Walker v. Borland
| Decision Date | 31 July 1855 |
| Citation | 21 Mo. 289 |
| Parties | WALKER, Respondent, v. BORLAND & OTHERS, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
1. In an action of trespass for selling property of the plaintiff under execution against another, the measure of damages, in the absence of any aggravating circumstances, is the value of the property at the time of the trespass and interest to the trial.
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court.
Trespass for the seizure and sale under an execution against James Walker, of a horse, some cows, calves and other cattle belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants were Nancy Borland, the plaintiff in the execution, and her sureties in a bond given to indemnify the sheriff for selling after a sheriff's jury had found the property to belong to the plaintiff. There was a judgment by default for want of an answer, and a writ of inquiry ordered. At the execution of the writ, the plaintiff was allowed to show the present value of the cattle, taking into consideration their growth and rise in value, and the court instructed the jury as follows:
“The criterion of damages in the above case is not the value of the property at the time of seizure and sale, but the jury may allow plaintiff damages for the natural growth of the property since the sale, together with its value at that time.”
“The jury may assess damages in this case to compensate plaintiff for all the damages which he has sustained by reason of the seizure and sale of the property.”
An instruction asked by the defendants that the measure of damages was the value of the property at the time of the seizure by the sheriff, with interest to the trial, was refused.
The defendants appealed from the judgment for the damages assessed under this ruling.
Edwards, for appellant.
Wright, for respondent.
The only point made before us in argument is in reference to the measure of damages, and in this we think the court erred. It is desirable to have as definite and precise rules upon this subject as possible, and a proper administration of justice requires that these rules should be strictly adhered to. It is in vain that the legal rights of the parties are settled by the courts if the amount of compensation for violations of these rights is left to the arbitrary discretion of a jury, and hence it is both the policy and tendency of our law to reduce the measure of damages, in all cases where it is practicable, to fixed legal rules, and to enforce a rigid adherence to them.
“Damages,” Lord Coke (Co. Lit. 257, a) tells us, “hath a special signification for the recompense that is given by the jury to the plaintiff for the wrong the defendant hath done him.” These damages, however, are sometimes vindictive, as well as compensatory. But compensation for the actual loss sustained is the professed object of the law, except where there has been fraud, oppression, malice, or gross negligence; and in these cases, a different rule is adopted, and the jury are allowed to award exemplary damages, not only to compensate the sufferer, but also to punish the offender. (Sedgwick on Damages, 2 ed., 38, 57.)
The most favorable measure of damages for the plaintiff, on account of the wrong here complained of, and that to which, we think, he is entitled, is that which would have been applicable, had the action been against the execution plaintiff for the alleged seizure and sale of the property--trespass de bonis asportatis; and, in that event, there being no aggravating circumstances in the transaction, the damages would have been confined to the actual loss sustained--the value of the property and interest, allowing nothing for the profits the party might have made by raising the stock. It is said by Sedgwick (Law of Damages, 69,) “that both the English and American courts have generally concurred in denying profits as any part of the damages to be compensated, and that, whether in cases of contract or tort.”
In Conrad against The Pacific Ins. Co. (6 Pet. (U. S.) Rep. 268,) which was trespass against a marshal for seizing and selling the property of the plaintiff under an execution against another, the instructions...
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State ex rel. Robertson v. Hope
...ought to be reversed. Karnes & Krauthoff for respondent. (1) Plaintiff was entitled to interest. Polk v. Allen, 19 Mo. 467; Walker v. Borland, 21 Mo. 289; Woodburn v. Cogdal, 39 Mo. 222; Miller Whitson, 40 Mo. 97; Spencer v. Evans, 57 Mo. 427; Charles v. Railroad, 58 Mo. 458; Watson v. Harm......
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Rassieur v. Charles
...gains of some later year. However, that is far too speculative (much more speculative than loss of future profits disallowed in Walker v. Borland, supra, cases disallowing contingent speculative damages cited 10 Mo. Dig. 50, Damages 24) because it depends on plaintiff having a future capita......
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Albers v. Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis
... ... Cape Girardeau , 90 Mo. 377, ... 2 S.W. 302; Waters [138 Mo. 160] v. Waters , ... 49 Mo. 385; Frissell v. Haile , 18 Mo. 18; Walker ... v. Borland , 21 Mo. 289; Haeussler v. Bank , 23 ... Mo.App. 282. The decision in State ex rel. Patterson v ... Tittmann et al. , 134 Mo ... ...
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State, ex rel. Burton v. McKeon
...actions of trespass against sheriffs, marshals, and constables, for making illegal seizures of chattels under judicial process. Walker v. Borland, 21 Mo. 289; Stevens Springer, 23 Mo.App. 375, 385; Eichelmann v. Weiss, 7 Mo.App. 87. We are, also, aware that the same rule of damages has been......