Walker, In re

• Decision Date: 30 April 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 12840
• Citation: 453 P.2d 456,71 Cal.2d 54,77 Cal.Rptr. 16
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 453 P.2d 456 In re Alyce Mae WALKER on Habeas Corpus.

Page 16

77 Cal.Rptr. 16

71 Cal.2d 54, 453 P.2d 456

In re Alyce Mae WALKER on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 12840.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 30, 1969.

Philip M. Schwabacher, Lancaster, Norman Herring, Henry J. Shames, Los Angeles, and Harold Benjamin, Beverly Hills, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Bradley A. Stoutt, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

This is a companion case to In re Marks, Ante, p. 1, also decided this day. With one crucial exception, the contentions are the same as those raised in Marks and are without merit for the reasons there stated. The exception, a challenge to the validity of the initial commitment for narcotics addiction, is meritorious and requires issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The present application was filed on behalf of Alyce Mae Walker (hereinafter called petitioner), currently confined in the California Rehabilitation Center under an order of commitment as a 'civil' narcotics addict. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3100 et seq.) The circumstances of her commitment are as follows:

In the early morning hours of April 18, 1967, petitioner, ill as a result of ingesting sleeping pills and alcohol, consulted her private physician. After an examination he gave her a handwritten note addressed 'To Whom It May Concern' and dated '5/18/67--9 a.m.,' stating that she had used heroin and narcotic stimulants 'on and off' since 1959 and was currently addicted to barbiturates and amphetamines, and that in his opinion it would be in her best interests if she were 'committed for care to a state institution.' Petitioner then went directly to the Psychiatric Unit of the Los Angeles County General Hospital and requested such care.

The hospital authorities, however, referred her to the district attorney's office. Thereafter matters proceeded swiftly. In the hours remaining of the same day, (1) the district attorney filed a petition in the superior court seeking to have petitioner committed to the California Rehabilitation Center as a narcotics addict (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3100); (2) after consultation with a deputy public defender, petitioner signed a sweeping waiver of all her statutory rights; (3) a 'hearing' was held at which no witnesses were called and no evidence was taken; and (4) the court nevertheless 'found' that petitioner was a narcotics addict and entered the order of commitment now challenged.

The record thus discloses that, contrary to the statutory requirements, ¹ the court did not order petitioner to 'be examined by a physician or physicians' (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3102); that a copy of the petition and order for examination were not 'personally delivered' to petitioner 'At least one day before the time of the (medical) examination' (Welf. § Inst.Code, § 3103); that the court did not 'appoint two medical examiners to examine the person alleged to be a narcotic addict,' and hence no report of such examination was 'delivered to the court' (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3104); and that the court did not 'set a time and place of hearing and cause notice thereof to be served' on petitioner (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3104).

It is settled that jurisdiction to enter an order of commitment depends on strict compliance with each of the specific statutory prerequisites for maintenance of the proceeding. (In re Raner (1963) 59 Cal.2d 635, 639, 30 Cal.Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638; In re Jones (1964) 61 Cal.2d 325, 327, 38 Cal.Rptr. 509, 392 P.2d 269.) There being no such compliance in the case at bar, the commitment was invalid unless it was saved by petitioner's purported waiver.

At the time here relevant, Welfare and Institutions Code section 3107 provided that 'Hearing may be waived by consent of the person sought to be committed, expressed in open court or in writing by the person prior to hearing.' Construing the similarly worded predecessor to this statute (former Pen.Code, § 6507; States.1961, ch. 850, p. 2227), we commended the practice of waiver as one 'which, while fully protecting the rights of the individual, permits the start of treatment and rehabilitation to be expedited in uncontested commitment cases and thus 'conserves the time and effort of the parties and the judiciary' (citation).' (In re Cruz (1965) 62 Cal.2d 307, 313, 42 Cal.Rptr. 220, 223, 398 P.2d 412, 415.) We adhere to that view; but we reiterate that in order to be effective such a waiver must be, as it was in Cruz, both 'informed and limited'. (Ibid.)

The first requirement of any waiver of statutory or constitutional rights, of course, is that it be knowingly and intelligently made. Such a showing is difficult enough in an ordinary criminal case, as witness the many appellate decisions on the point; it is even more difficult when the person purporting to make the waiver is in an altered physiological or psychological state, the characteristic of all narcotics addicts (see People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 301--305, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391). A waiver pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3107, therefore, must be carefully scrutinized to determine that the person making it had the physical and emotional capacity to do so under all the circumstances of the case.

Here the waiver by petitioner includes a statement that she had 'an opportunity to discuss * * * the advisability and ramifications of my waiving my rights * * * with legal counsel;' and that she 'freely and voluntarily' waived these rights, 'which I fully understand and comprehend.' This is followed by a similar statement on the part of her attorney, joining in the waiver. Other considerations, however, weigh against the sufficiency of the foregoing recitals. The entire waiver instrument is a printed form, and petitioner's sole participation in its preparation was to 'sign on the dotted line.' ² In a declaration made under penalty of perjury, petitioner now avers that while the signature on the waiver form is hers, 'that is all I recall about the instrument'; and that at the time of the hearing 'I through I was going to the Los Angeles County General Hospital, Psychiatric Unit, for some sort of treatment or thereapy.' A written waiver executed by a person represented by counsel will not lightly be set aside on the basis of such self-serving, post facto explanations; but in the present case petitioner's complaint that the proceedings were all over 'before I realized what was happening to me' is lent credibility by her headlong rush from illness to doctor's examining room to county hospital to district attorney's office to courtroom to commitment, all in the span of a single working day.

We need not, however, resolve the question whether the waiver in this case was knowingly and intelligently made, for in any event it is too broad. It purports to dispense with the fundamental requirement of a medical examination of petitioner to verify the fact of her addiction. But section 3107 provides only that 'Hearing may be waived' by appropriate consent, not that the various statutory safeguards Preceding a hearing may also be waived. In particular, the authority to waive the actual presence and testimony of physicians at a hearing does not necessarily imply an authority to waive the prior examination and report by such physicians. That examination serves an independent and vital purpose, as we explicitly recognized in Cruz.

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