Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-379
• Parties: CALVIN GARY WALKER, WALKER'S ELECTRIC, WALKERS ELECTRIC, and JESSIE HAYNES, Plaintiffs, v. BEAUMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AARON COVINGTON, LEROY SALEME, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

CALVIN GARY WALKER, WALKER'S ELECTRIC,WALKERS ELECTRIC, and JESSIE HAYNES, Plaintiffs, v. BEAUMONT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,AARON COVINGTON, LEROY SALEME, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-379

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

July 6, 2016

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court are Plaintiffs' Calvin Walker ("Walker"), Walker's Electric, Walkers Electric, and Jessie Haynes's ("Haynes") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers' ("IBEW") Motion to Dismiss (#127). The court referred this matter to United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin for consideration and recommended disposition of case-dispositive pretrial motions (#55). On June 17, 2016, Judge Giblin issued a Report and Recommendation (#240), wherein he recommended that the court grant in part and deny in part the IBEW's motion, dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against the IBEW in their entirety, and dismiss the IBEW as a party to this case. Plaintiffs filed timely objections (#247) to the report and recommendation. The court has reviewed Plaintiffs' objections and concludes that they are without merit. Therefore, the court adopts the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.

The factual and procedural history of this case was laid out in detail in Judge Giblin's Report and Recommendation and will not be repeated here. On June 29, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their objections to Judge Giblin's report and recommendation on four grounds: (1) Walker's claims of tortious interference and civil conspiracy are not preempted by the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"); (2) Judge Giblin erroneously found that Walker had failed to plead vicarious liability; (3) Walker's claims for tortious interference and civil conspiracy are not barred by limitations; (4) Plaintiffs have properly pleaded all of the elements of their claims under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (c), (d); and (4) that the IBEW cannot be dismissed from this case because its participation in a civil and RICO conspiracy makes it jointly and severally liable for the conduct of all members of the conspiracy.¹

A party who files timely, written objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation is entitled to a de novo determination of those findings or recommendations to which the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). "Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings [to which they object]. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court." Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); accord Bank of America, N.A. v. Ingram, No. 1:12-cv-55, 2012 WL 2524274, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 29, 2012);Flynn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. (Tex.), 605 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (W.D. Tex. 2009); Savage v. Barnhart, 372 F. Supp. 2d 922, 924 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Here, the court has undertaken a de novo review of the report and recommendation and concludes that Plaintiffs' objections are without merit.

I. Discussion

A. Preemption by the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the NLRB

Plaintiffs assert that their claims of tortious interference and civil conspiracy are not preempted by the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB because they do not present an identical controversy to that which would be presented to the NLRB, because they involve matters about which the state has a strong interest in regulating, and because there is little risk of inconsistent holdings between the NLRB and state law.²

As stated in the report and recommendation, Congress has provided no guidance for determining when the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97, preempts a court's jurisdiction over state-law causes of action, and, therefore, courts have "struggled to enunciate a governing theory and to apply it in particular cases." Winfield v. Groen Div., Dover Corp., 890 F.2d 764, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1989). The general rule regarding preemption by the NLRB, commonly referred to as " Garmon preemption," comes from San Diego Building Trade Council v. Garmon, where the Supreme Court of the United States held that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with national policyis to be averted." 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The scope of Garmon is broad and "requires federal preemption of state causes of action 'if they attach liability to conduct that is arguably protected . . . or arguably prohibited' by federal labor relations law." Kaufman v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 274 F.3d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 (2002) (quoting Mobile Mech. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlough, 664 F.2d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1981)).

When analyzing whether a claim is subject to Garmon preemption, courts have rejected a formulaic approach and have held that "the critical inquiry . . . is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application[,] but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . . or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the NLRB." Winfield, 890 F.2d at 767 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 197 (1978)); accord E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Sawyer, 517 F.3d 785, 792-93 (5th Cir. 2008); see Kaufman, 274 F.3d at 201 ("The Court has explicitly rejected a formalistic implementation of Garmon and invited a balancing of state interests and federal regulatory interests in analyzing the preemption question."). "That inquiry requires not only looking to the factual bases of each controversy, but also examining the interests protected by each claim and the relief requested." E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 517 F.3d at 792-93 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 54 v. E.F. Etie Sheet Metal Co., 1 F.3d 1464, 1469-70 (5th Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, the party claiming preemption bears the burden of showing that the challenged conduct is arguably subject to the NLRA. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 396 (1986); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 517 F.3d at 793.

Garmon preemption, however, has two recognized judicial exceptions. First, it does not preempt a court's jurisdiction over conduct that "touches interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that . . . [the court] could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." Kaufman, 274 F.3d at 201 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244). Such interests include "laws prohibiting violence," defamation alleging malice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. at 204; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966) ("We . . . limit the availability of state remedies for libel to those instances in which the complainant can show that the defamatory statements were circulated with malice and caused him damage."). Second, Garmon preemption does not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction "if the behavior to be regulated is behavior that is of only peripheral concern to the federal law . . . ." Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); accord Winfield, 890 F.2d at 769 (finding that Garmon did not preempt employee's claims of breach of contract and fraud based on employer's "personal guarantee" of continued employment because those claims would require only a "discrete, narrow inquiry into the relationship between [the employee] and his former employer"); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. at 200; Farmers v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977); Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.

Plaintiffs do not contest the determination that Walker's claims against the IBEW allege conduct that is arguably prohibited by the NLRA. Instead, they argue that Judge Giblin erred in finding that Walker's claims against the IBEW should be dismissed for the same reasons articulated in Jones. See Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, AFL-CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). They aver that Walker's case is more analogous to Belknap, wherein theSupreme Court found that claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation against an employer brought by replacement workers, hired to replace a number of union members who went on strike, did not fall under either Garmon preemption or Machinists preemption.³ See 463 U.S. at 498; see also Machinists v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.132, 140 (1976). Regarding Garmon preemption, the Supreme Court determined that the dispute at issue was between the replacement workers and their employer and, thus, did not present an identical controversy to the one that would be before the NLRB, which would be between the striking union workers and the employer, and thus Garmon preemption did not apply. Walker further cites the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Winfield, wherein the court determined that Garmon preemption did not bar a plaintiff's breach of contract and fraud claims where the union had already filed charges before the NLRB, which had subsequently refused to issued a complaint. Winfield, 890 F.2d at 766.

In contrast to the Belknap and Winfield decisions, however, both of which were addressed in the report and recommendation, the heart of Walker's complaint against the IBEW is a labor dispute. He asserts that the entire, decades-long conspiracy to ruin his reputation and business stems from the IBEW's attempt to force him...