Walker Dishwasher Corp. v. Medford Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1932
• Parties: WALKER DISHWASHER CORPORATION v. MEDFORD TRUST CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

279 Mass. 33

180 N.E. 517

WALKER DISHWASHER CORPORATION

v.MEDFORD TRUST CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

March 31, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Gray, Judge.

Bill in equity by the Walker Dishwasher Corporation against the Medford Trust Company. From the decree in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Dennis E. Sullivan, of Boston, for appellant.

B. Potter, of Boston, for appellee.

CROSBY, J.

This is a bill in equity by which the plaintiff seeks to have the defendant ordered to deliver to it thirty-two Walker dishwasher sinks, installed in an apartment house now owned by the defendant. The sinks were sold by the plaintiff on or about September 23, 1929, to one Griffin who then owned the premises, now owned by the defendant, and was at that time engaged in building thereon the apartment house in which the sinks were later installed. Before September 23, 1929, Griffin had executed to the defendant first and second mortgages on the real estate, which were duly recorded. On September 23, 1929, he executed to the plaintiff a chattel mortgage covering the thirty-two sinks to secure the payment of twelve promissory notes totalling $2,990; this mortgage was duly recorded. At the date of the filing of the bill eleven of the notes, amounting to $2,750, were overdue. Thereafter the defendant took title to the apartment house property by foreclosure of its second mortgage. The case was heard by a judge of the superior court. He states that, ‘Having due regard to the nature and purpose of the articles in dispute, to the manner in which they were attached to the real estate and the intention of the parties, the court finds that the articles remained personal property and finds and rules that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of them under its personal property mortgage of the condition of which there has been a breach.’ A final decree was entered ordering the defendant to permit the plaintiff to enter the apartments and remove the sinks.

A description of the sinks and of the manner of their installation as appears by the undisputed evidence is, in substance, as follows: The sink hangs on the wall suspended from brackets which are screwed into the wall. The plaintiff does not furnish the faucets or the trap. In order to remove the sink ‘Just unscrew the tail-piece * * * and lift your sink right off the wall * * * it would not be necessary to detach your waste. It would be necessary to detach the faucets, and you could put them back. It would not be necessary to detach the waste line, because that is a permanent proposition. The dishwasher sink hangs on these lugs, and you can lift the sink off. * * *’ In removing the sink no damage would be caused to the building. The sink takes the place of an ordinary sink, it is the dishwasher and sink combined. In order to remove the sink it would be necessary to unscrew the drain pipe. The hot and cold water pipes go through two holes in the casting and to remove the sink ‘you just unscrew your faucets, and put them back.’

The finding of the trial judge that the sinks remained personal property must stand unless in the opinion of this court it is plainly wrong. Donnelly v. Alden, 229 Mass. 109, 114, 118 N. E. 298;Freeman v. Davenport Peters Co., 272 Mass. 321, 323, 172 N. E. 234. In determining the question of fact whether or not the sinks were personal property, the judge could properly consider the way in which they were attached to the building, the intention of the parties, and the nature and purpose of the articles. All that was required to remove the sinks would be to unscrew the ‘tail-piece’ and faucets and lift the sink from the lugs which were attached to the brackets. It thus appears it could be found from the physical facts that as installed the articles easily could be removed from the apartments without any damage whatever to the building. It also could be found from the giving by the purchaser to the plaintiff of a chattel mortgage covering the thirty-two sinks that the parties intended that they were to be regarded as personal property. The nature and purpose of the articles and the manner in which they were attached to the walls were evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that they were to remain personal property. Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327,6 L. R. A. 249, 15 Am. St. Rep. 235;Medford Trust Co. v. Priggen Steel Garage Co., 273 Mass. 349, 174 N. E. 126. Generally...