events which transpired in this case, she certainly would have standing to litigate this issue. However, the appellant possesses no such right, due to the fact that the right involved is a personal one belonging to Mary Lube only. The cases cited by the appellant in his brief are not persuasive, for the simple fact that in each of those cases the appellant was asserting a challenge based on his or her own Fourth Amendment rights, rather than those of someone else. Therefore, these cases provide no support for the appellant's position.
The trial court held that the appellant had no standing to litigate this issue. However, had the court ruled on the merits of the claim presented under this assignment of error, it is the opinion of this Court that there was sufficient proof before the court to show that Mary Lube was neither under arrest nor in custody at the time she executed the consent to search. It is also undisputed that the trailer in question belonged to her; therefore, she had every reason and right to consent to a search of her own property. She also testified at trial that at no time did the officers threaten, promise or use any other form of inducement or intimidation to secure her consent to search the trailer. It is therefore the opinion of this writer that there is no merit to this assignment of error.
When the appellant was arrested, he denied ownership of the trailer. In fact, he told police officers that Mary Lube owned the trailer. When questioned, Lube admitted this was true. It has long been the law in this state that if a person denies ownership or possession of property, he later has no standing to complain that the search of it was unlawful. See Watkins v. State, 262 So.2d 422, 423, 424 (Miss.1972), Ball v. State, 194 So.2d 502, 503 (Miss.1967). It is entirely arguable that...
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