Walker v. City of S.F.

• Citation: 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 423,51 Cal.App.5th 682
• Decision Date: 30 June 2020
• Docket Number: A159563
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jeffrey WALKER, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

51 Cal.App.5th 682
265 Cal.Rptr.3d 423

Jeffrey WALKER, Petitioner,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent;

The People, Real Party in Interest.

A159563

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Filed June 30, 2020

Counsel for Petitioner: Erwin F. Fredrich

Counsel for Respondents: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Lance E Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rene A. Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Moona Nandi, Deputy Attorney General

TUCHER, J.

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Jeffrey Walker petitions for a writ of mandate that would direct the superior court to reverse its finding of probable cause to commit Walker as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Walker argues the superior court's finding was based on inadmissible hearsay contained in two statutorily mandated psychological evaluations. We hold that the SVP statute, which requires

265 Cal.Rptr.3d 424

these psychological evaluations as the basis for an SVP petition, also requires the court to consider the evaluations in deciding whether there is probable cause to proceed to an SVP trial. In reviewing the evaluations, the court may consider hearsay contained within them. Thus, we deny Walker's writ petition.

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BACKGROUND

In June 2015, as Walker neared the end of a state prison commitment, the People filed a petition to commit him civilly as an SVP. The petition was supported by the evaluations of two psychologists appointed by the Director of State Hospitals, Thomas MacSpeiden and Roger Karlsson. Both psychologists concluded Walker satisfied the criteria to be considered an SVP. Their evaluations noted that Walker had previously been convicted of a sexually violent offense—a 1990 conviction for rape. The evaluations also described offenses charged against Walker that did not result in a conviction for a sexually violent offense.

The trial court held a probable cause hearing spanning five sessions in February and March of 2016. At the beginning of the hearing, Walker objected to the admission of the MacSpeiden and Karlsson evaluations on the ground they contained inadmissible hearsay. In particular, Walker objected to portions of the evaluations describing details of two sexually violent offenses for which Walker was charged but not convicted. One of these offenses was a rape charge from 1989 that was dismissed prior to trial, though Walker was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor against the same victim. (See Pen. Code, § 261.5.) A second offense was also an alleged rape, in 2005. A jury acquitted Walker of this charge, though it convicted him of pandering the same victim. The experts obtained details of the conduct underlying these two alleged offenses from a probation report and a police inspector's affidavit.

The trial court overruled Walker's objection to the psychologists’ evaluations. During the probable cause hearing, Walker's attorney cross-examined the psychologists at length about their evaluations, including their reliance on the alleged rapes from 1989 and 2005 that did not result in convictions. Walker also testified on his own behalf and called a number of his own witnesses, including a third psychologist appointed by the Director of State Hospitals who concluded Walker did not meet the criteria to be considered an SVP. Following the hearing, the trial court found there was probable cause to believe Walker should be committed as an SVP.

In September 2016, Walker moved to dismiss the SVP petition. He argued that the psychological evaluations contained case-specific hearsay statements submitted for their truth, in contravention of the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320 ( Sanchez ). The trial court denied the motion. In March of 2017, Walker moved to have the court reconsider the denial of his prior motion to dismiss based on new case law applying Sanchez to SVP trials. The trial court again denied the motion.

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In October 2019, Walker filed another motion to dismiss, this time citing Bennett v. Superior Court (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 862, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 ( Bennett ), which held, relying on Sanchez , that case-specific facts conveyed by two psychologists in their evaluations and testimony were inadmissible at an SVP probable cause hearing. ( Id. at p. 880, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 693.) The trial court denied Walker's motion. Walker challenged the ruling in a petition for writ of mandate filed with this court

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(Walker v. Superior Court (Dec. 2, 2019, A158971 [nonpub. opn.] ), which a different panel of this court summarily denied.

In January 2020, Walker filed another motion to dismiss, this time citing Bennett as well as a second appellate opinion, People v. Superior Court (Couthren ) (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1001, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 603 ( Couthren ). Once again, the trial court denied the motion. Walker challenged the ruling by filing the instant petition for writ of mandate in our court. In response, we issued an order to show cause that directed the parties to address whether Bennett was correctly decided. The matter is now before us for decision.

DISCUSSION

Walker contends the trial court impermissibly relied on case-specific hearsay contained in the psychological evaluations to find probable cause. Absent the inadmissible hearsay, he contends there was insufficient evidence to commit him as an SVP. As we explain, we conclude the statute governing SVP probable cause hearings permitted the trial court to consider the evaluations and any hearsay contained within them. At the probable cause hearing, but not at Walker's SVP trial still to occur, hearsay statements in the reports may be considered even where they are not independently proven by competent evidence or covered by another hearsay exception.

A. The Sexually Violent Predator Act

The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act) ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. )¹ "allows for the involuntary commitment of certain convicted sex offenders, whose diagnosed mental disorders make them likely to reoffend if released at the end of their prison terms." ( Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 235, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654 ( Cooley ).) In order to commit a person as an SVP, the People must show that the person has been convicted of one or more of the sexually violent offenses listed in section 6600, subdivision (b) ; the person has a diagnosed mental disorder; and the mental disorder "makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." ( § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) "The civil commitment can only

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commence if, after a trial, either a judge or a unanimous jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is an SVP." ( Cooley , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 243, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654.)

"The trial, however, is the last stage of a complex administrative and judicial process to determine whether an offender should be civilly committed as an SVP." ( Cooley , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 244, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654.) Before the People may file a petition to commit an inmate as an SVP, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) must first screen the inmate, generally at least six months before his or her scheduled release date. ( § 6601, subd. (a).) "If as a result of this screening it is determined that the person is likely to be a sexually violent predator, the [CDCR] shall refer the person to the State Department of State Hospitals for a full evaluation of whether the person meets the criteria in Section 6600." ( § 6601, subd. (b).)

When the CDCR refers an inmate to the Department of State Hospitals, the Department of State Hospitals "shall evaluate the person in accordance with a standardized assessment protocol, developed and updated by the State Department of State Hospitals, to determine whether the person

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is a sexually violent predator as defined in this article. The standardized assessment protocol shall require assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as well as various factors known to be associated with the risk of reoffense among sex offenders. Risk factors to be considered shall include criminal and psychosexual history, type, degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of mental disorder." ( § 6601, subd. (c).) The offender is first evaluated by two mental health professionals designated by the Director of State Hospitals. ( § 6601, subds. (c), (d).) If both evaluators concur "that the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody," the Director of State Hospitals forwards a request for a petition for civil commitment to the county in which the inmate...