Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 90-7636

• Decision Date: 18 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-7636,90-7636
• Citation: 944 F.2d 841
• Parties: 58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 486, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,048, 20 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1446 Ann WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDERSON ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS, a Subsidiary of Square D Company, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 841

944 F.2d 841

58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 486,

57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,048, 20 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1446

Ann WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDERSON ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS, a Subsidiary of Square D Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 90-7636.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 18, 1991.

C. Michael Quinn, Ann K. Norton, and Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.

John C. Falkenberry, William F. Gardner; and William K. Thomas, Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before FAY and COX, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant, Ann Walker ("Walker") appeals the outcome of several post-trial motions in which the district court ruled that Walker was not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief, nominal damages, or attorneys fees, despite a jury finding of sexual harassment and invasion of privacy. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 1989, Ann Walker sued both her employer, Anderson Electrical Connectors ("Anderson Electrical"), and her union, Local Lodge 2601, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ¹ claiming that they "condoned and allowed [her] to be sexually harassed by management and personnel for a continuous period, making her working conditions intolerable." Walker also brought pendent state tort claims against Anderson Electrical for invasion of privacy and outrage. ²

Initially, Walker's complaint contained a demand for jury trial only on the pendent tort claims. Following publication of an opinion in which the same district court judge permitted the use of a jury trial to resolve Title VII claims, ³ however, Walker successfully added her Title VII issues to the list of other issues to be heard by the jury. Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 736 F.Supp. 253 (N.D.Ala.1990).

In her complaint, Walker sought relief in the form of back-pay, benefits, lost seniority, loss pension, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs for the alleged Title VII violation. Walker also sought actual and punitive damages for the pendent tort claims. At the pre-trial conference, however, Walker narrowed her grocery list of remedies by dropping her request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction. Walker's position statement, as drafted by Walker and incorporated into the pre-trial order by the court, reads as follows:

As a result of these discriminatory actions of the defendants, the plaintiff seeks back-pay (including interest), benefits, lost seniority and loss pension. The plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages according to proof against the defendants for invasion of privacy and tort of outrage. The attorney also seeks a reasonable attorney's fee, costs, and expenses of this litigation.

Following four days of trial, the jury returned its verdict through the use of special interrogatories. The jury found that Anderson Electrical had committed acts of sexual harassment against Walker in violation of Title VII and had invaded Walker's privacy. However, the jury also found that Walker had sustained no monetary damage, either in the form of compensatory or punitive damages, as a proximate result of these violations. ⁴ In response to the interrogatories involving Local Lodge 2601, the jury determined that the Union had committed no acts of sexual harassment against Walker.

Based on the answers to the special interrogatories, the district court entered final judgment ordering that the "[p]laintiff, Ann Walker, shall have and recover nothing of defendants, or either of them." The court also refused to grant Walker attorneys' fees.

Walker filed several post-trial motions affecting only Anderson Electrical, all of which were denied. In addition to a motion for a new trial on the subject of damages, which is not at issue, all of the motions sought an injunction, a declaratory judgment, nominal damages, and attorneys' fees based on the jury finding of sexual harassment and invasion of privacy. 742 F.Supp. 591. The denial of these motions is the subject of this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A.

At the outset, Walker argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her declaratory and injunctive relief in light of the jury's finding of a Title VII violation. We disagree.

Walker's post-trial motion for injunctive and declaratory relief was interpreted by the district court as a post-trial motion to amend the pre-trial order. The pre-trial order stated that Walker would seek only a money award. The district court indicated that Walker's failure to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief in the pre-trial order, where Walker had initially demanded such relief in her complaint, may have been part of a strategy to achieve a jury trial on the Title VII issues. "The absence of any prayer for equitable relief," the court noted in its Memorandum Opinion of July 9, 1990 "subtracted somewhat from defendant's arguments against trial by jury." ⁵

The court denied Walker's motion to amend the pre-trial order citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(e), which states that the pre-trial order "shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pre-trial conference shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice."

The district court's decision to follow the pre-trial order can be reversed on appeal only where the district court has abused its discretion. Randolph County v. Alabama Power Co., 784 F.2d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 878, 93 L.Ed.2d 833 (1987); Hodges v. United States, 597 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.1979). ⁶ "[W]e realize that for pretrial procedures to continue as viable mechanisms of court efficiency, appellate courts must exercise minimal interference with trial court discretion in matters such as the modification of its orders." Hodges, 597 F.2d at 1018.

While Rule 16(e) requires that the pre-trial order be modified to "prevent manifest injustice," in this case the modification requested by Walker would only serve to work an injustice against the defendant, Anderson Electrical. As the district court pointed out in its Memorandum Opinion of July 9, 1990, "Walker chose her strategy, forcing Anderson Electrical to choose its strategy. It would be disingenuous of any court to find at this late date that this pre-trial order can be modified post-trial in order to 'prevent manifest injustice.' "

We agree with this reasoning and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the pre-trial order. Walker pursued a damages trial and got just that. It would be unfair to Anderson Electrical to give Walker relief which she did not request; relief for which Anderson Electrical was never permitted to establish a defense.

Walker's central argument on this matter is that the district court has not complied with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c). Rule 54(c) states, in pertinent part, that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings." Applying Rule 54(c) to the facts of her case, Walker contends that she is "entitled" to equitable relief based on the jury's finding of sexual harassment even though she abandoned this claim for relief in the pre-trial conference and actively pursued a monetary award. Walker further contends that Rule 54(c) and Rule 16(e) conflict under these facts and that Rule 54(c) prevails in the event of such a conflict.

We see no conflict and find that Rule 54(c) does not apply to this case. Rule 54(c) requires that the district court grant Walker only the relief to which she is "entitled," even when that relief is not requested in the pleadings. But Walker did request a declaratory judgment and an injunction in her pleadings and then abandoned this form of relief at the pre-trial conference in favor of something else, namely a money award. Rule 54(c) simply does not sanction this type of maneuvering. We hold that Walker is not entitled to the relief abandoned in the pre-trial order and affirm the district court's denial of her motion for injunctive and declaratory relief.

B.

Walker next argues that a jury finding of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII mandates a court award of one dollar in nominal damages and that the district court erred by not making such an award. We disagree.

The district court did not instruct the jury on the possibility of awarding nominal damages in the event of a finding of sexual harassment. Walker did not request a charge on nominal damages, nor did she object to the court's failure to make such a charge. ⁷

Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, which states that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection," precludes Walker, at this late date, from objecting to the fact that no jury instruction on nominal damages was given at trial. The federal court's long standing policy against additur, as an intrusion on the jury's domain and violation of the Seventh Amendment, also stands in the way of Walker's request for one dollar in nominal damages where the jury awarded none. See Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440, 1451 (11th Cir.1990); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935).

Walker argues that Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), requires the automatic award of nominal damages upon the finding of a Title VII violation regardless of Rule 51 and the federal courts' dislike of additur. Carey does not,...